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Abstract 
Background 
Rare diseases and neglected diseases are characterized by deficits in drug research 
and development (R&D) activities owing to market failures. Rare diseases do not 
offer a lucrative market because of the very small numbers of patients affected; 
neglected diseases, in contrast, are highly prevalent, but in poor and marginalized 
populations in developing countries. Public health policy responded to the R&D 
deficit for rare diseases with the adoption of orphan drug acts, i.e. regulatory 
instruments which contain financial and non-financial incentives for the 
pharmaceutical industry to encourage R&D into treatments for rare diseases. 
Similar legislation for neglected diseases does not exist, even though neglected 
diseases were part of the initial concepts which formed the basis for orphan drug 
acts. The debate about applying orphan drug acts to neglected diseases is ongoing in 
the scientific community. At the same time, a draft for an international medical 
R&D treaty has been developed, which proposes to restructure funding for medical 
research and development globally, and to heighten the role and financial 
obligations of the public sector, especially for neglected diseases.  
Objectives 
The prime objective of this research project was to gather stakeholders’ opinions on 
the desirability and the feasibility of implementing a regulatory instrument to 
promote R&D into drugs for neglected diseases. Orphan drug regulations, the draft 
Medical Research and Development Treaty and their R&D-promoting mechanisms 
served as frames of reference. A secondary objective of this project was to explore 
the acceptance and the feasibility of the method of the Policy Delphi for our 
research question. 
Methods 
An international online-Delphi survey was conducted with stakeholders of different 
backgrounds and professional affiliations. Their opinions were compiled and 
ii 
analyzed on causes for the treatment deficit for neglected diseases, on a possible 
definition of neglected diseases, on desirable and feasible measures to promote 
neglected disease R&D, and on the desirability and feasibility of a regulatory 
instrument to foster R&D for neglected diseases. 
Results 
117 (first round) and 56 (second round) stakeholders participated in the survey. In 
both rounds of survey, the majority of the respondents (88.4% first round, 86.8% 
second round) advocated the development of a regulatory instrument to promote 
R&D for neglected diseases. Most respondents (77.9% first round, 79.3% second 
round) also considered this to be a feasible option. With the exception of market 
exclusivity, which was viewed with skepticism, key provisions of orphan drug 
regulations were judged favorably also for neglected diseases. A majority (87.1 % 
first round, 77.2% second round) supported national funding obligations for 
neglected diseases which are proposed by the medical R&D Treaty. 
Conclusions 
While not all features of orphan drug regulations and of the draft Medical Research 
and Development Treaty received equal support, the view was expressed that a 
regulatory instrument would be a desirable and feasible measure to promote R&D 
for neglected diseases. 
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1 Introduction to the Research Project 
“Although health is widely understood to be both 
 a central goal and an important outcome of development, 
the importance of investing in health to promote economic development  
and poverty reduction has been much less appreciated.” 
(from the introductory remarks to the Final Report of the WHO Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health; WHO, 2001) 
 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), more than one billion people 
worldwide suffer from so-called neglected diseases. (WHO, 2006f) Neglected 
diseases are mostly, but not exclusively, tropical infectious diseases, which affect 
poor and marginalized populations in the developing world. About 50% of the 
disease burden in developing countries can be attributed to poverty-related and 
neglected infectious diseases. (WHO, 2006e) Substandard living conditions and a 
lack of clean water and sanitary facilities contribute to the spread and persistence of 
neglected diseases. Neglected diseases, such as leishmaniasis or Buruli ulcer, cause 
immense suffering for the individual patient, and often lead to life-long disability. 
Their accumulated prevalence perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty and disease, 
with long-lasting social and economic adverse effects on entire endemic regions. 
(WHO, 2010g) The persistence and the consequences of neglected diseases are an 
expression of what the WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health 
termed health inequities, that is “avoidable health inequalities” between groups of 
people within countries and between countries.” (WHO, 2008, p. 1) Consequently, 
WHO not only speaks of neglected diseases, but also of “neglected communities”3 
(WHO, 2006d, p. iii)  
The neglect of tropical infectious diseases encompasses the absence of treatments, 
insufficient medical research and development (R&D), and inadequate or no access 
to existing treatments. Poverty, equivalent to a lack of individual purchasing power 
and to financially ill-equipped health systems, is considered the root cause for the 
R&D deficit. For so-called tool-deficient neglected diseases, treatments are either 
completely lacking or inadequate, i.e. expensive, toxic, causing severe side effects, 
                                                 
In its most recent report on neglected tropical diseases, WHO points out that it „may appear inappropriate“ to 
speak of neglected diseases in the WHO context, as the organization „has never neglected them.”. (WHO, 2010g, 
p. 7) 
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or requiring complex administration protocols that precludes their use in endemic 
regions. (Pécoul et al., 1999; Pécoul, 2004) Where treatments are available for 
neglected diseases, drug donation programs have brought temporary relief, yet these 
programs have not been sufficient in volume to reach all affected patient 
populations. (WHO, 2010g) Furthermore, lasting effects of existing controls are 
highly dependent on access to health care, and on reasonable standards of living in 
endemic countries. (WHO, 2006c)  
This research project focuses on the R&D deficit for neglected diseases, and on two 
regulatory approaches to promote R&D into neglected diseases, i.e. orphan drug 
regulations and the draft Medical Research and Development Treaty (MRDT). 
Orphan drug regulations were created to stimulate drug development for rare 
diseases, i.e. diseases with very low prevalences in a given population. To this end, 
they contain incentives for the pharmaceutical industry, such as tax credits, grants, 
fee waivers and several years of market exclusivity for products developed for rare 
diseases. The first orphan drug regulation came into effect in 1983 in the United 
States, and was followed by similar legislation in Australia, Japan and Europe. 
(OrphaNet, 2010c) The success of orphan drug acts, and the perceived similarity of 
the structural R&D deficit between rare and neglected diseases, nourished a long-
standing debate whether orphan drug incentives may also promote drug 
development for neglected diseases. While advocates for the application of orphan 
drug incentives to neglected diseases pointed to their success for rare diseases, 
skeptics referred to the prerequisite of an affluent market to serve their key 
incentive, i.e. market exclusivity. In the absence thereof, little benefit was expected 
from applying orphan drug laws to diseases of poverty. (cf. Bührlen et al., 2003; 
Milne et al., 2001; Trouiller et al., 1999; Villa et al., 2009) 
A different regulatory approach to promoting R&D for neglected diseases was 
taken with the proposal for an international Medical Research and Development 
Treaty (CPTech, 2005b). Proceeding from the notion that current funding for 
medical R&D does not respond to public health needs, the authors and sponsors of 
this document propose national funding obligations for medical R&D, needs-based 
priority setting, and the separation of innovation incentives from drug prices to 
guarantee access to innovative products. The draft MRDT was presented to the 
WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health (WHO-
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CIPIH) in 2005 for evaluation (CPTech, 2005a; WHO, 2006e), and has been 
debated in follow-on WHO expert working groups up to the time of this writing. 
(WHO, 2010e; WHO, 2012g; WHO, 2008) 
Against the background of current debates about regulatory approaches to correct 
the deficit in R&D funding for neglected diseases, we considered it timely, 
worthwhile and of relevant public health interest to explore, among stakeholders of 
various professional backgrounds and professional affiliations in developed, 
developing and threshold countries, the desirability and feasibility of creating and 
implementing a regulatory instrument to promote R&D into neglected diseases. 
Orphan drug regulations and the draft Medical Research and Development Treaty 
served as frames of reference for this project. To obtain quantifiable data, we 
performed a Policy Delphi survey, which follows the characteristic Delphi process 
of anonymous rounds of survey with feedbacks after each round, yet it does not aim 
to achieve consensus among the respondents. Instead, the objective of a Policy 
Delphi is to collect, explore and correlate views from a heterogeneous panel, and to 
present to political decision makers a range of options on which they may base their 
informed decision. (Linstone & Turoff 2002). Delphi surveys have long been 
applied to issues of health policy and health systems research. (cf. Daar et al., 2007; 
de Meyrick, 2003; de Villiers et al., 2005; Mullen, 2003; O'Loughlin & Kelly, 
2004; Schopper et al., 2000) To the best of our knowledge, however, the method 
has not been employed to explore measures to promote R&D into neglected 
diseases. We designed and implemented the Policy Delphi as an international online 
exercise and pursued, as a secondary objective of this project, the aim to examine 
the acceptance and the feasibility of the method for our research question. 
The concept for this research project was developed in 2005, at a time, when the 
debate on innovative financing mechanisms for neglected disease R&D gained 
considerable momentum at the level of WHO. These developments were both 
beneficial and challenging for us. They were beneficial, because they provided 
continuous input and reassurance of the public health relevance of our research 
topic. They were challenging, because at times they had the author question how 
relevant – in the face of intergovernmental working groups – a small project such as 
ours could be. This thesis cannot and will not strive to measure up to international 
commission reports. We had the privilege, however, of interesting more than 100 
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stakeholders in our two-round Delphi survey, who shared their knowledge and 
experience. The objective of a Policy Delphi, according to Turoff (2002), is to 
complement and to support decision-making processes of committee debates. We 
would be more than pleased if the outcome of this study could meet this objective. 
This thesis document is divided into two parts. Part I introduces the issue of 
neglected tropical infectious diseases (Chapter 2 / Statement of the Problem) and 
gives an overview of orphan drug acts, the Medical Research and Development 
Treaty, and the possible application of these instruments to neglected diseases 
(Chapter 3 / State of the Art of Research). Part II presents the methods which were 
applied, and describes the design and implementation of the Policy Delphi survey 
(Chapter 4 / Methods). The results of the survey are reproduced in Chapter 5 
(Results) and discussed in Chapter 6 (Discussion). The survey documentation as 
well as tabulations of frequency data and cross-tabulations are included in the 
Annex. 
  
 5 
2 Neglected Diseases: A Global Public Health Challenge 
The term ‘neglected diseases’ describes a heterogeneous (Aagaard-Hansen & 
Chaignat, 2010) group of predominantly, but not exclusively, tropical infectious 
diseases. As diseases of poverty, neglected diseases thrive in remote rural areas, 
urban slums or areas of conflict and unrest, where people are exposed to disease-
transmitting vectors and lack sanitary installations, adequate supplies of fresh 
water4 as well as access to health care services. (Liese et al., 2010; WHO, 2004a) 
Environmental risk factors, climate change, human-, livestock- and vector-
migration, urbanization, gender and other socio-cultural factors further contribute to 
the prevalence and persistence of neglected diseases (Aagaard-Hansen & Chaignat, 
2010). In the absence of a clear-cut definition, several disease-spanning features 
characterize neglected diseases. The WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health (CMH) ranked diseases from Type I to Type III, based on endemicity, 
burden of disease and pharmaceutical R&D activities. In this ranking, Type I 
diseases describe communicable and non-communicable diseases which are highly 
prevalent in both industrialized and in developing countries (e.g. measles, 
cardiovascular conditions, cancer, diabetes or smoking-related illnesses), and which 
are focused on by the pharmaceutical industry in its research and development 
efforts. Type II diseases include malaria, HIV / Aids and tuberculosis, prevalent in 
both developed and developing nations, but with a significantly higher prevalence 
in the latter. Type III diseases are tropical infectious diseases, prevalent nearly 
exclusively in developing nations, and lowest on the R&D agenda. Type II diseases 
are sometimes labeled ‘neglected’ and Type III ‘very neglected’ diseases (WHO, 
2001, p. 78). 
In 2001, the Médecins sans Frontiers (MSF) / Drugs for Neglected Diseases (DND) 
working group (Depoortere & Legros, 2001) selected parameters to describe the 
degree of neglect of tropical infectious diseases and collected data to establish a 
knowledge base aiming to enable the Drugs for Neglected Disease Initiative 
(DNDi) to select and prioritize research projects. (Ibid, p. 41) The parameters 
included, in short, the existence, the number and the quality of available treatments, 
                                                 
4
 In 2010, 783 million people globally relied on unimproved drinking water sources, and 2.5 billion people had 
no access to improved sanitation facilities. (http://www.who.int/research/en/, Accessed 6.4.2012) 
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diagnostic means or vaccines, the geographic distribution of the disease, prevalence 
and / or incidence rates, mortality / case fatality, and the burden of diseases 
measured by DALYs. Furthermore, R&D activities were assessed by determining 
the number of new chemical entities, ongoing clinical trials, the cost of treatment, 
and, i.a. the number of publications. (Ibid, p. 46 ff.) The working group concluded 
that “the answer basically can be reduced to an economical argument: Neglected 
diseases are those diseases whose treatments – in spite of the disease’s magnitude 
and severity – do not have any market potential, and consequently do not promise a 
profitable financial return.“ (Ibid, p. 43), adding that “to define the concept of 
‘neglected diseases’ is definitely a very complex exercise that has turned out to be 
rather philosophical at points.” (Ibid, p.50)  
In its recent First report on neglected tropical diseases, WHO named the following 
“common features of neglected tropical diseases”: 
 “[a] proxy for poverty and disadvantage 
 [a]ffect populations with low visibility and little political voice 
 [d]o not travel widely 
 [c]ause stigma and discrimination, especially of girls and women 
 [h]ave an important impact on morbidity and mortality 
 [a]re relatively neglected by research 
 [c]an be controlled, prevented and possibly eliminated using effective and 
feasible solutions.” (WHO, 2010g, p. 5) 
The groups of neglected diseases are not entirely homogenous and are further 
subdivided into tool-ready diseases, i.e. diseases for which treatments are available, 
and tool-deficient neglected diseases, for which no treatments are currently 
available. The WHO First report on neglected tropical diseases lists 17 neglected 
diseases (WHO, 2010g) while the Special Programme for Research and Training in 
Tropical Diseases (TDR)5 covers 13 neglected diseases (WHO, 2004b), and the 
WHO Department of Control of Neglected Diseases lists 21, including neglected 
zoonotic diseases, as well as snakebite and podoconiosis. (WHO, 2006a). Four of 
                                                 

 TDR was established in 1975 and is funded by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank and the World Health Organization (WHO). 
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these 21 diseases are considered tool-deficient (Buruli ulcer, Chagas’ disease, 
Human African Trypanosomiasis and Leishmaniases). The WHO Global Plan to 
Combat Neglected Diseases 2008-2015 includes 20 neglected diseases, 
acknowledging that the lists of diseases may differ between regional WHO offices. 
The Plan further subdivides tool-ready diseases into those targeted for elimination / 
eradication, and other tool-ready diseases, and distinguishes them from tool-
deficient diseases; the latter group encompasses four neglected diseases, two 
neglected zoonotic diseases and two-vaccine-deficient viral infections 
(Dengue / Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever, Japanese encephalitis). (WHO, 2007) The 
U.S. Federal Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FFDAAA) 
established priority review vouchers for sponsors of neglected disease products 
which apply to 16 tropical diseases (tuberculosis, malaria, blinding trachoma, 
Buruli ulcer, Cholera, dengue/dengue haemorrhagic fever, dracunculiasis (guinea-
worm disease), fascioliasis, human African trypanosomiasis, leishmaniasis, leprosy, 
lymphatic filariasis, onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis, soil transmitted helmithiasis, 
yaws), whereby the Act stipulates that the list may be extended to include “[…] 
[a]ny other infectious disease for which there is no significant market in developed 
nations and that disproportionately affects poor and marginalized populations, 
designated by regulation by the Secretary.” (United States Congress, 2007, p. 973) 
Table 2-1 below illustrates groups of neglected diseases within WHO. 
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Table 2-1 WHO: Tool-ready and tool-deficient neglected diseases 
 WHO Department of Control of 
Neglected Diseases 
WHO Global Plan to Combat NTDs TDR First WHO 
report on NTDs 
 Tool-
ready 
Tool-
deficient 
Neglected 
zoonotic diseases 
Tool-ready (targeted for 
elimination / eradication 
Other 
tool-ready 
Tool-
deficient 
  
(Blinding) Trachoma x    x   x 
Anthrax   x   x   
Anthroponotic leishmaniasis     x    
Bovine tuberculosis   x      
Brucellosis   x   x   
Buruli Ulcer  x    x  x 
Chagas’ disease (American trypanosomiasis)  x    x x x 
Cystercercosis x  x  x   x 
Dengue/ dengue hemorrhagic fever      x x x 
Dracunculiasis (guinea-worm disease) x   x    x 
Echinococcosis   x  x   x 
Endemic trepanematoses (yaws7, syphilis, pinta)        x 
Fascioliasis   x      
Foodborne trematode infections x  x     x 
Human African trypanosomiasis  x    x x x 
Japanese encephalitis      x   
Leishmaniasis  x    x x x 
Leprosy    x   x x 
Lymphatic filariasis x   x   x x 
Malaria       x  
Onchocerciasis x    x  x x 
Podoconiosis6         
Rabies   x  x   x 
Schistosomiasis x    x  x x 
Sexually transmitted infections       x  
Snakebite6         
Soil transmitted helminthiasis x    x  x x 
TB/HIV coinfection       x  
Tuberculosis       x  
Yaws     x7   x7 
                                                 

 The WHO Department of Control of Neglected Diseases describes podoconiosis and snakebite as “other neglected conditions” (http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/, Accessed August 7,2011) 

 The WHO First Report on neglected tropical diseases includes yaws with the group of endemic trepanematoses. 
Data Sources: 
WHO Department 
of Control of 
Neglected 
Diseases, 
http://www.who.in
t/neglected_diseas
es/diseases/en/. 
Accessed 
3.8.2010; Special 
Programme for 
Research and 
Training in 
Tropical Diseases 
(TDR), 
http://apps.who.int
/tdr/svc/diseases. 
Accessed 
3.8.2010, First 
WHO report on 
neglected tropical 
diseases, 2010; 
WHO Global Plan 
to Combat 
Neglected 
Tropical Diseases 
2008-2015 
(WHO), 
http://whqlibdoc.w
ho.int/hq/2007/W
HO_CDS_NTD_2
007.3_eng.pdf.) 
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As a result of efforts to eradicate tool-ready diseases, to develop treatments for tool-
deficient diseases, and as a possible consequence of resistances being developed to 
existing treatments, the attributions may not be consistent over time.8 To illustrate, 
leprosy and guinea-worm disease (dracunculiasis) are close to shedding the label of 
being neglected. Between 1985 and today, 14,5 million people were cured of 
leprosy; funding for leprosy is considered adequate and the disease is close to being 
eliminated, that is to reach a prevalence rate of less than one case in 10.000 people. 
Equally, the WHO Guinea-Worm Eradication Programme reduced the rate of 
infection from 3,5 million people in 20 endemic countries in the early 1980’s to 
10,000 cases in 9 countries in 2005. (WHO, 2006d) 
At present, neglected diseases are endemic in 149 countries and territories, of which 
about two thirds report two or more and 30 report even six or more diseases. 
(WHO, 2006d) Together with maternal, perinatal and nutrition-related diseases, 
neglected diseases make up more than 50% of the burden of disease in low-income 
developing countries. (WHO, 2006e) 90% of the overall neglected disease burden is 
caused by blinding trachoma, Chagas’ disease, leishmaniases, lymphatic filariasis, 
onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis and three soil-transmitted helminthes. (Hotez et al., 
2009) However, the geographic concentration of neglected diseases in remote or 
marginalized areas of developing countries makes it difficult to gather reliable 
epidemiological data. (cf. WHO, 2004a) Furthermore, in most endemic countries, 
neglected diseases are not subject to compulsory reporting (Ehrenberg & Ault, 
2005), and deficient (health) infrastructures and surveillance systems render little 
information on incidences, prevalences and mortality. Consequently, recent studies 
suggest that the prevalences for neglected diseases are possibly underestimated, 
which, when it comes to funding on the basis of burden of disease, would even 
magnify the extent of their neglect. (Vanderelst & Speybroeck, 2010; Aagaard-
Hansen & Chaignat, 2010) Doubts have also been expressed on the validity of 
disease-adjusted life years (DALYs)9 as proper measurements to reflect the burden 
                                                 
8
 Cf. a. Anderson (2009) who noted with reference to the list of tropical diseases included in the U.S. Federal 
Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007 that: „In addition, the law has provided flexibility to add and remove 
diseases from the list based on new evidence. For example, a reason for updating the list on a periodic basis is 
that new products may become available and be proven effective against a particular neglected disease, at which 
point it may no longer be deemed necessary to provide incentives to spur innovation.“ (p. 1751) 
9The sum of years of potential life lost due to premature mortality and the years of productive life lost due to 
disability. http://www.who.int/mental_health/management/depression/daly/en/), Accessed 13.8.2011 
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of chronic neglected diseases, to describe their effect on the quality of life, and to 
serve as the basis for the allocation of funds. (Conteh et al., 2010; WHO, 2010g; 
Moran et al., 2009b). To illustrate, difficulties had been encountered in assigning 
proper disability weights that would adequately indicate (impaired) function. 
(WHO, 2010g)10 Furthermore, co-morbidity may not have been sufficiently 
considered in the burden of neglected diseases. Patients suffering from neglected 
diseases are not only more susceptible to co-infections with HIV / Aids, malaria or 
tuberculosis (Molyneux et al., 2005); by the same token, morbidity from neglected 
diseases may have serious impacts on the progress and severity of other infectious 
diseases. (WHO, 2010g) Finally, morbidity from neglected diseases can be 
misattributed to other causes, and vice versa, owing to similar clinical symptoms or 
a lack of proper diagnostic tools. (Canning, 2006) As for mortality, neglected 
diseases had long been associated with low death rates, compared to HIV / Aids, 
malaria and tuberculosis; recent data now underline their high impact also on 
mortality in endemic countries. (WHO, 2010g) 
Neglected diseases include bacterial, viral and parasitic infections, and show a 
variety of clinical symptoms, with often devastating long-term effects. Some 
diseases lead to lifelong disabilities which not only results in considerable work day 
losses in the adult population (Ehrenberg & Ault, 2005), especially in agrarian or 
rural societies (Ault, 2008), but which also stigmatizes patients, their families and 
social environment to the point of social marginalization and exclusion. (Ault, 
2008). Especially soil-transmitted helminthes lead to school absenteeism and 
retarded growth and cognitive development in affected children. (WHO, 2004a) 
The economic burden caused by neglected diseases perpetuates a vicious cycle of 
disease and poverty for patients, families, communities and entire endemic regions 
(WHO, 2010d; Niens et al., 2010). Populations affected by neglected diseases are 
impoverished by the cost accruing for treatment; only 2.8 percent of the population 
in low-income countries, mostly in the upper segment of society, are covered by 
health insurance (United Nations MDG Gap Task Force, 2009). At a larger scale, 
neglected diseases thus contribute to a persistent global economic imbalance. 
(WHO, 2001) The lack of reliable data renders it difficult, however, to quantify the 
                                                 
10
 In 2007, a study, funded by the Bill&Melinda Gates Foundation, was initiated to update the Global Burden of 
Disease Study of 1990. Its results are due to be published in 2012. ( http://www.globalburden.org/index.html) 
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true economic burden from neglected diseases. Additionally, it has been underlined 
that figures for economic impacts must not only consider quantifiable work day 
losses, but also take into account the vast burden of unpaid and unquantifiable work 
which is mostly carried out by women in endemic countries (WHO, 2010g) who 
make up 70% of the people living in absolute poverty. (Hampel, 2004) Any proper 
measurement of the impact of neglected diseases and of the return on investment for 
their control must therefore balance costs for prevention, treatment and loss of 
productivity against benefits in (agricultural) productivity, education and poverty 
reduction. (Conteh et al., 2010) 
Geographical confinement to developing countries is a common feature of 
neglected tropical diseases; however, population mobility, including migration, 
travel, or child adoption, leads to a detection of cases in previously non-endemic 
regions. (WHO, 2010g) The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
consider Chagas’ disease as a “Neglected Infection of Poverty in the United States” 
(www.cdc.gov/parasites/resources/pdf/nip_factsheet.pdf, Accessed 19.6.2011)11 
Overall, however, of the 133.000 deaths (0.2% of global deaths) attributed to six 
tropical diseases (trypanosomiasis, Chagas’ disease, schistosomiasis, leishmaniasis, 
lymphatic filariasis and onchocerciasis) in 2008, only 25 occurred in developed 
nations. (WHO Health statistics and informatics Department, 2011) 
Table 2-2 below gives an overview of the causes, prevalences, mortality, DALYs, 
clinical symptoms, long-term effects and economic impact of neglected diseases. 
Diseases in italic print are considered tool-deficient. 
                                                 
11
 In 2009, the first “National Summit on Neglected Infections of Poverty in the United States” was held. (Hotez 
et al., 2010) Currently, Chagas‘ is described as one of the „Neglected Parasitic Infections in the United States“ 
(http://www.cdc.gov/parasites/npi.html, Accessed 26.05.2012) 
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Table 2-2 Causes, symptoms, prevalence and burden of neglected tropical diseases 
(italics= tool-deficient diseases) 
Disease Cause Incidence / Prevalence Deaths in 2008 
DALYs (000s) 
in 2004 Clinical symptoms Long-term effects Economic impact 
Blinding 
Trachoma (incl. 
trichiasis) 
Bacterial 
infection 
(Chlamydia 
trachomatis) 
approximately 84 
people million are 
infected in 57 
countries 
81 1334 
redness, watering, 
swelling, sensitivity to 
light, lumps in the 
eyelid, eye pain, 
corneal scarring, visual 
impairment 
approx. eight million 
people are blind or 
visually impaired; 
leading infectious 
cause of blindness 
worldwide 
2.9 billion U.S.$ p.a. 
lost productivity (8 
billion incl. trichiasis) 
Buruli ulcer 
Bacterial 
infection 
(Mycobacterium 
ulcerans) 
no global prevalence 
rates are available12, 
the disease is endemic 
in approx. 33 
countries; in 2010, 
4.888 new cases were 
reported from 15 
endemic countries 
figures are available 
only on death owing 
to secondary 
causes(sepsis, 
tetanus) 
 
formation of large 
ulcers, destruction of 
the skin 
long-term functional 
disability if untreated 
high economic burden 
on patient and health 
care system; 
treatment cost may 
range from 16-89% of 
a work year per 
household, depending 
on disease stage 
(Ghana 2001-2003) 
and are up to 7 times 
the average health 
spending per person 
(Australia) 
Chagas’ disease 
Vector-borne 
parasitic 
infection 
10 million infections 
in 2009, 35 million 
people at risk in 21 
Latin American 
countries.  
9.887 430 
acute phase: mild 
symptoms, including 
fever, headache, lymph 
swelling, pallor, muscle 
/ abdominal/chest pain, 
difficulties in breathing; 
chronic phase: cardiac 
(~30%) / digestive 
(~10%) disorders, 
neurological/mixed 
alterations 
infection can lead to 
sudden death / heart 
failure 
burden of medical 
care for all 
chronically ill patients 
equals appr. U.S.$ 
267 per annum 
                                                 
12
 WHO recorded various prevalence rates from endemic countries, ranging from 24.000 cases between 1978 and 2006 in Cote d’Ivoire to 144 cases in Australia between 2004 and 2006. The disease may be 
considerably underreported, since reporting BU is not compulsory in many countries. (WHO, 2012c) 
 13 
Table 2-2 continued 
Disease Cause Incidence / Prevalence Deaths in 2008 
DALYs (000s) 
in 2004 Clinical symptoms Long-term effects Economic impact 
Dengue/Dengue 
Hemorrhagic 
Fever (DHF) 
Mosquito-borne 
viral infection 
1 million confirmed 
cases annually, 50 
million infections p.a., 
2,5 billion people at 
risk, endemic in >100 
countries 
16.099 670 
severe flu-like 
symptoms (DF); high 
fever, enlargement of 
the liver, poss. 
circulatory failure 
(DHF) 
 
U.S.$ 587-1.800 
million 
Guinea-worm 
disease 
(Dracunculiasis) 
Parasitic 
infection 
transmitted via 
infested water 
187 countries are 
disease-free or 
interrupted 
transmission; the 
annual incidence 
declined from 892.055 
cases in 1989 to 1.797 
in 2010 
  
oedema, pruritus, 
ulceration, fever, 
secondary bacterial 
infections 
temporary to 
permanent disability  
Human African 
Trypanosomiasis 
Vector-borne 
parasitic 
infection 
endemic in 24 west and 
central African (90% 
of cases) and 13 east 
and south African 
countries(10% of 
cases), 55 million 
people are at risk, the 
estimated prevalence is 
between 50.000 and 
70.000 patients; for the 
year 2009, 9.688 new 
cases of T.b. 
gambiense and 190 
new cases of T.b. 
rhodendiense were 
reported 
54.289 1673 
first stage: fever, 
headaches, joint pains, 
itching; second stage: 
confusion, sensory 
disturbances, poor 
coordination, 
disturbance of sleep 
cycle, seizures, coma. 
100% fatal if left 
untreated 
Fatal if untreated 
~U.S.$ 1.5 million per 
annum loss in income 
from agriculture 
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Table 2-2 continued 
Disease Cause Incidence / Prevalence Deaths in 2008 
DALYs (000s) 
in 2004 Clinical symptoms Long-term effects Economic impact 
Leishmaniases: 
cutaneous (CL), 
mucocutaneous 
(MCL) and 
visceral forms 
(VL, also known 
as kala azar); 
 
Vector-borne 
parasitic 
infection 
estimated prevalence 
of 12 million in 88 
countries13, 2 million 
infections p.a., 350 
million threatened 
with infection 
25.980 1974 
CL: skin ulcers/ lesions/ 
scars,; MCL: partial or 
total destruction of 
mucous membrane,; 
VL: fever, weight loss, 
swelling of spleen and 
liver, anemia 
CL / MCL and VL:. 
disabling, disfiguring; 
VL: fatal if untreated 
 
Leprosy 
Bacterial 
infection 
(Mycobacterium 
leprae), droplet-
transmission 
endemic in 122 
countries, 213.000 
infected, 244.797 
cases were reported in 
2009 
11.716 194  
permanent/progressiv
e damage to skin, 
nerves, limbs and eyes 
if untreated 
 
Lymphatic 
Filariasis 
Vector-borne 
parasitic 
infection 
120 million infected, 
one billion at risk in 
81 endemic countries 
185 5941 
fever, lymphoedema, 
enlargement of arms, 
legs, genitals, vulva and 
breast through lodging 
of worms in the human 
lymphatic system, 
kidney/lymphatic 
damage; asymptomatic 
forms are possible (no 
outward clinical 
symptoms, but internal 
organ affection); 
second leading cause 
of disability 
worldwide, 40 million 
seriously 
incapacitated and 
disfigured 
 
Onchocerciasis 
Vector-borne 
parasitic 
infection 
~ 37 million people 
infected in 30 
endemic countries 
83 389  
severe skin disease, 
visual impairment, 
and blindness; can 
shorten life 
expectancy in those 
infected by up to 15 
years 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Leishmaniases have to be reported in only 32 of 88 endemic countries. (WHO, 2010g, p. 22-23) 
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Table 2-2 continued 
Disease Cause Incidence / Prevalence Deaths in 2008 
DALYs (000s) 
in 2004 Clinical symptoms Long-term effects Economic impact 
Schistosomiasis 
(intestinal and 
urogenital form) 
Parasitic 
infection 
(transmitted via 
infested water) 
207 million people 
infected 44.057 1707 
intestinal: abdominal 
pain, diarrhea, blood in 
the stool, liver/spleen 
enlargement; 
urogenital: haematuria, 
bladder/ureter fibrosis, 
kidney damage, bladder 
cancer, genital lesions, 
vaginal bleeding/pain, 
male infertility 
20 million with severe 
consequences 
(disability weight of 
0.5 probably 
underestimate) 
 
Soil-transmitted 
helminthiasis 
parasitic 
infection 
1 billion people 
infected 
2.777 (ascariasis, 
trichuriasis, 
hookworm) 
 
anaemia, nausea, 
tiredness, abdominal 
pain, appetite loss 
school absenteeism, 
retarded cognitive 
development 
 
(Data Sources: (Niedrig et al., 2006; Aagaard-Hansen & Chaignat, 2010; WHO, 2010f; WHO, 2010c; WHO, 2010a; WHO, 2010b; WHO, 2010g; WHO, 2012c; WHO, 2012h; WHO, 
2012b; WHO, 2012e; WHO, 2012d; WHO, 2012i; WHO, 2012f; WHO, 2012a) 
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In 2003, WHO launched a shift from vertical, disease-specific control efforts to 
population-based, disease-spanning approaches, which was laid down as a strategy 
in the Global Plan to combat neglected tropical diseases 2008-2015. (WHO, 2007) 
The shift took account of the multimorbidity and the geographical overlap that had 
been identified for neglected diseases in endemic countries, of the potential synergy 
effects of combining vertical disease-specific programs, and of the benefits 
expected from linking treatment delivery for neglected diseases with existing 
infrastructure for HIV / Aids, malaria and tuberculosis. (Hotez et al., 2006; 
Molyneux, 2004; Molyneux et al., 2005) For tool-ready diseases, preventive 
chemotherapy programs were launched and implemented as mass drug-
administration; the drugs which are used14 were considered safe enough to render a 
case-based diagnosis expendable in highly endemic regions. In addition to the 
safety and efficacy of the drugs used, benefits named for this strategy include the 
easy administration of drugs which does not require medically-trained staff. 
Furthermore, several drug donation programs by the pharmaceutical industry enable 
treatments free of charge. (WHO, 2010g, p. 22) Nearly 670 million people in 75 
countries had been covered with preventive chemotherapy by the end of 2008. 
(Ibid, p. vii) The challenge remains, however, to secure sufficient quantities of 
treatments, and to deliver treatments to patients on the ground. Thus, the First WHO 
report concluded that targets for coverage cannot be met for some diseases which 
are eligible for preventive chemotherapy owing to a lack of donated drugs or 
insufficient drug production. (Ibid, p. ix) 
Currently, WHO recommends five control strategies for tool-ready diseases, which 
are “(i) preventive chemotherapy; (ii) intensified case-management; (iii) vector 
control; (iv) provision of safe water, sanitation and hygiene; (v) veterinary public 
health.” (Ibid, p. 21) In the absence of effective treatments for tool-deficient 
diseases, mechanisms to their control focus on early case detection, vector control, 
the improvement of environmental, sanitary and housing conditions, and the 
promotion of research and development into drugs and diagnostic tools. (Ibid, p. 25 
ff.) Critics point to an imbalance of control strategies, which focus on biomedical, 
disease-specific approaches and neglect measures to improve national health 
                                                 
14
 Albendazole, mebendazole, diethylcarbamazine, ivermectin, praziquantel, levamisole and pyrantel are used in 
varying combinations depending on the indication for treatment. (WHO, 2010g) 
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systems and basic health care. (cf. Hein & Kickbusch, 2010) Thus, Spiegel et al. 
(2010) argue that the ratio between funds for biomedical research and interventions 
versus research and interventions on the social determinants of neglected diseases 
does not reflect the degree to which improvements in housing, sanitation and the 
environment contribute to reducing the burden of disease. This imbalance, so the 
authors claim, could be corrected if a certain percentage of all funds directed at 
innovations for neglected diseases would be earmarked “to address related socio-
environmental and health system aspects.” (Ibid, p. 1) 
In 1990, the Commission on Health Research for Development calculated that only 
5% of global health expenditure, which had amounted to U.S.$ 30 billion in 1986, 
was spent on health problems in low and middle income countries, in which 93% of 
preventable deaths occurred worldwide. The figure became known as the 10 / 90 
gap (Global Forum for Health Research, 2010) and as a synonym for the neglect of 
diseases of poverty. It highlighted that drugs had become “ordinary commodities, 
subject to the laws and forces of a market economy.” (Depoortere & Legros, 2001, 
p. 43) Between 1990 and 2001, global spending on health research increased from 
U.S.$30 billion to 105.9 billion (Dentico et al., 2005); still, in 1999, North America, 
Europe and Japan made up 82.4% of the global pharmaceutical market. (Trouiller et 
al., 2001) Table 2-3 below, taken from recent data of the G-Finder Reports15, show 
current funding flows for tool-deficient Type III diseases in relation to Type II 
diseases. 
  
                                                 
15
 Against the background that funders of projects for Type II and Type III diseases lacked reliable information 
on funding needs and funding flows, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation supported a project to monitor 
funding flows. G-Finder Reports have been published annually since 2008 
(http://www.policycures.org/publications.html.) Most recently, the data have also been made available in a 
publically accessible database. (https://g-finder.policycures.org/gfinder_report/) 
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Table 2-3 Funding for Type II diseases and for tool-deficient Type III diseases 
 
 2007 2008 2009 
Total Type II and 
Type III  2.560.068.749 2.955.964.344 3.178.605.592 
HIV / Aids, malaria, 
tuberculosis 
U.S.$ 1.961.896.326 2.152.556.487 2.283.225.648 
% of total 
funding 77% 73% 72% 
Chagas’ disease 
U.S.$ 10.099.322 15.555.193 16.697.169 
% of total 
funding 0.39% 0.53% 0.53% 
Leishmaniasis 
U.S.$ 51.270.622 57.742.199 69.384.940 
% of total 
funding 2.00% 1.95% 2.18% 
Sleeping sickness 
U.S.$ 41.368.700 34.490.416 46.398.125 
% of total 
funding 1.62% 1.17% 1.46% 
Buruli Ulcer 
U.S.$ 2.412.950 1.954.465 1.793.717 
% of total 
funding 0.09% 0.07% 0.06% 
Data Sources: https://g-finder.policycures.org/gfinder_report/, Accessed 24.8.2011 
Figures include funds for research, diagnostics, drugs, preventive/therapeutic vaccines, vector 
control/biologic products. 
From the data which they have gathered, the authors of the G-Finder-Report 
analyzed that research funding and investment decisions for neglected diseases may 
not only be guided by science and epidemiology, but also by a presence of product 
development partnerships (PDPs) and civil society groups with active advocacy, 
fundraising and investment activities, by funders’ perceptions and preferences, and 
by a presence of policy frameworks and funding mechanisms that prioritize specific 
diseases. (Moran et al., 2009c) Furthermore, given the lack of supportive structures 
for funders to identify projects and their funding needs, the Reports underline the 
need for better funding coordination to avoid duplication, to coordinate funding 
decisions among donors, and to direct investment towards tools with the highest 
health impact. (Moran et al., 2011) 
Developing countries today are faced with increasing morbidity and mortality rates 
also from non-communicable diseases (Daar et al., 2007; WHO, 2010g) which 
marks a health transition towards a growing double burden of disease. (Hampel, 
2004) Consequently, the focus laid on R&D efforts for Type I diseases by the 
private pharmaceutical sector is said to rightly reflect the low mortality rate of Type 
III diseases and the “convergence of patterns of mortality” (Stevens, 2004, p. 5) in 
both developed and developing countries. Stevens (2004) argues that for most Type 
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III neglected diseases there is no R&D or drug deficit, but an access deficit. (Ibid, p. 
7) Therefore, “[…] in the future, low-income countries will derive significant 
benefit from drugs currently being researched with high-income country markets in 
mind. It would seem rather unjust, then, to vilify the pharmaceutical industry for 
spending research money on finding treatments for these areas; it is a simple case of 
the supply of research following the demand of mortality patterns […].” (Ibid, p.6)  
Little public data is available on the exact costs for pharmaceutical research and 
development; figures relating to drug development differ considerably and range 
from approximately 115 million to 800 million U.S.$ (cf. DiMasi et al., 2003; 
Winters, 2006; Roche Pharmaceuticals, 2003) for a new drug to reach the market.16 
By the same token, “[e]stimates of future funding needs are necessarily inexact 
because of uncertainties about actual costs for each stage of research, attrition rates 
and the number of products entering development in a fast-moving scene.” (WHO, 
2006e, p. 75) Still, to be carried through to marketing approval, medical R&D 
programs must promise optimal return on investments (Webber & Kremer, 2001); a 
lack of purchasing power, i.e. market failure, disincentivizes medical R&D. 
(Hopkins et al., 2007; Herrling, 2007; Pécoul, 2004; Trouiller et al., 2001; Liese et 
al., 2010) Patent protection under the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (WTO-TRIPS, 
www.wto.org) is considered an essential incentive for the private sector to recover 
R&D investments. (Stevens, 2004) For neglected diseases in resource-poor settings, 
however, patents can both fail their incentive function (Winters, 2006) and block 
                                                 
16
 For an analysis of drug development cost s.a. BUKO Pharma, Pharma Brief, 3-4, 2011, available at 
www.bukopharma.de, and Médecins sans Frontières/Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group (MSF/DND) 
(Eds.): Tödliches Ungleichgewicht: Die Krise in Forschung und Entwicklung von Arzneimitteln gegen 
vernachlässigte Krankheiten., available at http://www.aerzte-ohne-
grenzen.de/kennenlernen/veroeffentlichungen/dokumente-zum-herunterladen/publikationen-
medikamentenkampagne/index.html 
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access to innovative products17 (Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), 2007; Médecins 
sans Frontières (MSF), 2005). For reasons of market failure, Type III-neglected 
diseases have long been in the blind spot of pharmaceutical research and 
development. Webber and Kremer (2001) concluded that “[c]urrently, it is not 
financially feasible for private industry to match the level of research investment 
that is socially justified.” (p. 736) The consequence for neglected diseases is that 
R&D programs are either not launched, or that they are discontinued after the 
discovery phase, before the clinical phase, at the development stage, or during the 
process of marketing application. If products for neglected diseases reach the stage 
of market approval, they are often too expensive for patients in developing 
countries, or ill-adapted to conditions on the ground. (Pécoul, 2004). As a result, of 
all drugs approved by the U.S. Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
between 1989 and 2000, less than 1% addressed diseases of poverty (Hubbard & 
Love, 2004); only 16 of 1393 new chemical entities marketed between 1975 and 
1999 were for tropical diseases and tuberculosis, compared with 68,7% with “little 
or no therapeutic gain”. (Trouiller et al., 2002, p. 2189) Trouiller et al. further 
analyzed that, despite considerable advances in understanding the pathophysiology 
                                                 
17
 The TRIPS Agreement of 1995 gives the owner of a (pharmaceutical) patent an exclusive 20-year right of 
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing a product or process. (WTO, 2003b; WTO, 2003a) During 
this time, the patent holder is protected from generic products and free in the pricing of the product. Developed 
countries had to translate TRIPS provisions into national law within one year of the Agreement’s adoption; for 
developing countries, two deadlines were set (2000 and 2005), the longer period being granted to countries 
without prior legislation to protect foreign pharmaceutical patents. Least developed countries originally had to 
comply with TRIPS provisions by the year 2006; the deadline was extended to 2016 with the Doha Declaration 
to the TRIPS Agreement of 2001. Major controversies arose over the TRIPS Agreement and its impact on public 
health. Prior to the adoption of the Agreement, developing and threshold countries with functioning 
pharmaceutical industries, but without a legal structure to protect foreign pharmaceutical patents, had produced 
generic drugs for domestic markets as well as for countries which lacked R&D capacities and pharmaceutical 
patent legislation. Having become States Party to the TRIPS Agreement, they were then only allowed to produce 
generic versions of patented drugs if their governments either negotiated a voluntary license from the patent 
holder or, in case such license negotiation failed, issued a compulsory license (i.e. allow for the production of a 
patented product without consent of the patent owner). Compulsory licenses, however, only permitted the 
domestic use of the generic product. Severe consequences were anticipated from this ruling for least developed 
countries (LDCs), which had been beneficiaries and dependent on the import of cheap generic products. On 
August 30, 2003, a waiver was adopted for the obligation to produce generic products under compulsory 
licensing predominantly for domestic markets. At first glance, these Doha flexibilities, which now also allowed 
exports of generic products to LDCs, seemed to have averted the most serious public health consequences of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Several difficulties were identified, however, in its implementation. Firstly, the application of 
the compulsory license-ruling required complex administrative procedures for which least developed countries 
often lack the infrastructure or know-how. (Cohen-Kohler, 2007) Secondly, it became evident, that pressure was 
being exerted on developing countries to renounce their right to import drugs produced under compulsory 
licenses, and agree to so-called TRIPS+-provisions in bilateral trade agreements which eroded the original 
flexibilities. (Correa, 2006) As a consequence of the latter, the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Innovation and Public Health called upon governments not to include in their bilateral or regional trade 
agreements any provisions that would counteract the flexibilities gained by the Doha Declaration. (WHO, 2006e) 
Another challenge arising from the Agreement concerned the limitation for threshold countries to export generic 
drugs only to LDCs. This ruling lead to low expected sales returns and difficulties with product development of 
generic drugs. In the end, market failure, again, threatened research and development efforts for diseases of 
poverty. (Luppe & Kreischer, 2004) 
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and molecular biology of some neglected diseases, between 1975 and 1999 the ratio 
between new chemical entities per million DALYs stood at 0.55 for infectious and 
parasitic diseases compared to 1.25 to 1.44 for diseases prevalent in developed 
countries. All drugs developed for neglected diseases in the given time, however, 
presented a clear benefit and were included in the WHO Essential Drug List. 
(Trouiller et al., 2002) These figures substantiated calls for an urgent shift from 
profit-oriented towards needs-based priority setting in health research and for “the 
enforcement of regulations and other mechanisms to stimulate essential drug 
development” as well as “[n]ew and creative strategies involving both the public 
and the private sector […]” (Trouiller et al., 2001, p. 945) 
The 1990s had seen a growing awareness of the role which health played in 
safeguarding international security and stability, fostering economic development 
and reducing poverty and inequality. This awareness lead to a rising interest in 
global health issues. (Kickbusch, 2010a) It became apparent that there was an 
urgent need to step up public health efforts and to implement a strategy to promote 
R&D for neglected diseases. (WHO, 2006e) Three of the eight Millennium 
Development Goals targeted health issues 
(http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml, Accessed 6.4.2012), and WHO 
commissions on Macroeconomics and Health, on Intellectual Property, Innovation 
and Public Health and on Social Determinants of Health provided ample data as 
well as policy recommendations to improve health, first and foremost for 
populations in developing countries. Thus, in the year 2000, the WHO Commission 
on Macroeconomics and Health, established to “assess the place of health in global 
economic development.” provided “compelling evidence that better health for the 
world's poor is not only an important goal in its own right, but can act as a major 
catalyst for economic development and poverty reduction.” (WHO, 2002, p. 1) In 
May 2003, with a view to identifying causes and solutions for the R&D deficit for 
neglected diseases, the World Health Assembly set up and tasked a Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (WHO-CIPIH) to “[…] 
collect data and proposals from the different actors involved and produce an 
analysis of intellectual property rights, innovation, and public health, including the 
question of appropriate funding and incentive mechanisms for the creation of new 
medicines and other products against diseases that disproportionately affect 
developing countries…”. (WHA, 2003, p. 2) The WHO-CIPIH concluded that a 
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“conjunction of positive conditions” for a self-sustaining cycle of medical 
innovation, including sufficient public funding for upstream research and a 
substantial market or the protection of intellectual property, was absent for 
neglected diseases. In developing countries, so the Final Report of April 2006 
stated, there is little R&D funding and capacity both in the public and the private 
sector. On the demand side, markets are small and the health sector is underfunded. 
In developed countries, the private sector has little incentive to invest into R&D for 
neglected diseases, and publicly funded R&D also correlates with local disease 
burden. (WHO, 2006e, p. 171 ff.) Consequently, the WHO-CIPIH issued more than 
50 recommendations, directed at national governments of developing and 
developed countries, at WHO and other international organizations, as well as at the 
private sector, encouraging them to promote public-health sensitive approaches to 
intellectual property rights, to step up R&D efforts for neglected diseases, develop 
and implement innovate funding schemes, invest in health infrastructure in endemic 
countries, increase pricing transparency, and reduce drug prices for developing 
countries. (WHO, 2006e) In 2006, an Intergovernmental Working Group was set up 
by the World Health Assembly, which, in May 2008, following a two-year process 
of international consultations, developed a “Global strategy and plan of action on 
public health, innovation and intellectual property”. (WHO, 2008) This document 
included a further call to establish an Expert Working Group on Financing and 
Coordination (EWG), which, having been set up in 2009, evaluated 109 proposals 
on financing and allocation of funding for medical research and development, and 
presented its findings in a Final Report in 2010. In May 2010, a follow-on 
Consultative Expert Working Group (CEWG) was established which introduced its 
Final Report in April 2012. (WHO, 2012g) Also, in 2005, the European Parliament 
(EP) had adopted a comprehensive report on major and neglected diseases 
(European Parliament, 2005), advocating an expansion of the European and 
Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP) program beyond 
HIV / Aids, malaria and tuberculosis to include neglected diseases. The Report 
further supported an inclusion of neglected diseases in any activities of translational 
research planned for the European Union’s Seventh Research Framework 
Programme and called “[…] for collaboration with the pharmaceutical industry on 
poverty diseases, with a new framework proposal for R&D in such diseases, to 
provide incentives for investment, including protocol assistance, fee waivers, tax 
 23 
credits, subsidies, innovation prizes, assistance for prequalification, advance 
purchase commitments and partial transfer of patent rights to drugs;” (European 
Parliament, 2005, p. 11) 
Numerous international or regional organizations, governments, private sector 
companies, foundations and humanitarian organizations18 launched or supported 
measures which aimed to improve local health infrastructure in developing 
countries, strengthen local research capacities, promote technology transfer, prevent 
brain-drain from developing countries, consider a public health-sensitive 
implementation of international patent regulations and create incentives and public 
private partnerships to encourage drug research and development. These 
multifaceted efforts were flanked by debates on priority setting and health 
economics (cf. Berndt et al., 2007; Webber & Kremer, 2001; Canning, 2006), on 
health and human rights (cf. BMZ, 2009; Robinson, 2007; Hunt, 2007; WHO, 
2006b; Razum et al., 2006; Pogge, 2005; WHO, 2005) and on ethics. (cf. Chokshi, 
2008; Coleman et al., 2008; Jayasinghe et al., 1998; Krebs, 2008; Pakes, 2006; 
Stefanini A, 1999; Cohen-Kohler, 2007) Success was indeed made in reducing the 
burden of some tool-ready neglected diseases (WHO, 2006d; WHO, 2010g). 
Furthermore, while up until the end of the last millennium the pipeline for drugs for 
neglected diseases had been nearly empty, Moran et al. (2005) identified dramatic 
changes for the better from the year 2000 onward, owing to the formation of public 
private partnerships (PPP). Having analyzed neglected disease R&D from 1975 to 
2004, the authors found that there were not only 63 products19 under development 
by PPPs by the end of 2004, but that these products were being developed at a 
fraction of the usually calculated costs for drug development. (Ibid, p. 12) 
Multinational companies, so the authors found, were motivated to engage in R&D 
for neglected diseases not for commercial reasons, but for reasons of corporate 
social responsibility, for reasons of “minimising reputational risk stemming from 
failure to address developing country needs” and for strategic reasons, i.a. 
“positioning themselves in emerging developing country markets […];…”.” (Ibid, 
                                                 
18
 Cf. e.g. the WHO „Summary of landmarks in overcoming neglected tropical diseases“ in the First WHO 
report on neglected tropical diseases (2010), p. 9, available at  
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2010/9789241564090_eng.pdf 
19
 Of these, five were for Human African Trypanosomiasis, two for Chagas’ disease, three for Dengue, three for 
visceral leishmaniasis and one for onchocerciasis. The remaining drugs are for malaria and tuberculosis. (Ibid, p. 
19 ff.) 
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p.11) Against the background of changed responsibilities and motivations, the 
authors warned that policy recommendations that called for commercial incentives 
for the private sector to stimulate R&D into neglected diseases, misjudged the 
current situation and might even “shift current company activity from a 
strategic/altruistic approach to a for-profit model, at an additional and probably 
unsustainable cost to the public purse of many billions across all neglected disease 
products.” (Ibid, p. 17) However, while public private partnerships were seen as 
providing “[m]aximum health outcomes for developing country neglected disease 
patients“, they were also threatened by „low sustainability“ owing to their reliance 
on public or philanthropic funding. (Ibid, p. 65) 
The number of actors in the field of global health grew exponentially in the past two 
decades, yet the health situation of the poorest populations has not improved 
significantly. Philanthropy increased funding for diseases of poverty, but also 
produced imbalances when well-funded philanthropic programs cause an internal 
braindrain to the detriment of financially less well-equipped local health systems. 
Thus, WHO leadership was called upon to coordinate global health actors and 
activities and to ensure needs-based priority setting, transparency and 
accountability. (cf. Kickbusch, 2010a) 
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3 A Regulatory Instrument to Promote R&D into Drugs for 
Neglected Diseases: Perspectives on Two Options 
3.1 Option 1: Orphan Drug Regulations - R&D Incentives for Rare 
Diseases 
There is a long-standing debate about adequate mechanisms to promote R&D into 
neglected diseases, taking into account the absence of viable markets in developing 
countries.20 One such option which has been considered is the application of orphan 
drug regulations to neglected diseases. Orphan drug regulations were developed to 
create incentives for the pharmaceutical industry to develop treatments for rare 
diseases. The rationale behind orphan drug regulations was that, without reducing 
the costs of research and development, and without financial incentives, little to no 
research into the development of treatments for rare diseases would be undertaken. 
(European Parliament and European Council, 2000; United States Congress, 1983) 
Occasionally, neglected diseases and rare diseases are grouped under the term 
“orphan diseases” in an attempt to make clear that both groups of diseases have 
been ‘orphaned’ by the pharmaceutical industry in terms of drug research and 
development. (Hogerzeil, 2005) A clear distinction has to be made, however, 
between this comprehensive use of the term ‘orphan diseases’, and the term ‘orphan 
drugs’, which exclusively describes drugs for rare diseases. (EURORDIS, 2009) 
The following paragraphs will give an overview of the topic of rare diseases, of the 
history of orphan drug acts, and of their current application, successes and deficits. 
Rare diseases are a heterogeneous group of diseases which span all medical 
disciplines. (cf. www.orpha.net) Between 5.000 and 8.000 rare diseases are known 
today, eighty percent of which are genetic diseases. The majority of the known rare 
diseases are chronic, severe or even life-threatening.21 (Wetterauer & Schuster, 
2008) There are no globally applicable prevalence or incidence limits for rare 
                                                 
20 Cf. Trouiller et al. (2002), who highlighted that in OECD countries, annual public spending for drugs amount 
to $ 239 per capita, compared to less than $ 20 per year per capita in most developed countries on all health 
programs, and less than $ 6 in sub-Saharan Africa, including drugs. (p. 2191) 
21
 To receive orphan drug designation for a medicinal product under the European orphan drug regulation, a 
disease has to  be a „[…] life-threatening or chronically debilitating condition affecting nor more than five in 10 
thousand persons in the Community […]“(European Parliament and European Council, 2000) 
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diseases. Instead, national or regional orphan drug acts22 determine what constitutes 
a “rare” disease. Patient numbers for each rare disease are low, the total population 
of patients afflicted with them, however, is not. (Table 3-1) 
Table 3-1 Rare disease prevalence limits and estimates 
Rare Disease Prevalence Limit (in 10.000 people) Rare disease prevalence estimates 
U.S. EU Japan Australia U.S.: N (% of total population) 
EU: N (% of total 
population) 
7 / 10.000 5 / 10.000 4 / 10.000 1.1 / 10.000 25 million (approx. 8.4%)+ 
13.5 to 25 million (3-
6%)* 
     
27 to 36 million 
(6-8%)**  
+(Knight & Senior, 2006), *(Aymé & Schmidtke, 2007; Wetterauer & Schuster, 2008) **(EMA, 
2011) 
Rare diseases bring particular hardships upon patients, on top of the severity and 
chronicity of the disease. In a survey conducted in 2005 among 5.980 patients, the 
European Organisation for Rare Diseases (EURORDIS) found that 40% of the 
respondents had been misdiagnosed at disease onset, and 25% had waited between 
five and 30 years for a correct diagnosis; 33% of the survey participants had 
received inappropriate medication, and 16% had undergone inappropriate surgery. 
(Knight & Senior, 2006; EURORDIS, 2009) For the vast majority of the known 
rare diseases, scientific knowledge about the causes are still lacking. (EMA, 2011) 
Medical experts, as well as patients, are few and geographically dispersed, and 
special coordinative efforts, sometimes across national borders, are necessary to 
conduct multi-center or multinational clinical trials. For many rare diseases, valid 
diagnostic procedures and therapeutic guidelines are lacking, and available 
treatments often only alleviate the symptoms, but cannot cure the disease. The 
heterogeneity of rare diseases had long overshadowed ‘rarity’ as a common 
denominator and as a cause for unique infrastructural problems. (Aymé & 
Schmidtke, 2007; Wetterauer & Schuster, 2008) The small number of patients 
equals a small market for the pharmaceutical industry and, in view of the high 
                                                 
22
 Over the past decades, legislation on orphan drugs has been implemented in the United States (1983), 
Singapore (1991), Japan (1997), Australia (1998) and the European Union (2000). An overview of orphan drug 
regulations worldwide is available at http://www.orpha.net. The Singapore “Orphan Drugs Exemption” does not 
contain epidemiological criteria for rare diseases and defines them as life threatening and severely debilitating; it 
further differs from the other orphan instruments in that it does not provide for financial incentives or market 
exclusivity, but only serves to regulate the import of drugs for rare diseases to Singapore. (OrphaNet, 2010a) 
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development costs for drugs,23 rare diseases offer little investment incentive. (Denis 
et al., 2009) 
The orphaning of drug development for rare diseases is traced back to 1962, when, 
following the thalidomide tragedy, the Kefauver-Harris amendments to the U.S. 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act were passed which required that controlled 
studies be performed for all drugs to prove that they are safe and effective.24 Costs 
of drug development rose, and as a result, the pharmaceutical industry orphaned 
drugs for small patient populations for the sake of research and development into 
more common diseases. (Haffner et al., 2002) Even where treatment options for a 
rare disease were discovered during research into a more common disease, it was 
rarely possible to find sponsors to pick up the findings and carry the research 
through to clinical trials, product development and marketing approval (Haffner, 
1991). To aggravate, if the data were part of published research, they were no 
longer eligible for patenting, and there was no further perspective for return on 
investment. (Rogoyski, 2006) In the 1970s, however, as a consequence of the lack 
of a public health strategy to promote R&D for rare diseases, patients and their 
families in the United States joined forces, demanded a right to equal medical 
attention and treatment, and called for political action. (National Organization for 
Rare Disorders, 2007) Their commitment contributed to the adoption of the first 
orphan drug regulation, the U.S. Orphan Drug Act of 1983. An Interagency Task 
Force on Significant Drugs of Limited Commercial Value (Interagency Task Force 
to the Secretary of Health, 1979) was convened by the Bureau of Drugs of the Food 
and Drug Administration and charged with the task “to propose a policy, action and 
means to meet the recognized problem of inadequate source and motivation for 
development and distribution of useful drugs deemed to have little or no 
commercial interest.” (Ibid, p. 4) The Task Force clearly acknowledged the role 
played by “health consumer activism” (Ibid, p. 5) in pushing government action 
towards incentives for rare disease research and development. For  about a decade, 
                                                 
23
 Figures on drug development costs are controversial and range from approximately 110 million (cf. Médecins 
sans Frontières (MSF) & Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative, 2001) to 800 million U.S.$ (DiMasi et al., 
2003; Roche Pharmaceuticals, 2003) for a new drug to reach the market. The process can take between two to 
four years for the screening and discovery phase, and another eight to nine years for the clinical testing phase. 
(Trouiller et al., 1999) 
24 Cf. a.  
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/PromotingSafeandEffectiveDrugsfor10
0Years/default.htm 
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the Task Force performed research into different options25, including surveys 
among stakeholders, before the United States Congress adopted the Orphan Drug 
Act (ODA), which would become a blueprint for similar legislation in Australia, 
Japan and the European Union.26 The objective of the ODA was to encourage the 
pharmaceutical industry to step up R&D for rare diseases. To this end, it offered 
incentives that would support the process at different stages, i.e. grant programs, 
assistance in the design of protocols for clinical trials, tax credits for qualified 
clinical testing, fee waivers for regulatory application processes, and a seven-year 
market exclusivity for orphan products upon marketing approval.27 (Haffner, 1991) 
A “principle of integrity” (Interagency Task Force to the Secretary of Health, 1979, 
p. 2) was to be observed, ensuring that the incentives granted must not compromise 
the safety or effectiveness of a rare disease treatment. 
Following its adoption in 1983, the U.S. Orphan Drug Act was amended in 1984, 
1985 and in 1988. The first amendment of 1984 defined epidemiological criteria, 
stipulating that orphan drug designation would be awarded to products that target 
diseases which affect less than 200,000 persons in the U.S. 28, and to those which 
affect more than 200,000 persons in the U.S., but for which there is no reasonable 
expectation that the U.S. sales will recoup the investment. (Haffner, 1991) Prior to 
                                                 
25
 In 1974, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration established an Interagency Committee on Drugs of Limited 
Commercial Value, which, in its 1975 Interim Report, called for more detailed investigations into the issue of 
rare disease research and development deficits. The Interim Report was followed by a report on the Control of 
Huntington’s Disease, by government appeals to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, and by the 
creation of a Task Force in 1978, whose concluding report in 1979 became „the basic legislative and regulatory 
approach and provisions for orphan product development“. (Haffner, 1991, p. 606) 
26
 The U.S. Orphan Drug Act (ODA) of 1983 amended the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act through the 
establishment of an orphan drug designation and of incentives measures, the Public Health Service Act through 
the creation of an Orphan Products Board, and the U.S. internal revenue code through tax credits for qualified 
clinical testing expenses. Additionally, it “provided authority for the FDA Orphan Products Grants Program” to 
make grants for qualified clinical testing expenses. (Department of Health and Human Services - Office of 
Inspector General, 2001; United States Congress, 1983) 
27
 Market exclusivity for an orphan drug only refers to the orphan indication for which marketing approval has 
been sought. The same drug may be approved for marketing within the seven-year period if the application is for 
another indication. Conversely, another drug for the same orphan indication may be approved for marketing 
within the seven-year period if the first sponsor is unable to provide sufficient quantities of the drug, if he 
consents to the approval of another application or if another drug proves clinically superior to the drug which 
was approved first. (Department of Health and Human Services - Office of Inspector General, 2001) 
28
 The prevalence limit for rare diseases in the United States initially was an “arbitrary ceiling based on the 
estimated prevalence of narcolepsy and multiple sclerosis.” (Department of Health and Human Services - Office 
of Inspector General, 2001) 
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this amendment, a medicinal product had been awarded orphan drug designation29 
if it occurred “so infrequently in the United States” (United States Congress, 1984) 
that a lack of economic viability would otherwise have hampered, or precluded, its 
development. Owing to this demand for proof of lack of economic viability, the 
pharmaceutical industry had been hesitant to submit applications for orphan drug 
designations during the first year of the Act’s enforcement. (Leis García, 2004) The 
second Amendment, adopted in 1985, established access to a Federal Grant 
Program; furthermore, it extended the market exclusivity privilege to patented and 
patentable orphan drugs. (United States Congress, 1985) Previously, only 
unpatented or unpatentable drugs had been awarded market exclusivity under the 
Orphan Drug Act; the United States Congress had been convinced that patents 
would provide sufficient incentive for an investment into rare disease treatments. 
(Leis García, 2004) The 1985 Amendment took account of the fact that, while it had 
been easy to identify unpatented drugs, it seemed difficult to assess a drug’s 
patentability. (Rogoyski, 2006, p. 5) The 1988 Amendment, eventually, established 
that a request for orphan drug designation must be filed prior to the submission of 
an application for marketing approval; originally, such request could be filed 
anytime before marketing approval. (Haffner, 1991; United States Congress, 1988) 
This ruling, however, only applies to the unapproved orphan use of a drug; the drug 
may have been approved for other indications already. (Seoane-Vazquez et al., 
2008) From its adoption in 1983 to the year 2009, 2002 applications for orphan 
drug designation were approved, and 352 drugs to treat rare diseases received 
marketing authorization in the United States. (Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, 2009) To 
compare, in the ten years before the passing of the Orphan Drug Act, only ten 
orphan drugs had been approved for marketing. (Grabowski, 2005) Against the 
background of these figures, the U.S. Orphan Drug Act and the choice of its 
incentives have been described as a “tremendous success” (Leis García, 2004, p. 1) 
and even “the most successful US legislative actions in recent history” (Haffner et 
al., 2002, p. 821). Initial appropriations for rare disease research were $ 500,000 per 
annum for the first year of the ODA’s implementation in 1983 (Haffner et al., 
                                                 
29
 To benefit from incentives under the ODA, a sponsor has to file an application for orphan drug designation of 
a medicinal product with the FDA Office of Orphan Products Development. The application has to contain 
“details on the rare disease for which the drug will be investigated, the specific indication for the drug, a 
description of the drug, documentation of disease prevalence, and the regulatory and marketing status and history 
of the product.” (Department of Health and Human Services - Office of Inspector General, 2001) 
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2002). The amount rose to currently $ 30 million per annum for the fiscal years 
2008 through 2012. (United States Congress, 2007) 
In the course of the ODA’s implementation, it has been questioned, however, 
whether the increase in orphan drug development was truly the result of ODA 
incentives, particularly of market exclusivity.30 In fact, studies on the performance 
of orphan drug acts indicated that the role of market exclusivity as an incentive may 
have been overestimated (Rogoyski, 2006; Seoane-Vazquez et al., 2008) The 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) report on the ODA’s impact 
found that “The lack of exclusivity, however, does not prevent companies from 
entering the market through conventional means.”. (Department of Health and 
Human Services - Office of Inspector General, 2001, p. 8) Orphan product 
development may also have increased as a result of developments in patent law31 
and of the growth of the pharmaceutical and biotech industry in the early 1980s. 
(Rogoyski, 2006) Likewise, the very incentives of the Orphan Drug Act may have 
triggered the rapid increase of the biopharmaceutical industry, since the perspective 
of monopoly profits through market exclusivity enabled these firms to attract 
venture capital. (Leis García, 2004) Moreover, since the adoption of the ODA 
Amendment of 1985, orphan drugs could be patented or patentable products; some 
orphan drugs even hold a patent life which extends beyond a seven year-market 
exclusivity. The considerable number of patented drugs with additional market 
                                                 
30
 In its report on the impact of the Orphan Drug Act, the Office of Inspector General judged that “Other 
incentives, including tax credits and the waiver of user fees, are not nearly as critical as the prospect of marketing 
exclusivity, which is especially important to small companies trying to raise public and private capital.” 
(Department of Health and Human Services - Office of Inspector General, 2001, p. 8) 
31
 Rogoyski (2006) argues that a Supreme Court ruling in the early 1980s, which allowed the patenting of 
engineered bacteria and thus “set the stage for the development of the biopharmaceutical industry” (Ibid. p.17), 
as well as the creation of a Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, which “immediately took a pro-
patent stance” (Ibid. p.17) had been “omitted from the Official Story” (Ibid. p. 16) of the increase in orphan 
product development. Such increase would further mirror the growth of the pharmaceutical and the biotech 
industry, which, between 1980 and 2003, increased its R&D spending from 2 billion to 33 billion U.S.$. 
Additionally, patent life was extended following the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 (extension of patent terms for 
up to five years to compensate the sponsor for time lost during marketing approval time) and through the 
Prescription Drug User Fees Act (PDUFA) of 1992 (sponsors had to pay FDA user fees for marketing approval 
which the FDA invested in the number of reviewers to speed up the approval process) The average time between 
application and approval for marketing authorization thus decreased from 30 to 18 months and the current 
average patent life for an approved drug ranges between 11 and 12 years. (Ibid. p. 18) 
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exclusivity32 cast doubts on the sole effect of this ODA incentive as the chief 
driving force behind rare disease R&D. It lead to the hypothesis that the ODA and 
its market exclusivity incentive may have been “superfluous this whole time” 
(Rogoyski, 2006, p. 21), and only served a minority of “developers of unpatentable 
drugs, and drugs for which patent protection will expire within seven years of 
approval. For the patented remainder, the ODA […] has theoretical value as a form 
of insurance.” (Ibid. p. 22), for instance in the case of patent litigations. 
Apart from being questioned as the sole driving force for orphan product 
development in the U.S., market exclusivity has been criticized as a method to 
“privatize something that is in the public domain, such an [sic!] invention paid for 
by tax dollars, or a patent that has expired.” (Love, 1999). And even though in 
passing the Orphan Drug Act, “Congress concluded that the benefits of access to 
new treatment outweighed the costs of granting a monopoly […].” (Department of 
Health and Human Services - Office of Inspector General, 2001, p. 10), rising costs 
for medical care, unaffordable orphan drugs and abuses of the ODA incentives 
triggered calls for the Act’s reform. (Thoene, 1991) Several attempts were made to 
correct what was perceived as public health deficits in the Orphan Drug Act. The 
U.S. House Resolution (H.R.) 4638 (1990) proposed that orphan drug designations 
shall not only be awarded on the basis of prevalence data at the time of the request, 
but also “on the basis of projections as to the number of persons who will be 
affected by the disease or condition 3 years from the date the request for designation 
of the drug is made […].”(Rep Waxman, 1990) The objective was to limit the 
number of “expanding orphan diseases”, i.e. diseases which surpass the prevalence 
limit for rare diseases within the period of market exclusivity. (Pulsinelli, 1999 p. 
323, as quoted in Leis García, 2004, p. 20) Additionally, H.R. 4638 aimed to open 
the market for other sponsors if, during the period of market exclusivity, prevalence 
criteria for a rare disease were no longer met. This would have amended the 
provision of the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 which stipulates that other drugs for the 
same indication can only be approved for marketing if the sponsor was unable to 
                                                 
32 Rogoyski (2006) found that 41% of the orphan drugs approved between 2001 and 2003 were unpatented or 
had a patent term which was due to expire before the onset of the seven year-market exclusivity; 28% were 
unpatented or had a patent term which would expire within the seven year-market exclusivity; 79% of the 
approved orphan drugs had patent protection, for 72% of these, patent protection extended beyond the seven 
year-market exclusivity. The author concluded that the “true engine of orphan drug development has been the 
patent system” and that the “ODA may not be the dominant incentive for orphan drugs”. (Ibid. p. 21) 
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provide sufficient quantities of the drug or if he consented to the approval of 
additional licenses. The draft amendment also proposed to allow shared market 
exclusivity in cases in which it was found that drugs for a rare disease had been 
developed simultaneously.33 (Rep Waxman, 1990) Orphan drug sponsors’ criticized 
this proposal, arguing that the prospect of having to share market exclusivity would 
“disturb initial financial risk assessment”. (Leis García, 2004, p. 21) In 1992 and 
1994, further draft amendments to the ODA were introduced, which would have 
shortened the time of market exclusivity, this time on the basis of profits from sales. 
The 1992 draft amendment proposed a sales cap of U.S.$ 200 million after which 
market exclusivity would end for an orphan product, while the 1994 draft 
amendment suggested that market exclusivity be terminated after four years, unless 
the sponsor proved that the drug was still of “limited commercial potential”. (Rep 
Waxman, 1994) In this case, exclusivity would be extended for another two years. 
Neither of the draft amendments were adopted, which was attributed to a lack of 
willingness on the part of drug developers to disclose their sales data. (Leis García, 
2004) Indeed, a hesitant stance towards disclosure of economic data had been said 
to have brought about the first amendment to the Orphan Drug Act, i.e. the decision 
to remove the requirement that a company prove the lack of economic viability of a 
potential orphan drug. By the same token, efforts were unsuccessful to introduce a 
windfall profit tax on all “profits accruing from the marketing of orphan drugs 
above a given threshold” (Leis García, 2004, p. 23; refering to Pulsinelli, p. 335-
336). This had been implemented in Japan, and it had actually been suggested by 
the Interagency Task Force of 197934. Even though the above draft amendments 
were not enacted, they were said to have created a climate of uncertainty which 
“was significant enough to postpone growth of orphan drug designations and 
approval for at least five years. […] Such events should remind potential ODA 
reformers of the sensitivity of rare disease research.” (Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, 
                                                 
33
 For the purpose of the amendment, simultaneous development meant that the second application for orphan 
drug designation had to be filed no later than six months after the publication of the first designation; clinical 
trials on which the second application for approval were based upon had to be initiated no more than 12 months 
after the first applicant’s trials, and the application for approval of the second drug had to be submitted no later 
than 12 months after the application for approval for the first drug. (Rep Waxman, 1990) 
34
 The Japanese orphan drug regulation provides for a 1% sales tax on orphan drugs with a profit beyond 100 
million Yen p.a. until the subsidy has been repaid. (Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, 2009) Similarly, the Report of the 
Interagency Task Force on Drugs of Limited Commercial Value underlined that “Sponsors aided through this 
program who realize a profit must be willing to share such profits, currently or retroactively, to repay in whole or 
in part, any subsidy or other incentive granted.” (Interagency Task Force to the Secretary of Health, 1979, p. 60) 
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2009, p. 5) Another public health concern which became apparent in the course of 
the application of the U.S. Orphan Drug Act were so-called pseudo-orphans 
products. While, under the ODA, only medically plausible subsets of a disease are 
eligible for orphan designation, the increasing ability to differentiate diseases made 
it difficult to distinguish between arbitrary and medically plausible subsets. (cf. Leis 
García, 2004, p. 28 ff.)35. Some sponsors ‘salami-sliced’ common diseases into 
subsets with low prevalences so that unpatentable products for these subsets, or 
products whose patenting process moved at a slow pace, became eligible for orphan 
drug designation. (Thoene, 1991). Critique has also been expressed about the 
incentive of tax credits, which are said to make the tax payer pay twice for an 
orphan product – once for the incentive, and a second time if costs for orphan 
products are reimbursed by health insurance plans. (Seoane-Vazquez et al., 2008) 
In sum, the U.S. Orphan Drug Act pioneered legislation to promote R&D for rare 
diseases, and its financial and non-financial incentives contributed to the 
development of orphan products. Market exclusivity, tax credits, grants and 
protocol assistance supported orphan drug R&D at different stages, while pseudo-
orphans and blockbuster sales of publically-funded orphan drugs continue to fuel a 
debate about amendments to the Act, and about incentive-based approaches to 
promoting orphan drug development in general. Some of the controversial issues 
surrounding the U.S. ODA were addressed several years later in the process of 
developing similar legislation in the European Union. 
The Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on orphan medicinal products entered into force on 22 January 2000. (European 
Parliament and European Council, 2000) Its adoption was preceded by expert and 
stakeholder consultations, and drew on the experiences made with the U.S. Orphan 
Drug Act. (European Commission, 1998) The EU Regulation grants ten years of 
market exclusivity for an authorized orphan product in the European Union, 
compared to seven years under the U.S. Orphan Drug Act. It stipulates that market 
exclusivity can be derogated, and another product for the same therapeutic 
indication can be placed on the market, if the holder of the first authorization 
                                                 
35
 One distinction between an arbitrary and a medically plausible subset would be that the therapy for a 
medically plausible subset must not be beneficial for the main group of patients. (Enzmann & Lütz, 2008) 
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consents to it, if he is unable to supply the product in sufficient quantity or if the 
competing product is clinically superior. Furthermore, a Member State may request 
to have the status of market exclusivity reviewed after five years based on 
indicators that the product has become sufficiently profitable. Should sufficient 
profitability be established, market exclusivity can be reduced to six years. 
(European Commission, 2008b) The EU Regulation includes fee waivers for 
services offered by the European Medicines Agency, the volume of which is 
dependent on whether the applicant qualifies as a small-or-medium-sized enterprise 
(SME)36. Protocol assistance for sponsors of designated orphan products is offered 
as a form of scientific advice which includes guidance on the significant benefit-
criterion37 for orphan products. (EMEA, 2002; EMEA, 2003) Requests for protocol 
assistance have steadily increased since the adoption of the Regulation (cf. 
Table 3-2 below). (EMA, 2006) 
Table 3-2 Applications for orphan drug designation and requests for protocol assistance 
Year Designated orphan drugs Requests for protocol assistance % of Applications 
2000 8 4 50,0% 
2001 70 4 5,7% 
2002 56 13 23,2% 
2003 55 25 45,5% 
2004 63 35 55,6% 
2005 88 58 65,9% 
2006 80 58 72,5% 
2007 94 68 72,3% 
2008 73 56 76,7% 
2009 106 77 72,6% 
(Data Source: EMA Annual Reports 2000 – 2009, available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/htms/general/direct/ar.htm, Accessed Jan. 23, 2011) 
Since no taxes are levied at European level, the EU orphan drug regulation does not 
include tax credits. (Dear et al., 2006) Neither does it include research funding; 
orphan designation, however, makes a sponsor eligible for EU funding earmarked 
                                                 
36
 For non-SMEs, the fee waiver for marketing authorization is 50%, for SMEs it is 100%. (EMA Annual 
Reports 2000–2009, available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/htms/general/direct/ar.htm, Accessed Jan. 23, 2011) 
37
 Art. 3 of EU Regulation No 141/2000 stipulates that a product can receive orphan designation if it can be 
established, i.a. “(b) that there exists no satisfactory method of diagnosis, prevention or treatment of the 
condition in question that has been authorised in the Community or, if such method exists, that the medicinal 
product will be of significant benefit to those affected by that condition.” (European Parliament and European 
Council, 2000) 
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for rare diseases38. The EU Regulation calls upon EU Member States to 
complement EU incentives with mechanisms at national level, such as funding of 
national research projects, scientific and / or administrative advice or fee reductions, 
and tax credits39.  These incentives are collated in an Inventory. (European 
Commission, 2006b) In the 2006 statutory general report, the European 
Commission noted, however, that national incentives were still wanting, and that 
Members States had not satisfactorily complied with the request to report measures 
which they have established. The European Commission and the EU Council 
recently renewed their call on Member States to step up national endeavors. 
(Council of the European Union, 2009; European Commission, 2008a) 
To take advantage of the incentives contained in the EU Regulation, a sponsor must 
prove that a medicinal product is meant to diagnose, prevent or treat a life-
threatening or chronically debilitating condition. Furthermore, he must prove that 
the condition a) does not affect more than 5 in 10,000 people in the Community40 
(prevalence criterion41) or b) would not generate sufficient profit to justify the 
investment (economic criterion). If treatments for the given indication are already 
available, the sponsor must prove the significant benefit of the product which is 
subject to the application for orphan drug status (significant benefit criterion). 
(European Commission, 2000) Significant benefit is assessed twice in the drug 
development process; once for the designation of a medicinal product as orphan 
drug, and at this stage with more lenient criteria, and a second time at the point of 
application for marketing authorization, this time with stricter criteria. (EMA, 
2010a) A Committee on Orphan Medicinal Products (COMP) at the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) is charged with the Regulation’s implementation. 
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 Funding for rare disease research activities at EU level has been granted through one of the eight Action 
Programmes of the Framework for Action in the Field of Public Health (1999-2003), in the follow-on First EU 
Public Health Programme (2003-2008) and currently in the Second EU Public Health Programme (2008-2013) 
(European Commission, 1998, p. 11). Additionally, funding has been made available under the European 
Framework Programmes (FP) for Research and Technology Development. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/research/health/medical-research/rare-diseases/index_en.html) 
39
 In fact, in the proposal to the EU regulation, tax credits were considered the most beneficial incentive at 
national level. (European Commission, 1998) 
40 The prevalence limit for rare diseases in the European Union was initially set in the Community action 
programme on rare diseases (1999-2003) and maintained in the EU orphan drug regulation. 
41
 Experiences from the U.S. Orphan Drug Act had shown that a sole economic criterion did not suffice to 
encourage the private sector to take advantage of orphan drug incentives, as this criterion required financial 
disclosures, which, at the point of application for orphan drug designation, may be considered speculative. The 
prevalence criterion that was added to the U.S. ODA with an Amendment in 1984 was thus included in the EU 
Regulation from the beginning. (Aymé & Schmidtke, 2007) 
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Applications for the designation of medicinal products as orphan drugs can be 
submitted to the COMP at any stage of drug development prior to the application of 
marketing authorization.42 Once a product receives orphan drug designation, it is 
included in the Community Register of Orphan Medicinal Products43 and becomes 
eligible for Community incentives. Orphan products are removed from the 
Community Register a) at the request of the sponsor, b) if, prior to marketing 
authorization, the criteria for an orphan medicinal product are no longer met or, c) 
at the end of the period of marketing authorization. During the first four years of the 
Regulation’s implementation, sponsors had the option to apply for marketing 
authorization either through a centralized or a decentralized procedure. With the 
adoption of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, the centralized procedure became 
mandatory for orphan and for a number of other selected medicinal products. 44 
Applications for orphan product marketing approval are thus submitted directly to 
EMA; once EMA grants marketing authorization, it is binding in all Member States. 
(European Parliament and Council, 2004) Pricing and reimbursement decisions for 
orphan products, however, are not taken at the Community level, but by Member 
States. (Denis et al., 2009) To date, more than 60 drugs with prior designation as 
orphan products have been approved for marketing in the EU. (OrphaNet, 2010b) 
Expenses of activities incurring from the implementation of the EU Regulation are 
compensated by special budgetary contributions from the European Commission to 
EMA. (European Parliament and European Council, 2000) In the last decade, the 
percentage of this contribution of the total EMA budget varied between 0.97 and 
5.34%. (Table 3-3) 
 
 
                                                 
42 Details of the application procedure are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/orphanmp/doc/2007_07/format_content_orphan_applications_rev3_200707_en.p
df. 
43
 http://ec.europa.eu/health/documents/community-register/html/orphreg.htm 
44 For products that do not fall under Regulation (EC) 726/2004,  marketing authorization can be obtained via a) 
national authorization procedures for products which are marketed in one Member State only, b) mutual 
recognition of national marketing authorizations or c) simultaneous applications in several Member States of 
which one is chosen as reference state; national marketing approval is then granted in the reference and the other 
applying States (decentralized procedure). (2009) 
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Table 3-3 EMA budget and orphan drug contributions 
Year EMA total budget45 
Special contribution (orphan medicinal 
products fund) 
% of total 
budget 
2000 55.287.220 1.000.000 1.81 
2001 61.934.000 600.000 0.97 
2002 61.304.000 2.750.000 4.49 
2003 84.179.000 3.100.000 3.68 
2004 99.089.103 3.985.000 4.02 
2005 111.835.000 5.000.000 4.47 
2006 138.676.000 7.400.000 5.34 
2007 165.298.000 4.892.000 2.96 
2008 182.392.000 3.755.000 2.06 
2009 196.135.000 5.632.000 2.87 
(Data Source: EMA Annual Reports 2000 – 2009, available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/htms/general/direct/ar.htm, Accessed Jan. 23, 2011) 
 
The majority of the expenses are shared between fee waivers for protocol assistance 
and for applications for marketing authorization; smaller amounts are used for 
inspections and for post-authorization fees. (EMA Annual Reports 2000–2009, 
available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/htms/general/direct/ar.htm, Accessed Jan. 
23, 2011) 
In the year 2005, five years after the Regulation’s implementation, the European 
Commission concluded that the response to the European orphan drug regulation 
had by far exceeded earlier expectations. The time which had elapsed since the 
enforcement of the Regulation, however, was considered too short to assess its 
ultimate public health benefits.46 Instead, the Regulation’s benefits were assessed by 
a set of alternate parameters, i.e. a) the benefit to patients (number of patients which 
potentially benefit from the legislation / the interaction with patient organizations), 
b) the impact on clinical trials and compassionate use programs (status of orphan 
drug development / impact of protocol assistance on clinical trial quality) and c) the 
stimulus for orphan disease research (level of innovation of orphan products / level 
of awareness of orphan diseases / establishment of networks of experts). (EMA, 
                                                 
45 EMA’s budget is comprised of fees paid by the pharmaceutical industry, of EU budget contributions and 
miscellaneous other income. In 2009, 75,1% of the budget came from the pharmaceutical industry, 23.9% from 
the EU and 1% from other sources.  
46
 These, according to the Report, would have to be the “increase in the survival, the life expectancy and / or the 
quality of life of patients affected by rare disorders” ( (European Commission, 2006a, p. 8) 
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2005, p. 17 ff.) 53% of the products for which applications for orphan drug status 
were submitted were novel or innovative products, 40% of the marketed orphan 
products between 2000 and 2005 were for conditions for which no treatment had 
been available before, while for the remaining 60%, a significant benefit to patients 
regarding efficacy, safety or contribution to patient care was expected. Special 
mention was made of the exchange with patient organizations and the benefit of 
dialog (the COMP is the first decision-making committee in the EU that includes 
patient representatives as full members). The EU Regulation had also raised the 
awareness for rare diseases, as a Medline publication count carried out by COMP 
had revealed. Furthermore, knowledge exchange and networking was fostered; 
more than 350 experts had been documented in the COMP database in the first five 
years of the Regulation’s implementation, who ensure competent reviews of orphan 
drug applications and reflect a growing interest of scientists in rare diseases. The 
Report did not call for amendments to the Regulation, yet it was acknowledged that 
a number of issues were in need of clarification. Among these are the duration of 
market exclusivity for a second product for the same orphan indication47 and the 
definition of sufficient profitability, or an acceptable return on investment to initiate 
the procedure for a possible derogation of market exclusivity. (European 
Commission, 2006a) 
It has been argued that, to stay “in line with spirit of legislation”, a review of market 
exclusivity should take into account all indications for which an orphan product is 
used. (Denis et al., 2009, p. 91) At present, designated orphan products can only be 
approved for marketing for the applied orphan indication. However, once an orphan 
product is on the market, the same product can receive marketing approval for other 
indications. Prevalences are not added up following such extension, so that an 
orphan product may keep its status even if it exceeds the prevalence limit for which 
it originally received market exclusivity. Also, a drug for a more common 
indication which proves effective for a rare disease can be approved as an orphan 
                                                 
47
 The Regulation states that a second product which shall be authorized for an orphan indication, will share 
market exclusivity with the first approved product for the remainder of the first product’s exclusivity period; it 
had not been determined though, whether the second product will receive its own ten year exclusivity. 
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drug with a different name (and a new price) for this rare indication.48 The EU 
Commission acknowledged that differences in pricing and reimbursement policies 
between the Member States caused problems with access to orphan drugs. A survey 
on the availability of 12 orphan products which had received market authorization 
before December 2003, revealed that one year after their approval, there was only 
one Member State in which all 12 products were available. In only 12 of the then 25 
EU Member States, 6 of the 12 products were available. The time which had 
elapsed between authorization and availability ranged from 35 to 212 days. In 
numerous cases, the products were not available at all; incomplete hospital records 
made it difficult, however, to exactly determine drug availability. Still, the issue 
was considered very serious, as patients with rare diseases should not be made to 
wait excessively for authorized products to become available to them. (EMA, 2005; 
EMA, 2006) In the absence of a European regulation, pricing and reimbursement is 
negotiated by Member States, and the outcome of such negotiations in the first 
Member State often serves as a reference for subsequent negotiations in other states. 
This procedure has been criticized as an incentive for the private sector to begin 
negotiations in states which are known for their generous pricing and 
reimbursement policy. Rising costs for orphan products are made partly responsible 
for “[…] an additional upward pressure on health care budgets and may challenge 
the limits of solidarity between citizens.” Consequently, “[…] high prices combined 
with the growing budget impact of orphan drugs also negatively affect the image of 
the orphan drugs among decision-makers.” (Denis et al., 2009, p. iv) Setting prices 
at the European level, so the authors argue, instead of the level of Member States, 
could ensure that the expected (and hoped-for) increase in the number of orphan 
products will not overstrain health insurance budgets and put “the success [of the 
orphan drug legislation] at risk.” (Ibid., p. 92) 
Five years after the Regulation’s implementation, EBE and EuropaBio, an 
association of over 75 bioindustries worldwide, published a White Paper on the 
European regulation. The organization gave strong support to the regulation, but put 
forward nine suggestions to “optimize the framework around it.” (for this and the 
                                                 
48Denis et al. identified three twin products (Savene®/Cardioxane®, Siklos®/Hydrea® and Revatio®/Viagra®) 
of which one has an orphan indication, and the other does not. In all three cases, the orphan product was sold at a 
higher price. (p. 89) 
 40 
following cf. EBE / The European Association for Bioindustries (EuropaBio), 
2005) The suggestions partly concurred with deficits already identified in the 
reports by the COMP and the European Commission, i.a. the lack of a definition for 
the notion of sufficient profitability. In addition, the Association called upon the 
European Commission to provide clear guidance on the significant benefit criterion, 
requesting that the present practice be kept, i.e. that the clause is not applied very 
strictly at the beginning of the application process for orphan designation. For many 
companies, so EBE and EuropaBio argued, a strict application of the requirement to 
prove significant benefit would mean that the sponsor has to have clinical data 
available before it applies for orphan drug designation. These data are rarely 
available for rare diseases, so that a stricter ruling on the significant benefit criterion 
could hamper research efforts. With regard to compassionate use-programs, i.e. 
making drugs available to patients before regulatory approval, EBE / EuropaBio 
suggested that all EU Member States follow the example of France, Italy and 
Belgium and pay for the supply of compassionate use-drugs. Many orphan 
medicinal products are, according to the Association, developed by small and 
medium-sized enterprises which cannot financially support long-term 
compassionate use-programs. (EBE / The European Association for Bioindustries 
(EuropaBio) 2005) 
To summarize, the incentives contained in the EU regulation on orphan drugs gave 
momentum to the development of orphan products in the European Union. At the 
same time, key public health issues, such as timely access to orphan drugs for 
patients in all EU Member States, harmonized reimbursement policies and 
affordable pricing, formulating an understanding on the significant benefit criterion 
and on the notion of sufficient profitability, still need to be addressed. The authors 
of the 2009 study on Policies for Orphan Diseases and Orphan Drugs issued the 
warning that: “The spirit of the legislation, being to stimulate research and 
development on drugs for diseases that would otherwise be neglected by industry 
and academia, is put at risk by this situation, as high prices also mean high budget 
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impacts and in general low cost-effectiveness in comparison to non-orphan drugs.” 
(Denis et al., 2009, p. 90)49 
3.1.1 Orphan Drug Regulations: R&D Incentives for Neglected 
Diseases? 
Both rare and tropical (neglected) diseases had been part of the initial concept to 
develop incentives for drugs of limited commercial value, which laid the foundation 
for the U.S. Orphan Drug Act. When the U.S. ODA was formulated eventually, 
however, reference to tropical diseases was made rather “incidentally” (Milne et al., 
2001, p. 10). The conclusion of a House Committee hearing in 1982 explained that 
“The term ‘rare in the United States’ is used to assure that the benefits of this bill 
apply to drugs for diseases or conditions which are rare here, even if prevalent in 
other countries. To the extent that this provision encourages the development of 
drugs for prevalent diseases in developing countries, the committee believes it is 
sound public policy.” (Orphan Drug Act: Report from the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, United States House of Representatives. Report 97-840, Part I. in 
Milne et al., 2001, p. 10) In the spirit of this argument, Haffner (1991) underlined 
nearly a decade later that „The orphan products program is concerned with and 
directed at public health needs and problems beyond the borders of the United 
States. While a given disease or condition may be rampant in some developing 
nation or area of the world, if its prevalence fits the orphan definition, or if it is clear 
that sales of the product ‘in the United States‘ would be insufficient to stimulate is 
[sic] development and distribution, then the orphan drug provisions are available to 
its sponsor. One of the objectives of the program is to stimulate the medical and 
pharmaceutical community in the United States to develop products to meet the 
needs of populations elsewhere.“ (p. 611-612) Interestingly though, the applicability 
of the U.S. ODA to neglected diseases, which had been named an implicit public 
health objective of the legislation, later appeared to surprise. „One unexpected 
consequence of orphan legislation”, so Haffner et al. noted, “has been the 
realization that many infectious diseases that are highly prevalent in developing 
areas of the world qualify for incentives to develop orphan drugs in developed 
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 For further discussion on the issue surrounding  cost-effectiveness of orphan products see (Clarke, 2006; Dear 
et al., 2006; Marshall, 2005; Owen et al., 2008; Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, 2009; Drummond et al., 2007; 
Thamer et al., 1998; CPTech, 2005b) 
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countries, such as in the USA.“ The authors conclude that “this decision is an aspect 
of orphan-drug legislation that might benefit from more vocal dissemination. 
(Haffner et al., 2008, p. 2043) Indeed, in 2009, the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) launched a new program for rare and neglected diseases, based at the 
NIH Office of Rare Diseases Research, and endowed with $24 million for the fiscal 
year 2009. The Therapeutics for Rare and Neglected Diseases Program (TRND) 
focuses on preclinical research, taking account of the fact that in the private sector, 
often promising compounds for both groups of diseases are not followed through to 
preclinical or clinical stages of research and development. The TRND aims to 
increase the number of Investigational New Drug (IND) applications for both 
groups of diseases, which could then be handed over to experienced companies to 
perform clinical trials. (NIH, 2009) 
Following the implementation of the European orphan drug regulation, European 
legislators were convinced that these could serve as a model for stimulating 
research into neglected diseases. At a Round Table on Access to Medicines in 2003, 
the then President of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi, declared that […] “the 
Commission will consider the need for a specific legislative instrument to 
incentivise R&D for neglected and poverty diseases, along the lines of the EU 
Orphan Drug Regulation”. (Prodi, 2003) Several months earlier, Erkki Liikanen, 
Member of the European Commission, took the occasion of a Round Table on the 
lack of R&D for neglected diseases to underline the potential of the EU orphan 
regulation, stating that „[t]his kind of mechanism works. [...] We believe that this 
legislation could support the development of medicines for certain neglected 
diseases!” (Liikanen, 2002) A study of the Fraunhofer Institute, conducted in 2003 
on the Impact of Regulation on the Development of New Products in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector, seconded this opinion, stating that the EU Orphan Drug 
Regulation might serve as a source for concepts to foster research and development 
for neglected diseases. (Bührlen B et al. 2003) The EU orphan drug regulation 
stipulates, however, that products have to have a significant benefit for citizens in 
the European Union; therefore,  “diseases in developing countries will not be able to 
benefit from the EU orphan status”. (European Commission 2006; p. 5) EMAs 
Committee for Orphan Medicinal Products had addressed the issue in its Report in 
2005, postulating that: “To support the development of medicinal products for 
neglected diseases in less developed regions of the world, the COMP would like to 
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be in a position to designate medicinal products for the so-called neglected diseases 
in the future. This could be achieved by waiving the significant benefit criterion in 
such cases and would be consistent with Commission policy in the Framework 
Programmes for research and technology development.” (EMA, 2005, p. 3) In its 
most recent Road Map to 2015, which named ‘addressing public health needs, 
particularly unmet medical needs for rare and neglected diseases’ a strategic area, 
EMA renewed its interest in contributing to R&D for neglected diseases. (EMA, 
2010b) 
Opinions on the desirability and the feasibility of applying orphan drug incentives 
to neglected diseases differ considerably. While Dear et al. (2006) consider it 
appropriate for neglected diseases to benefit from orphan drug status, given the 
difference in resources between Europe or the U.S. and endemic countries of 
neglected diseases, Villa et al. (2009) have doubts regarding the political feasibility 
and the public support that needs to be generated for such proposals, especially in 
times of cuts in health spending. Market exclusivity, on which the success of orphan 
drug regulations seems to hinge, is considered irrelevant in the resource-poor 
settings of neglected diseases, that is in environments without functioning and 
financially well-equipped health coverage programs (WHO, 2006e; Trouiller et al., 
1999) To illustrate, in Africa and in Latin America, only 8% and 35% of the 
population, respectively, have two-thirds of their drug costs reimbursed, compared 
to 80-100% of the population in Europe. (Trouiller et al., 2002, p. 2191) Tax 
credits, an orphan-drug incentive, do not offer a profit in the R&D process. It has 
been argued, however, that they may at least reduce investment losses for neglected 
diseases. (Anderson, 2009) The WHO-CIPIH Final Report observed that “[…] there 
is evidence that general tax credits have an impact on market-driven R&D.”, yet it 
qualified that, in the absence of markets and profits, “even a 100% tax relief would 
have no stimulating effect.” (WHO, 2006e, p. 87) Several proposals have been put 
forward to complement or amend orphan drug regulations to fit the particular needs 
of neglected diseases. Transferable market exclusivity could grant a sponsor of a 
drug for a neglected disease market exclusivity for a drug of his choice to 
compensate him for the low return on investment. Alternatively, transferable market 
exclusivity could be granted to a sponsor “for all products with the same active 
moiety” as the drug for the neglected disease (Milne et al., 2001, p. 50). Also, 
defining all neglected diseases as orphan diseases according to the economic 
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criterion would make them eligible for all incentives under orphan drug regulations. 
(Villa et al., 2009) The WHO Expert Working Group on ‘Research and 
Development. Coordination and Financing’, which received and evaluated 
proposals for innovative financing for neglected diseases, included orphan drug 
schemes in its list of potential mechanisms, yet it acknowledged shortcomings for 
neglected diseases in the current legislation that would have to be dealt with. Thus, 
apart from the absence of a viable market, the Working Group pointed to the lack of 
requirement for regulators to ensure that products are suitable for use in endemic 
developing countries. (WHO, 2010e)  
Under the U.S. Orphan Drug Act, neglected diseases are eligible for orphan drug 
incentives, if “there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and 
making available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will 
recovered [sic] from sales in the United States of such drug”. (United States 
Congress, 1983) Malaria and human African trypanosomiasis have, in fact, been 
defined as “rare” under the U.S. Orphan Drug Act’s epidemiological criterion 
“…based on the few cases recorded on the American territory and linked to 
individuals returning from endemic areas.” (Villa et al., 2009, p. 35) In general, 
however, it has been found that little use has been made of orphan drug regulations 
for neglected diseases. (WHO, 2010e) Villa et al. (2009) noted that “[a]chievements 
for neglected tropical diseases have been minimal under orphan drug laws 
compared to what has occurred for rare diseases.” (p.35) By the year 2002, only 12 
of the 238 market approvals under the U.S. Orphan Drug Act had been for tropical 
diseases, most of them travel diseases. One reason may be that orphan drug 
regulations do not offer incentives or funds for preclinical research. (Anderson, 
2009) 
The debate in the public health community about the application of orphan drug 
incentives to neglected diseases is ongoing (cf. Baker, 2004; Milne et al., 2001; 
Trouiller et al., 1999; Villa et al., 2009), and orphan drug regulations have been 
named one option whose reforms to include incentives for neglected disease R&D 
“are awaiting legal answers”. (Leis García, 2004, p. 1) 
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3.2 Option 2: The draft Medical Research and Development Treaty 
(MRDT) 
Another approach to a regulatory solution for the R&D deficit for neglected 
diseases was taken with the draft Medical Research and Development Treaty 
(MRDT) (CPTech, 2005b). The concept for this Treaty was introduced in 2002 
(Love & Hubbard, 2007) and submitted for evaluation to the WHO Commission on 
Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) in February 2005. The 
MRDT does not exclusively address R&D for neglected diseases, as orphan drug 
regulations target rare diseases. Instead, its authors and sponsors50 proceeded from 
the view that the current system of funding for medical R&D, based on patents and 
high drug prices to recoup investment, is ineffective and expensive. (Love & 
Hubbard, 2007) It is argued that it further impedes equitable access to innovative 
treatments and, from a public health point of view, misdirects investments from 
public health priorities towards drug marketing or highly profitable, but less urgent 
areas of medical R&D. To illustrate, the authors underline that, of the new drugs 
approved by the U.S. Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) between 1990 
and 2004, only 22.5% had a significant benefit over previously approved products, 
and less than 1% of the drugs approved between 1989 and 2000 were developed for 
diseases of poverty. Additionally, only 10% of drug sales went into research and 
development activities, and of these 10%, only 20% were invested in innovative 
products. (Hubbard & Love, 2004; Love & Hubbard, 2007) To correct these 
imbalances, the MRDT proposes that signatories commit themselves to national 
funding obligations for medical research and development. The governing bodies to 
be established with the Treaty would not collect and distribute funds, but set 
funding levels and monitor funding flows. The level of obligatory national funding 
would be based on shares of GDP, or per capita income.51 Several options are 
provided for signatory states to meet their financial obligations; these include direct 
public funding of medical research projects, offering tax credits, contributing to 
philanthropic spending or to prize funds for medical innovation. A Council for 
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 The MRDT was submitted to the Commission for evaluation with an open letter signed by 162 scientists, 
public health experts, lawyers, economists, government representatives and parliamentarians. (CPTech, 2005a) 
51
 Thus, high income countries would spent 15 basis points of GDP on medical research and development and 2 
basis points on priority research, of which at least half would be allocated for neglected diseases. (CPTech 
2005b) 
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Medical Innovation52 (CMI) would “review minimum levels” of financial 
contributions every two years (CPTech, 2005b, p. 6) and monitor their achievement. 
(CPTech, 2005b, p. 8) The CMI would also be tasked with drawing up regulations 
to measure and report financial flows, and assemble and publish funding 
mechanisms in signatory states in biennial reports. (CPTech, 2005b, p. 8) A 
Committee on Priority Medical Research and Development (CPMRD) would be 
appointed to set “global targets for priority medical research and development 
(PMRD)” every two years in the areas of vaccine development, neglected diseases, 
global infectious diseases, databases, research tools and other public goods, health 
systems and appropriate technology, preservation and dissemination of traditional 
medical knowledge and “other appropriate priority research”; these targets would be 
evaluated annually (CPTech, 2005b, p. 6) Further specialized committees on open 
public goods, technology transfer or on exceptionally productive and useful projects 
would be established to identify qualifying projects. As an incentive to invest into 
these projects, investments would be counted towards the financial obligations of a 
State under this Treaty; investments in priority research that exceed a State’s 
obligations could, similar to the Kyoto Protocol-procedure, be transformed into 
tradable credits or certificates. No more than one third of a State’s obligations, 
however, shall be served by special credits. (CPTech, 2005b, p. 9) To improve 
access to innovation, promote knowledge-sharing and discourage me-too-products, 
the authors and sponsors of the Treaty suggest to separate innovation incentives 
from drug prices through the creation of prize funds. Prizes would be tied to the 
obligation of allowing generic production of the rewarded product; the level of the 
reward would reflect the health impact of the innovation, thus aiming to discourage 
investment in me-too products. (Love & Hubbard, 2007)53 The Treaty further 
stipulates that the signatories will “adopt procedures concerning obligations for 
research supported by the public sector to be made available to the public through 
open access archives or repositories.” (CPTech, 2005b, p. 10) 
The Committee on Medical Innovation (CMI) would be charged with adopting 
“regulations that ensure equitable access to government funded inventions.” 
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 The Treaty would be governed by an Assembly for Medical Research and Development, a Council for 
Medical Innovation, six Committees, and have a Permanent Secretariat. 
53
 For the ongoing debate on prize funds see e.g. http://keionline.org/prizes 
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(CPTech, 2005b, p. 10) For a limited time period, patents shall not be submitted for 
data which stem from qualifying open public goods. 
In addition to funding for medical R&D, the Treaty addresses a broad range of 
issues relating to medical research and development, which the signatories of the 
Treaty would be encouraged to promote. (CPTech, 2005b) Table 3-4 below gives 
an overview of objectives pursued and mechanisms proposed in the MRDT. 
Table 3-4 The Medical Research and Development Treaty: Aims and Mechanisms 
Objectives Eligible finance mechanisms 
include 
Eligible for tradable credits 
(max. one third of all 
funding obligations) 
Adequate and predictable 
sources of finance 
Direct public funding of profit 
or non-profit research projects 
investment in priority medical 
research (i.a. in R&D for 
neglected diseases) 
Cost-effective incentives Purchases of relevant medical 
products (if this creates R&D 
incentives) 
investment in open public 
goods 
Equitable access Preservation and 
dissemination of traditional 
medical knowledge 
investment in technology 
transfer 
Facilitation of follow-on 
research 
Payment of royalties to patent 
owners 
investment in exceptionally 
productive and useful projects  
Fair allocation of cost for 
medical R&D 
Tax expenditures  
Knowledge sharing Innovation prizes / incentives  
Needs-based priority setting Philanthropic expenditures  
Support of diversity and 
competition 
Government-obliged 
expenditures by businesses or 
non-profit organizations / 
research funding obligations 
on sellers of medicines 
 
Transfer of technological 
knowledge and capacity 
  
Data Source: Medical Research and Development Treaty (MRDT), Discussion draft 4. 
http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/rndtreaty4.pdf 
 
Debates in the scientific community accompanied the introduction of the concept of 
a medical R&D Treaty, and the arguments brought forward suggest a separation of 
responses into three groups. While a first group gathers supporters of the proposed 
Treaty and its mechanisms, a second group doubts the Treaty’s political and 
technical feasibility. The third group assembles respondents who either reject the 
Treaty concept on the grounds of anticipated undesirable impacts on pharmaceutical 
research and development, or on the argument that the Treaty concept is based on 
wrong premises. 
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Favorable analyses of the concept highlight the necessity of a shift in paradigm 
(Dentico & Ford, 2005) and of the steering function of a prize fund, which would 
disincentivize the development of me-too-products, and direct research priorities 
towards public health needs. Additionally, access barriers would be removed as 
drug producers, after having received their innovation reward, would pool patents 
for generic production. (Winters, 2006; Faunce & Nasu, 2008) Among more 
skeptical reviewers, the Treaty is credited with playing a valuable role in drawing 
attention to these issues (Orsenigo, 2005), yet the question is raised whether the 
mechanisms proposed in the MRDT could easily coexist alongside the current 
patent system, or whether a smooth transition from one system to the other could be 
managed. (Orsenigo, 2005; Farlow, 2007) Furthermore, difficulties are anticipated 
in distinguishing medical from other intellectual property, whereby the latter would 
not be covered by the MRDT. (Farlow, 2007) The flexibility of mechanisms that the 
Treaty offers to fund medical R&D is considered “commendable” (Tren & Bate, 
2006, p. 3)54, yet critics point to a lack of enforcement mechanisms for these 
funding obligations. (DiMasi & Grabowski, 2004) Furthermore, it is argued that 
numerous measurements and sophisticated accounting systems would have to be 
installed, also in developing countries, to track financial flows. Also, shortfalls are 
named in the system of tradable credits55, and the option of fulfilling Treaty 
obligations with the purchase of high-priced drugs is seen as undermining efforts 
for cost-efficiency and encouraging waste. (Farlow, 2007) 
In addition to those critical of what may be summarized as issues of the feasibility 
of the Treaty’s provisions and mechanisms, there is a stark opposition to the 
perspective that under the MRDT, research priorities would be set by public 
institutions, and not by the private sector. Firstly, so it is argued by the Treaty’s 
opponents, research organizations have adequate research agendas and select 
innovation priorities according to consumer needs and preferences. If these 
preferences are not be shared by “government research czars” (DiMasi & 
                                                 
54 Apart from acknowledging the funding flexibilities provided for by the Treaty,  Tren and Bate (2006) 
consider the document to be „unworkable“, „impractical“ and based on wrong premises. 
55
 Farlow (2007), for instance, argues that a common denominator would be needed for trading credits, that it is 
unclear how and whether risk-bearing, basic research, generic products or cheap, yet effective measures of 
prevention would be measured and counted, and that high income countries would have little incentive to 
provide low-income countries with inexpensive  medicines as long as buying drugs for high prices fulfills the 
high-income-country’s Treaty obligations. 
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Grabowski, 2004, p. 10), relevant projects may not receive funding under the direct 
funding scheme of the MRDT. Additionally, it is feared that governments will find 
it difficult to correctly value innovations, and thus be tempted to offer research 
prizes that are too small, but which a company that has already spent its investment 
will have no other choice than to accept. (DiMasi & Grabowski, 2004; DiMasi & 
Grabowski, 2007) The MRDT is also considered to be vulnerable to corruption and 
rent-seeking from various sources and with varying effects. Staff in the public 
sector, so it is argued, may lack adequate knowledge compared to research 
organization’s staff; therefore, it may be susceptible to political lobbying and be 
guided by the wrong motives when selecting research priorities. “Asymmetric 
information” would then lead to “adverse selection” to the point where “the best 
organized und funded [patient] groups succeed the most in influencing allocative 
choices”, and “[…] innovator firms [are turned] into contract research organizations 
[…]”. (DiMasi & Grabowski, 2004, p. 7) On the other hand, if those public 
institutions that determine innovation prizes have extensive discretionary powers, 
they may also be subject to lobbying efforts by research organizations, and pay 
prizes that exceed the investment. (Faunce & Nasu, 2008) Lastly, doubts are being 
cast on the validity of the premises on which the call for a paradigm shift and the 
Treaty concept are based, i.e. the R&D deficit and the public health relevance of 
neglected diseases. Treatment deficits, so it is argued, are access deficits caused by 
inadequate health infrastructure, taxes levied on drug imports, or ill-directed 
spending by endemic countries, e.g. into defense instead of health or education 
budgets. Low mortality rates for neglected diseases and the increasing burden of 
non-communicable diseases, also in developing countries, justify current R&D 
priorities since these will benefit patients in the developed and the developing 
world. (Stevens, 2004)  
In 2005, the European Parliament produced a report on major and neglected 
diseases in developing countries which supported the concept of a medical R&D 
treaty and “[u]rges, in the context of the WHO Commission on Intellectual 
Property, Innovation and [sic] Health, a new global medical R&D treaty, including 
minimum obligations to support R&D, priority setting mechanisms and 
consideration of a system of tradeable [sic] credits for investments in particular 
projects;“. (European Parliament, 2005, p. 11) The WHO-CIPIH, in its Final 
Report, acknowledged that the Treaty “[…] seeks to address the fundamental policy 
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dilemmas in promoting innovation and access relevant to public health, and has 
initiated a useful debate.”, yet it observed that “[m]any comments emphasized that 
the proposal was set out in a broad-brush fashion, making it difficult to assess, 
without further information and analysis, how various legal, financial, technical and 
institutional issues could be addressed, as well as genuine concerns about political 
and practical feasibility.” (WHO, 2006e, p. 90) While “[r]ecognizing the need for 
an international mechanism to increase global coordination and funding of medical 
R&D”, it recommended that “the sponsors of the medical R&D treaty proposal 
should undertake further work to develop these ideas so that governments and 
policy-makers may make an informed decision.” (Ibid., p. 91) Consequently, the 
WHO Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property, adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2008, listed 
among the “actions to be taken to promote research and development […]” to 
“encourage further exploratory discussions on the utility of possible instruments or 
mechanisms for essential health and biomedical R&D, including inter alia, an 
essential health and biomedical R&D treaty”. (WHO, 2008, p. 11&27) However, 
the WHO Expert Working Group on Research and Development Financing, 
established on the basis of the Global Strategy and tasked to „examine current 
financing and coordination of research and development and proposals for new and 
innovative sources of financing, to stimulate research and development related to 
types II and III diseases and the research and development needs of developing 
countries in relation to Type I diseases.“ concluded in its 2010 Report that a 
“biomedical research and development treaty” did not meet the criteria which the 
Expert Working Group had established for the selection of proposals to be 
evaluated as new and innovative sources of financing.56 (WHO, 2010e, p. 86) The 
proceedings and conclusions of the Expert Working Group were sharply criticized 
(López Montaño, 2010; HAI, 2010) In response to a “divergence between the 
expectations of the Member States[…] and the output of the [EWG]…”, (WHA, 
2010, p. 1), a follow-on Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and 
Development: Financing and Coordination (CEWG) was set up to take forward and 
deepen the work of the EWG, under careful observance of scientific integrity and 
                                                 
56
 All proposals submitted to the EWG were screened and short-listed on the basis of impact on health in 
developing countries, operational efficiency and feasibility and financial aspects. For a detailed description of the 
screening and evaluation methodology, s. http://www.who.int/phi/documents/RDFinancingEN.pdf, p. 81 ff. 
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the absence of any conflict of interest. (Ibid, p. 3)57 The CEWG reconsidered the six 
proposals which the EWG had excluded as proper mechanisms, which included the 
draft Medical Research and Development Treaty, as well as the proposal for a 
global framework. In its Final Report of April 2012, the WHO-CEWG judged the 
proposals for the treaty and the global framework to be “ambitious”, yet concluded 
that the concepts were promising and comprehensive enough to recommend the 
launching of negotiations. Consequently, the Working Group proposed that 
Member States enter into formal negotiations during which “[…] key steps 
necessary to begin implementation and the financial feasibility of the proposals […] 
should be deliberated […].” (WHO, 2012g, p. 53) The WHO-CEWG is due to 
present its Final Report to the 65th World Health Assembly in May 2012. 
3.2.1 The MRDT: A Solution for the Deficit in Neglected Disease 
R&D? 
The Medical Research and Development Treaty is based on the premise that 
medical R&D does not take sufficient account of public health needs and instead 
responds to market values of interventions, clearly illustrated by the lack of R&D 
for neglected diseases. It aims to ensure adequate and predictable flows of 
financing, cost-effective incentives, a fair distribution of the burden of cost, as well 
as knowledge-sharing, capacity-building, technology transfer, follow-on research 
and priority setting for the benefit of public health needs. The Treaty seeks to 
establish a system of national financing obligations for medical research and 
development, based on a wide array of R&D funding mechanisms that the 
signatories may chose from to meet their obligations. While it is agreed, even 
among critics of the concept, that an exclusive reliance on patents to encourage 
medical innovation contributes to access and R&D deficits in the area of neglected 
diseases, reservations are expressed whether the MRDT offers the right solutions. 
The MRDT is criticized as being politically unfeasible (Farlow, 2007; Orsenigo, 
2005), lacking clear enforcement mechanisms and as being an instrument which 
may promote national protectionism. (DiMasi & Grabowski, 2004) The current 
patent system to protect medical innovation, so it is argued, may well be 
supplemented with prizes or other incentives as in orphan drug regulations, but it 
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 For the issue of conflict of interest in both WHO working groups, cf. a. http://www.keionline.org/node/1058 
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must not be weakened or supplanted. And while some analysts suggest that debates 
shall continue about the public benefit of this and other schemes of reform, (Faunce 
& Nasu, 2008) others argue that even to pursue the debate of this instrument was a 
waste of time and resources which could better be devoted to strengthening existing 
and productive product development partnerships. (Farlow, 2007) Some analysts of 
the MRDT suggest alternatives, such as a partial socialization of costs for clinical 
trials (Orsenigo, 2005), or an extension of orphan drug regulations to neglected 
diseases (Tren & Bate, 2006). Advocates conclude, however, that it would be short-
sighted to continue to rely on philanthropic spending or public funding efforts if 
these were not embedded in a strategy of sustainable financing to meet current and 
future health care challenges. (Winters, 2006) 
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4 Methods 
4.1 Operationalizing the Research Question 
Orphan drug regulations and the draft Medical Research and Development Treaty 
have long been discussed in the scientific community as regulatory approaches to 
promote R&D into neglected diseases. The aim of this research project was to 
gather quantifiable data among stakeholders with which to accompany these 
ongoing reflections, debates and the path to political decision-making. Two key 
differences between orphan drug regulations and the MRDT had to be taken into 
account in the operationalization of the research question: Firstly, orphan drug 
regulations were developed to promote drug development for rare diseases, while 
the MRDT takes a broader approach and “[…] recognizes the importance of 
ensuring sustainable sources of finance for innovation, including R&D for 
neglected diseases and other public health priorities, […]”. (CPTech, 2005a, p. 3) 
Secondly, at the time of this writing, orphan drug regulations have been in force for 
nearly three decades, while the MRDT is in draft status. In view of these 
differences, we did not formulate the research questions to compare and contrast the 
performance of both instruments. Instead, the concept of the project was to 
decouple incentives and measures from their instruments, and to gather data on the 
following key questions: 
 Which are the most important causes for the deficit in R&D and 
treatments for neglected diseases? 
 Which measures are desirable and feasible to promote R&D into 
neglected diseases? 
 Is it desirable and feasible to develop a regulatory instrument to 
promote R&D into neglected diseases? 
The question on the causes for the treatment deficit for neglected diseases was 
included into the survey to identify such causes which a regulatory instrument to 
promote R&D would have to respond to. For the purpose of the question on 
measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases, key measures of orphan drug 
regulations, of the MRDT, as well as proposals gathered from literature search were 
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submitted to the participant’s assessment. Furthermore, the participants in the 
survey were asked to contribute proper suggestions for measures to promote R&D 
into neglected diseases. 
The questionnaire for the first round included a section on orphan drug regulations 
for rare diseases, since we were interested to learn how familiar the survey 
participants are with orphan drug regulations, and how they judged the regulations’ 
performance for rare diseases. The section on the performance of orphan drug acts 
for rare diseases was not carried forward into the second round of the survey. 
Against the background that no precise definition exists for neglected diseases, and 
that such definition may be required in a regulatory instrument, the survey 
participants were asked to name criteria to define neglected diseases, and to rank 
these according to importance. 
We were aware that the approach which we selected precluded an answer to the 
question of the desirability and feasibility of either instrument for neglected 
diseases. It would, however, allow us to learn from the stakeholders which 
measures they recommend to promote R&D for neglected diseases, irrespective of 
the measures’ current association with a regulatory concept. Our approach was 
based on the assumption that a regulatory instrument to promote R&D into 
neglected diseases may also rely on selected or modified incentives contained in 
orphan drug regulations, or include a selection, but not all of the measures proposed 
by the MRDT. 
4.2 Description of Methods 
Several methods lend themselves to the realization of such research question, 
among them focus groups, face-to face meetings, face-to-face interviews, telephone 
interviews or opinion surveys. (cf. Geyer & Siegrist, 2003; Behnke et al., 2006) We 
selected the Delphi method, since it allowed us, firstly, to conduct the survey online 
so that we were able to invite potential survey participants globally, i.e. from 
developed, developing and threshold countries. Secondly, it enabled us to contact, 
and possibly include, a large number of survey participants. Thirdly, a Delphi 
survey provides for the collection of both full-text and quantitative data. Lastly, the 
method goes beyond an opinion survey, and offers an anonymous forum for the 
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exchange of ideas and opinions among the survey participants. To analyze full-text 
responses gathered in the course of the survey, we selected the text-sorting 
technique by Beywl and Schepp-Winter (2000). The following sections describe the 
methods used and the application to our research project. 
4.2.1 The Delphi Method 
In a Delphi exercise, experts, or stakeholders, for a specific subject are asked to 
respond to several rounds of a survey. Characteristic for the Delphi method is the 
anonymity of the panel and the fact that feedbacks containing results of previous 
rounds are forwarded to the panel with each new round of survey. (Sackman, 1975) 
Some Delphi surveys allow participants to give brief explanations around their 
replies, which are also made available to the panel, together with the statistical 
analyses of the quantitative items. Against the background of this information, the 
panel members are asked to reconsider their estimates of the previous round. (de 
Meyrick, 2003) Delphi surveys thus differ from opinion surveys in that the 
participants “answer from the second round on under the influence of their 
colleagues' opinions”. (European Commission, 2006c) The procedure aims to 
stimulate cognitive processes as in group discussions while anonymity shall 
eliminate negative group processes such as opinion leadership, peer-pressure, the 
influence of individual powerful personalities or the effects of status. (Häder, 2002) 
Delphi surveys are said to allow the respondents to state their opinion free from the 
constraint of group processes, and to receive the opinions of co-respondents equally 
free from distorting public images. (de Meyrick, 2003)58 
The development of the Delphi technique dates back to 1948 at the Rand 
Corporation. (Sackman, 1975) The “definitive paper” (de Meyrick, 2003, p. 9) on 
the method was only published in 1963, as initial Delphi studies had dealt with 
unpublished defense research issues. In the years to follow, Delphi surveys were 
increasingly used outside the area of defense research, particularly as forecasting 
devices and in technology assessment, thereby “respond[ing] to a demand for 
improved communications among larger and/or geographically dispersed groups 
which cannot be satisfied by other available techniques.” (Linstone & Turoff, 2002, 
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 For an analysis of group processes cf. a. (Dalkey, 1969) 
 56 
p. 11) Originally, the goal of the technique was “to obtain the most reliable 
consensus of opinion of a group of experts […] by a series of intensive 
questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback. “ (Ibid, p. 10) Today, 
Delphi surveys are applied in various disciplines to research questions for which 
“accurate information is unavailable or expensive to obtain, or evaluation models 
require subjective inputs to the point where they become the dominating 
parameters.” (Linstone & Turoff, 2002, p. 10) Building on the concept of what has 
been labeled the “conventional Delphi” (Sackman, 1975, p. 8 ff.), different forms of 
Delphi surveys have evolved under the labels quantitative Delphi, reactive Delphi, 
modified Delphi, normative Delphi or exploratory Delphi. Some labels refer to “the 
type of application, some to the method of ‘scoring’ used and some just imply that 
the approach is different […]”. (Mullen, 2003, p. 38) Between the early 1950s and 
1994, over 1.000 projects applied or discussed the Delphi method; the most popular 
areas of research that used the Delphi technique were business, education and health 
care. (de Meyrick, 2003) Delphi applications in health care and medical research 
questions are known since the 1960s. (Ammon, 2005; Day J & Bobeva M, 2005; 
Linstone & Turoff, 2002; Mullen, 2003; Scholles, 2006) For the time period of 
1995 to 2001, de Meyrick (2003) identified 33 Delphi studies related to medical 
issues, of which three dealt with health policy questions. Recent Delphi surveys on 
global health issues explored priority setting to combat non-communicable diseases 
(Daar et al., 2007), or examined public health-sensitive patent legislation. (Costa 
Chaves & Oliveira, 2007) 
Delphi surveys allow for rankings and priority-setting which is considered 
operational also for policy-makers. (European Commission, 2006c) Assessments of 
the required expenditure for Delphi exercises vary. While O'Loughlin & Kelly 
(2004) referred to low administrative costs for a Delphi survey, the European 
Commission considers it a disadvantage of Delphi surveys that they are “fairly 
time-consuming and labour intensive and require (external) expert preparation. 
They are therefore expensive.“ (European Commission, 2006c) For the experts who 
participate in a Delphi exercise, “[…], it provides a communication device […] that 
uses the conductor of the exercise as a filter in order to preserve anonymity of 
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responses.” (Helmer, 1977, p. 19)59 Critics have argued that the anonymity in 
Delphi surveys may deliver the respondents from the responsibility of his or her 
views, and lead to a “circular buck-passing”. (Sackman, 1975, p. 52) Especially in 
Delphi exercises that strive to reach a consensus, anonymity is said to run the risk of 
veiling respondents who are less committed to the issue, and who adopt the 
majority opinion to expedite the exercise, thus promoting an artificial consensus. 
(de Meyrick, 2003) 
Linstone & Turoff (2002, p. 4) recommend to consider a Delphi survey if a problem 
“cart benefit from subjective judgments on a collective basis”, if the potential 
participants “have no history of adequate communication and may represent diverse 
backgrounds with respect to experience or expertise”, if “[m]ore individuals are 
needed than can effectively interact in a face-to-face exchange” or “[t]ime and cost 
make frequent group meetings infeasible”, if there are severe disagreements among 
the individuals who shall interact so that “the communication process must be 
refereed and / or anonymity assured” and, finally, if “[t]he heterogeneity of the 
participants must be preserved to assure validity of the results, i.e., avoidance of 
domination by quantity or by strength of personality (‘bandwagon effect’).” 
A panel in a Delphi study does not represent a numeric sample of a given 
population of experts, but a sample of available expertise. Pill (1971, p. 62) 
underlines that heterogeneity of the panel shall minimize “the possibility of 
overlooking some obvious facet of a question”. While random sampling may be 
used in “wide-ranging, social and marketing Delphi studies”, purposive sampling is 
required if depth and specificity of expertise is needed. (Day J & Bobeva M, 2005) 
To measure available expertise, Häder (2002) recommends to identify the number 
of perspectives to a topic, and to select one expert per perspective. Reported sample 
or panel sizes, as well as recommendations for optimal panel sizes in Delphi studies 
range from single-digit to four-digit numbers. (Akins et al., 2005; Mullen, 2003) In 
health applications, Delphi studies have been performed with four to 3000 
participants. (Mullen, 2003) Turoff (1970) suggests 10 to fifty participants for a 
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 Sackman (1975) criticizes both the use of the term “expert” as well as “panel” in the context of Delphi 
surveys, arguing, firstly, that Delphi investigators have failed to present proof of statistical difference between 
experts and non-expert (p. 43), and secondly, that a panel requires a direct interaction between panelist; as this is 
not the case in anonymous Delphi exercise, the appropriate terminology would be “respondent”. (p. 51) 
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Policy Delphi. Homogeneity of the level of expertise has been identified as a 
decisive factor for the validity of a Delphi survey’s outcome. In a methodological 
analysis on adequate panel sizes for Delphi surveys, Akins et al. (2005) applied 
bootstrap sampling to a first round of responses from 23 participants. The raw data 
of the original participants were augmented to two computer-generated samples of 
1000 and 2000 resampling iterations. Having compared the augmented results with 
the original responses, the authors concluded that “[p]anels of similarly trained 
experts (who possess a general understanding in the field of interest) provide 
effective and reliable utilization of a small sample from a limited number of experts 
in a field of study to develop reliable criteria that inform judgment and support 
effective decision-making.” (Akins et al., 2005) Homogeneity of the level of 
expertise is also critical against the background that the selected experts must 
perceive each other as authoritative and credible. Assuring panelists that they are 
part of a peer-group is decisive for their readiness to re-think their opinion. (Häder, 
2002) 
The criteria which are applied to the selection of panel members in Delphi exercises 
depend on the type of the Delphi design, and range from screening procedures to 
determine an individual’s expertise to using scales to identify the potential experts’ 
degree of dogmatism as an indicator for their ability and willingness to change their 
opinion. Häder (2002) recommends to consider, but not to generalize such criteria. 
Pre-Delphi-Studies can be conducted to recruit experts and to determine their 
expertise and willingness to participate in the exercise. Häder (2000) found few 
publications, however, to prove that such additional effort was merited. As a 
prerequisite for participation in an expert panel, the panelists should have sufficient 
expertise in the topic which is being researched; furthermore, there should be a 
reasonable balance between industry and academia, and between regions. (Häder, 
2000; Häder, 2002; cf. a. Pill, 1971) 
The number of rounds for a Delphi survey depends of the goal of the exercise and 
on the definition of its endpoint. Häder (2002) distinguishes the following four 
types of Delphi surveys with different objectives: 
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 the purely qualitative survey, which serves to gather experts’ ideas on a 
particular problem (type 1); 
 the survey which uses qualitative and quantitative data to firm up a vague 
subject-matter and to forecast specific developments; the results of the 
survey are compared with actual developments (type 2); 
 the survey which uses qualitative and quantitative data to collect and 
quantify experts’ opinions (type 3) and 
 the purely quantitative survey which aims to reach consensus among experts 
(type 4) 
While one round of survey may suffice for a Delphi survey which strives to gather 
experts’ ideas, several rounds will be required to reach consensus. 
Recommendations range from an open-ended first round with only one further 
round (Gallagher et al. 1996; Butterworth et al. 1995 in Mullen, 2003) to four or 
five rounds for the Policy Delphi. (Linstone & Turoff, 2002) A Delphi survey may 
be terminated upon consensus among participating experts, or at the point when the 
analysis of responses shows no significant variation from a previous round 
(stability).60 The amount of information retrieved from a Delphi panel which 
remains consistent in size for four to five rounds is certainly substantial; however, 
two or three rounds may be sufficient and avoid increasing attrition. Walker & Selfe 
(1996, in Mullen, 2003) recommend to aim for a response rate of 70%. It has been 
observed that drop-out rates are highly dependent on the quality of the project 
design and on properly estimating and communicating the time and workload for 
the respondents. (de Meyrick, 2003) Drop-out rates have been shown to increase 
with panel size, while panels of 20 tend to keep their members. (Reid, 1988, in 
Mullen, 2003)  
A characteristic element of Delphi surveys are feedbacks. With each new round of 
survey, the panelists receive the results of the previous round. Feedbacks take the 
form of graphic illustration (graphs, dots), tables or verbal comments, depending on 
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 Linstone, as cited by Day J & Bobeva M (2005), „suggests that marginal changes of less than 15% offer a 
working definition of a threshold for stability, which might be used as a criterion for termination of the Delphi 
exercise.” (p. 106) 
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the type of data gathered, and on the goal of the study. Forecasting studies, which 
involve estimations of time intervals, mostly use numeric values, while questions 
geared at evaluating developments or scenarios, or which solicit verbal statements, 
also apply qualitative methods. (Mullen, 2003) De Meyrick (2003) identified 33 
different statistical methods applied in Delphi studies. Most commonly used are 
mean, median, standard deviations, chi square, quartiles or interquartile ranges as 
well as percentages. (Mullen, 2003) Some experts on the method strongly oppose 
the exclusion of extreme opinions during feedbacks, arguing that it may lead to 
false consensus, since the “‘pull of the median’ is much stronger than the pull of the 
true”. (Dalkey, 1969, p. 424) The use of the mean is not discouraged, though; Häder 
(2002) suggests to use standard deviations to measure the distribution of responses, 
and the arithmetic mean for tendency. Frequency distributions may complement the 
feedback to ensure that no information is lost and opposing views are maintained 
and visible. (McKenna (1994) and Mullen et al. (2000) in Mullen (2003) 
In summary, key features of Delphi designs are: 
 anonymity 
 a structured flow of information through the 
o use of questionnaires 
o calculation of statistical group answers and 
o feedback to participants about the results of previous rounds 
 several rounds of survey and 
 a definition of end points. 
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4.2.2 The Policy Delphi 
The Policy Delphi was introduced in 1969 and aimed to support decision-finding in 
committee processes. (Turoff, 2002) It was described as “an organized method for 
correlating views and information pertaining to a specific policy area and for 
allowing the respondents representing such views and information the opportunity 
to reaction to and assess differing viewpoints.” (Ibid, p. 83) While previous Delphi 
surveys had focused on technology forecasts, and striven to achieve consensus 
among homogenous groups of experts, the Policy Delphi aimed to gather opposing 
views, to ensure that all relevant aspects of a topic under consideration are taken 
into account, that impacts and consequences are analyzed, and that the acceptability 
of a proposed policy option be examined. (Ibid, p. 83) Turoff had observed that 
“[i]n an atmosphere of budget cuts, belt tightening, and competition for limited 
funds, it may appear advantageous not to advocate, not to be noticed, and especially 
not to be held accountable for views, promises, or positions which require effort to 
document or substantiate”. Furthermore, he found that “psychological 
characteristics of committee processes” such as “ 
 domineering personalities 
 the unwillingness of individuals to take a position on an issue before all 
facts are in or before it is known which way the majority is headed 
 reluctance to publicly contradict […] individuals in higher positions 
 reluctance to abandon a position once it is publicly taken as well as 
 fear of bringing up an uncertain idea that might turn out to be idiotic and 
result in a loss of face” 
called for “substitutes for the committee process[…]”. (Ibid, p.82) The Policy 
Delphi is based on the concept of the anonymous Delphi process, yet its objective is 
not to generate a decision or a consensus (even though a consensus may be reached 
during the exercise), but to present to a decision-maker a comprehensive range of 
options, along with the supporting evidence. A Policy Delphi can also function as a 
precursor to a consensus-oriented Delphi exercise, whereby the Policy Delphi 
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serves to gather relevant options for a subsequent consensus study. (de Meyrick, 
2003) The course and outcome of an “honest” Policy Delphi, according to Turoff, 
cannot be predicted. (Turoff, 2002, p. 96) 
Turoff recommends that a Policy Delphi be conducted in five rounds which shall 
cover the following six phases: 
 Formulation of the issue 
 Exposing the options 
 Determining initial positions on the issues 
 Exploring and obtaining reasons for disagreement 
 Evaluating the underlying reasons 
 Reevaluating the options 
The process can be reduced to three rounds, if the research team formulates obvious 
issues for the first round. The respondents will add to the initial range of items and 
be asked for positions on an item and for underlying assumptions in the first round. 
(Ibid, p. 84) The issues at stake are rated according to desirability, feasibility, 
importance and confidence. Each item is ranked on a scale of four. (Table 4-1) 
Instead of including a neutral position in the rating scales, which is said to offer 
very little information, it is recommended that the respondents be given the 
opportunity to mark a ‘no judgment-option’. 
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Table 4-1 Policy Delphi – Rating categories 
Desirability (Effectiveness or Benefits) 
Very Desirable  - Will have a positive effect and little or no negative effect 
- extremely beneficial 
- justifiable on its own merit 
Desirable  - will have a positive effect and little or no negative effect 
- beneficial 
- justifiable as a by-product or in conjunction with other items 
Undesirable  - will have a negative effect 
- harmful 
- may be justified only as a by -product of a very desirable item, 
not justified as a by -product of a desirable item 
Very Undesirable  - will have a major negative effect 
- extremely harmful 
- not justifiable 
Feasibility (Practicality) 
Definitely Feasible - no hindrance to implementation 
- no R&D required 
- no political roadblocks 
- acceptable to the public 
Possibly Feasible 
 
- some indication this is implementable 
- some R&D still required 
- further consideration or preparation to be given to political  
or public reaction 
Possible Unfeasible - some indication this is unworkable 
- significant unanswered questions 
Definitely Unfeasible  - all indications are negative 
- unworkable 
- cannot be implemented 
Importance (Priority or Relevance) 
Very Important - a most relevant point 
- first-order priority 
- has direct bearing on major issues 
- must be resolved, dealt with, or treated 
Important - is relevant to the issue 
- second-order priority 
- significant impact but not until other items are treated 
- does not have to be fully resolved 
Slightly Important - insignificantly relevant 
- third-order priority 
- has little importance 
- not a determining factor to major issue 
Unimportant - no priority 
- no relevance 
- no measurable effect 
- should be dropped as an item to consider 
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Confidence (In Validity of Argument or Premise) 
Certain - low risk of being wrong 
- decision based upon this will not be wrong because of this "fact" 
- most inferences drawn from this will be true 
Reliable - some risk of being wrong 
- willing to make a decision based on this but recognizing some 
chance of error 
- some incorrect inferences can be drawn 
Risky - substantial risk of being wrong 
- not willing to make a decision based on this alone 
- many incorrect inferences can be drawn 
Unreliable - great risk of being wrong 
- of no use as a decision basis 
(The table is reproduced from Turoff, 2002, p. 86-87) 
 
The term ‘expert’ is not considered the most appropriate label for the respondent in 
a Policy Delphi, since “a policy issue is one for which there are not experts, only 
informed advocates and referees. […] The expert becomes an advocate for 
effectiveness or efficiency and must compete with the advocates for concerned 
interest groups within the society or organization involved with the issue.” (Ibid, p. 
80) Hence, a Policy Delphi may also become a “self-fulfilling prophecy”, if the 
respondents are at the same time involved in decision-making processes for the 
subject under consideration. (de Meyrick, 2003) Several pitfalls have been 
identified for conventional Delphis (Linstone & Turoff, 2002), of which some may 
also apply to Policy Delphi. Among these are an over-reduction of complexity, 
illusory expertise (meaning that experts are blind for other views outside of their 
field of expertise), or careless execution of the survey (both by the researcher and 
the participant) (de Meyrick, 2003). Regarding the size of a panel, Turoff 
recommends that “[…] in many policy areas, a larger number of respondents, in the 
area of twenty or more, is commensurate with the number of differing interests that 
must often be considered in the increasingly complex issues facing organizations.” 
(Turoff, 2002, p. 83) 
Guidelines for the conduct of a Policy Delphi recommend i.a. at least two 
professionals to design / monitor the exercise, sometimes prior development of 
scenarios, factual summaries of background information, pre-tests, presenting 
respondents their original vote during feedbacks, as well as ensuring that the panel 
represents a peer group. (Ibid, p. 88-89) It is highly recommended to explore 
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dissensions when analyzing the results of a Policy Delphi. Aggregated responses of 
different groups of respondents (e.g. groups representing different stakeholders) 
will enable the researcher to identify trends among groups. (Ibid, p. 96). The ideal 
approach to test the reliability of the results would be to establish parallel panels, or 
to test-retest a panel. De Meyrick (2003), however, found only one project that had 
realized this approach. 
The issue of promoting R&D for neglected diseases is debated in various fora and 
by stakeholders from different professional backgrounds and affiliations in 
developing, developed and threshold countries. The aim of our research project was 
to complement current debates with quantifiable data. Against the background of 
the possibilities and objectives outlined above for Delphi and Policy Delphi 
exercises, we considered a Policy Delphi to be the suitable method to collect the 
data for our research question. 
4.3 Data Analysis 
4.3.1 Quantitative data 
Since the panel of our Policy Delphi survey was not a representative sample of a 
population of experts, planned analyses included descriptive, but not inferential 
statistics. (cf. a. Häder, 2000, p. 7 ff.) To inform the participants of the results of the 
categorical items after each round of the survey, frequency analysis would be 
performed, and the percentage scores would be displayed in bar charts. For the 
purpose of the feedback, frequency analysis were based on fully completed 
questionnaires only. (cf. Chapter 4.2.1, Feedback) In the final analysis of the survey 
data (cf. Chapter 5, Results), frequency analysis also included questionnaires that 
had been partially completed. 
In the set of raw data, missing values were coded differently depending on whether 
the respondent had not seen the question, i.a. because of abandoning the 
questionnaire (Code -77), or whether he or she saw the question, but did not answer 
it (Code 0); in the final analysis, both types of missing values were summarized to 
form a single category labeled “missing data”. Cross-tabulations using break 
variables of the questionnaire section on demography (professional affiliations / 
place of residence of the participants) were performed for selected variables to 
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identify variations between subgroups of survey respondents. Standard deviations 
and mean values reflected the overall support for an item and the degree of 
consensus among the respondents. The respondents were asked to rank categorical 
items on scales of four, with a fifth option being labeled “no judgment”. (cf. 
Chapter 4.4.1 including questionnaire development) The value labels ranged from 
“1” for the most positive replies to “4” for the most negative reply. The value label 
for the answer “no judgment” was “5”. No judgment-replies were considered active 
replies and were not coded as missing values. The results for no judgment-replies 
were included in the frequency analysis as a source of information; however, they 
were excluded from calculations of standard deviations and mean values. 
4.3.2 Qualitative data  
A Policy Delphi may include general comments or full-text replies, i.e. additions or 
modifications of questionnaire items. Often, these are quite numerous, and the 
researcher faces the challenge to develop a manageable questionnaire for the second 
round, while taking due account of the contributions made by the respondents. (cf. 
de Villiers et al., 2005) We asked the respondents to provide comments on the 
survey and to modify or complement existing items; for the latter option, each 
respondent could add a maximum of three suggestions for modifications and / or 
additions. Comment fields were cleaned from information which could reveal the 
authorship, and forwarded to the respondents with the feedback. Full-text fields that 
contained suggestions for modifications of, or additions to, existing items were 
subject to a qualitative analysis with a view to incorporating these suggestions into 
the questionnaire for the second round. The method chosen for the qualitative 
analysis was the “text sorting technique” (TST) which recommends the following 
steps (for this and the following cf. Beywl & Schepp-Winter, 2000, p. 62 ff.): 
 Coding of questionnaires / respondents 
 Include text in a word document 
 Separate texts into meaningful units and check them against the research 
question 
 Development of categories 
 Document the edited text passages 
 Development of brief descriptions for categories. 
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To prepare for the data analysis, numeric codes are assigned to each questionnaire 
or respondent and to each full-text questionnaire item. It is recommended that the 
codes are preceded by special characters to perform search and sorting operations. 
The qualitative data are organized in columns (Word or Excel format) under the 
headings of the respondent’s questionnaire code, the questionnaire item number, the 
variable name and the value, i.e. the full-text response. The last column heading is 
labeled “category” and contains the three-digit number of the category (or 
categories) to which the full-text response is being assigned. (Table 4-2) 
Table 4-2 Organization of qualitative data for category development 
Respondent ID Questionnaire Item Variable name Value Category 
000 000 XXX Full-text response 000 
 
Referring to Kelle / Kluge (1999) and Kleining (1994), Beywl / Schepp-Winter 
(2000, p. 66 ff.) suggest a process of iterative / repeated reading of all incoming 
suggestions for the development of categories, and the identification of similarities. 
This process shall always be guided by the question whether the newly developed 
category serves to answer the original question. Categories shall not overlap, and 
dichotomies (good-bad) or categories headed ‘miscellaneous / other’ are to be 
avoided. In an ideal category system, the maximum number of categories that are 
assigned to each original questionnaire item ranges between three and eight. The 
number of responses in each category shall not exceed 30, whereby one response 
can be given various category codes. Categories can be subdivided, but subdivisions 
should not exceed three levels. Each category is to be documented in a legend. 
Categories may include in-vivo-codes (exact wording of a respondent) or codes 
developed independently from the respondents’ wording. After the categorization 
for a questionnaire item is complete, the full-text replies are sorted by category to 
check the validity of the coding concept. 
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4.4 Implementation of the Policy Delphi Survey 
The survey was designed along the guidelines described in Chapter 4.2.2, with 
slight adaptations to the recommended structure to minimize attrition rates, and to 
accommodate the research question. Sections 4.4.1 ff. below describe the design 
and the implementation of the survey. The survey was conceptualized as an online 
exercise using Unipark, the university version of Globalpark EFS Survey61. Unipark 
EFS Survey works with all common browsers; no software installation is required 
to design a survey or to participate in it. In addition to enabling online questionnaire 
design and survey implementation, the software facilitates mailings to survey 
participants, generates personalized access codes, online data analysis, online 
reports and data exports in different formats. Separated exports of participants’ 
personal data (names, e-mail addresses) and survey results ensure anonymous data 
analysis.  
4.4.1 Step 1: Literature review, questionnaire development, panel 
selection 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior to the development of the questionnaire for the first round, a literature search 
was performed using the internet search function of the literature data base 
Reference Manager, Version 11.062 (s. Annex II – Survey Documentation). In 
addition, documents and grey literature were researched and retrieved by keyword 
search using the Google search engine, or from relevant homepages (e.g. WHO, 
EMA). Publications of an exclusively clinical character, e.g. case reports, were 
eliminated from the search results. Publications which were considered appropriate 
dealt with political, ethical, legal / regulatory and / or economic aspects of orphan 
and neglected diseases. The literature was reviewed against the backdrop of the 
following questions: 
 
                                                 
61
 The survey was conducted with Unipark Version 5.2. 
62
 Reference Manager searches the ISI Web of Science, a selection of Web of Science databases, PubMed, the 
National Library of Medicine’s public access database, and Z39.50 sites, a selection of Z39.50 databases. 
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 Which are the likely causes for a treatment deficit for neglected diseases? 
 Which measures should / could be taken to remedy this deficit? 
 Should a regulatory instrument be created to promote neglected disease 
R&D? 
 How could neglected diseases be defined (with a view to developing a 
regulatory instrument)? 
 Are orphan drug laws and their provisions an effective measure to foster 
R&D for rare diseases? 
 Could orphan drug laws and their provisions serve as a blueprint for 
measures to foster R&D for neglected diseases? 
 How desirable and how feasible are the provisions proposed in the draft 
Medical Research and Development Treaty for the promotion of neglected 
disease R&D? 
QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT 
Along the lines of the above questions, the items for the first round of survey were 
formulated and organized into chapters on causes for the treatment deficit, on the 
performance of orphan drug regulations for rare diseases, on measures to promote 
R&D for neglected diseases, on criteria to define neglected diseases and on the 
option of a regulatory instrument to promote R&D into neglected diseases. The 
survey closed with a chapter in which the respondents were asked to contribute 
information on their professional background, their professional affiliation and their 
place of residence. In view of the fact that there would be only two rounds of 
survey, it was decided to ask the respondents in the first round to rank pre-
formulated items, and to suggest modifications and additional items. To this end, 
three full-text fields each were included in Chapters I (Causes for the treatment 
deficit for neglected diseases), III.1 (Measures to foster R&D for neglected 
diseases), III.5 (Criteria for a definition of neglected diseases) and IV. 2 a) and b) 
(Demographic data on professional backgrounds and professional affiliations of 
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survey respondents).63 The questionnaire was first drafted as a paper version and 
then developed as online-questionnaire in the EFS software. 
Different scales were selected for the various chapters of the survey. Causes were to 
be rated according to importance, and orphan drug regulations and their provisions 
according to effectiveness. Measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases were 
rated according to desirability and to feasibility; the same scale was used for the 
question on a regulatory instrument to promote R&D into neglected diseases. In the 
first round of survey, the experts were also asked to name three criteria each for a 
definition of neglected diseases. In the last chapter, multiple choices were possible 
for the question on professional backgrounds; one option each could be selected for 
the questions on professional affiliations and place of residence. The questions on 
professional backgrounds and affiliations contained an ‘other’-option with a full-
text field. Entries into these full-text entries would be included in the list of options 
in the second round of the survey. Full-text fields for comments were included in 
the section on the desirability and feasibility of a regulatory instrument for 
neglected diseases, and as general comment field at the end of the survey. 
The labels for the variables were: 
1= most important / very desirable / definitely feasible64 / very effective 
2= important / desirable / possibly feasible / effective 
3= unimportant / undesirable / possibly unfeasible / ineffective 
4= least important / very undesirable / definitely unfeasible / very ineffective 
5= no judgment 
                                                 
63
 Chapter II on the effectiveness of orphan drug regulations for rare diseases served to inform the research team 
how familiar the respondents were with orphan drug-incentives and whether they considered them effective for 
rare diseases. However, since our research project did not aim to identify new options to foster R&D for rare 
diseases, the Chapter was not repeated, and no additions and modifications were requested. Orphan drug-style 
incentives were, however, part of the list of measure to promote R&D into neglected diseases. (Chapter III) 
64
 In round one, the ranking said “very feasible – feasible- unfeasible - very unfeasible” while the definition read 
“definitely feasible – possibly feasible – possibly unfeasible - definitely unfeasible”. This was corrected in the 
second round. 
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The no-judgment-option was given instead of a “neutral” position to enable the 
participants to actively indicate that they did not wish to express an opinion on an 
item. Prior to launching the survey, a pre-test via the EFS survey software was 
carried out during which five individuals of different academic backgrounds and 
professional affiliations contributed 21 technical and editorial comments on the 
survey design, the formulation of the items and on the implementation of the online 
version. 
PANEL SELECTION 
The participants were selected from the following sources: 
• Publications on neglected and orphan diseases 
• Participants in the Conference on Neglected Infectious Diseases, organized 
by the DG Research of the European Commission, Brussels, November 8 
and 9, 2006, which the author attended 
(http://ec.europa.eu/research/health/infectious-diseases/neglected-
diseases/pdf/nid-conference-final-report052007_en.pdf) 
• Contributions to two online hearings (November 1-15, 2006 and August 15 
– September 30, 2007) of the WHO Intergovernmental Working Group 
(WHO-IGWG) to develop a global strategy and plan of action for neglected 
diseases (http://www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/en/) 
• A letter signed by 162 scientists, public health experts, lawyers, economists, 
government representatives and parliamentarians to accompany the 
submission of the draft Medical Research and Development Treaty to the 
WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health in 
2005. 
The selection was purposive insofar as we chose sources that would ensure that the 
invitees were interested in the matter, knowledgeable of the matter, and would 
represent a broad professional and geographic spectrum. When selecting the panel, 
however, we could only assume the participants professional background or 
affiliation, or their place of residence. Since it was impossible to predict 
 72 
participation and attrition rates at the onset of the study, we did not reduce or adjust 
the potential panel to achieve a balanced sample for geographic distribution, 
professional backgrounds or professional affiliation. The outcome of the 
demography section of the survey would later have to show whether the data would 
lend themselves to a stratification of the experts, and to cross-tabulations of the 
results. 
4.4.2 Step 2: First round of the survey 
Contact data65 that were available from the aforementioned publications, hearings 
and conference proceedings were entered into an Excel sheet. To invite potential 
participants, first names, last names and Email addresses were imported into the 
EFS survey software. The software generated participants IDs and personalized 
access codes to the survey. An Email invitation was sent out on March 9, 2008 
which included the personalized access code to the survey, and a brief project 
description. Two weeks into the field time, a reminder Email was sent to all 
participants who had activated the link to the survey, but who had not completed the 
questionnaire (the invitation and related documents are reproduced in the Annex to 
this document). At the request of several participants, the closing date for the first 
round was extended from March 29 to April 3, 2008.  
4.4.3 Step 3: Analysis of the data of the first round, revision of the 
questionnaire 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA OF THE FIRST ROUND 
Feedbacks in our survey served two purposes: a) to forward the quantitative results 
of the first round to the participants and b) to display the suggestions and comments 
received during the previous round. The respondents were not shown their votes 
from the previous round, though, as this would have required that the author sign a 
data protection waiver in order to receive a combined data export of survey results 
and contact data; the anonymity of the experts vis-à-vis the research team would 
thus have been lifted, which we considered a breach of our initial commitment to 
                                                 
65
 Contact data included last names, first names, Email addresses, and, if available, information on professional 
background, professional affiliation and country of residence. 
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anonymity. Quantitative data of the first round were analyzed using the Globalpark 
Reporting function as well as SPSS and Microsoft Excel in their current versions. 
Frequency distributions of categorical variables were prepared and displayed in bar 
charts. Frequencies were calculated for all participants who fully completed the 
questionnaire for the first round (N=117). To feed back the raw data of the full-text 
fields (suggestions and modifications), the contents were edited, and information 
which revealed a respondent’s identity, such as names, contact data or links to 
proper publications were removed. The contents were then collated in pdf-
documents. Links to both the bar charts and to the pdf-files were included in the 
relevant pages of the questionnaire for the second round. (Fig. 4-1, Fig. 4-2)  
Fig. 4-1 Screenshot: Access to the feedback of the 1st Round (Frequencies) 
 
Fig. 4-2 Screenshot: Access to the feedback of the 1st Round (Full-text replies) 
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REVISION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The questionnaire for the first round contained two types of full-text responses, i.e. 
comments and suggestions for new items / modifications of existing items. The 
latter, suggestions and modifications, formed the basis for the revision of the 
questionnaire. To keep the questionnaire for the second round manageable, the 
suggestions were clustered and aggregated using the TST-method described in 
Chapter 4.3.2. Utmost effort was devoted to the analysis of the numerous 
suggestions and modifications, which were matched with existing items, or formed 
into new items. The process is described below. 
All full-text responses (excluding those in the comment sections) were exported 
from the EFS survey software into an Excel file. The data for each chapter (causes 
for the treatment deficit, measures to promote R&D for neglected diseases, criteria 
for a definition of neglected diseases) were saved in separate work sheets. The data 
were organized into six columns (Table 4-3). 
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Table 4-3 Qualitative data analysis: Example of structuring of data 
Questionnaire No. varname Question Code value Category 
corresponding existing/  
newly created item no. 
§825 Addmeas3 #06 to mobilise fund 100 
e.g. previous questionnaire item 
no.xyz 
§829 Addmeas3 #06 
Commitment & accountability of organization receiving funding towards 
achievement of goals 100 
 
§837 Addmeas2 #05 Availability of adequate funding 100 
 
§861 Addmeas2 #05 
it has to go through taxes and public funding; tax reduction to companies can 
never be a 'lasting' commitment, the research program will be cut as soon as 
the company realizes that it is lost money. 100 
 
§873 Addmeas2 #05 Commitment from governments in developed countries to fund R&D 100 
 
§878 Addmeas3 #06 Follow up of tho ongoing program 100 
 
§894 Addmeas1 #04 calls from international R&D org. like EC for research projects 100  
§911 Addmeas2 #05 public accountability systems for producers and providers  100 
 
§920 Addmeas1 #04 Increase fundings opportunities for neglected tropical diseases 100 
 
§924 Addmeas3 #06 more available grant for R and D for neglected diseases  100 
 
§971 Addmeas1 #04 More predictable and sustained funding for PPPs e.g. MMV 100 
 
Export and coding of qualitative data: Table 4-3 shows suggestions for additional items that were received in the first survey round for the questionnaire heading “Measures to 
promote research and development  for neglected diseases”. Each participant was allowed to make a maximum of three suggestions which, for the purpose of the qualitative analysis, 
were coded as question 04, 05 and 06. The above suggestions were, after qualitative analysis, included in a Category 100 labeled “Measures relating to increased / more sustainable 
funding and to accountability for funds received”. Some entries, such as the one shown for questionnaire no. §861 above, contained not only additions or modification of existing 
questionnaire items, but also comments on selected item in the list of measures, (here: tax reduction/tax credits). 
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The first column in the Excel work sheets, headed Questionnaire No., contained the 
three-digit ID which the EFS software generated for each survey participant. For 
search and grouping purposes, the EFS codes were preceded by the character “§”. 
The second column contained the variable name (here: AddMeas1-3, which 
abbreviates the three full-text fields for suggestions in the chapter on measures to 
promote R&D into neglected diseases). In addition to the variable name, a third 
column (Question code) contained a code which was assigned to each variable and 
which was preceded with the special character “#”; full-text fields in the 
questionnaire were thus numbered chronologically, irrespective of their original 
number in the questionnaire. The fourth column contained the full text replies of the 
respondents, while the fifth column had the number of the category which was 
assigned to the full-text reply. Full-text replies that contained several suggestions, or 
whose content could be matched with more than one category heading could be 
grouped into several categories. In a sixth column, the full-text replies were either 
cross-referenced with previous questionnaire items, or assigned new item numbers. 
For each questionnaire section, a system of categories was developed ad hoc. 
Original wording was retained in those cases where suggestions were very specific 
and could not be merged with other statements. Full-text entries were compared and 
analyzed with a view to identifying patterns and structures in the data that would 
eventually serve as new category or subcategory. (cf. Kelle Udo & Kluge Susanne, 
1999, p. 54 ff.) The procedure for each questionnaire chapter is described below. 
CAUSES FOR THE TREATMENT DEFICIT FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES 
Chapter I of the questionnaire for the first round of survey contained seven likely 
causes for the deficit in treatment for neglected diseases. The experts contributed 98 
suggestions to this section which, in a first step, were clustered into eight categories. 
(Table 4-4) 
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Table 4-4 Category legend: Causes for the deficit in treatments for neglected diseases 
Category Legend: 'Causes for the Treatment Deficit'.* 
000 (9)  Comment or proposal how to improve the situation 
100 (9) Causes relating to poverty 
200 (15) Causes relating to structural (delivery / health system structures) or policy deficits in developing (endemic) countries  
300 (12) Causes relating to inadequacy of current incentives 
400 (3) Causes relating to inadequate prevention 
500 (9) Causes relating to human resources / education / training in developing countries 
600 (11) Causes relating to lack of awareness / advocacy 
700 (9) Causes relating to disease-specific research difficulties 
800 (20) Causes relating to inadequate policy / insufficient (financial) commitment / inadequate research priorities 
900 (4) Causes relating to inadequate research coordination / cooperation 
999 (3) not applicable to the question 
* Three-digit-numbers labeled the categories while the numbers in brackets show the number of 
suggestions that were included in a category. Where necessary, two categories 000 and 999 were 
established. Comments (000) gathered contributions and statements that could not be identified as a 
cause. At the request of the respondents, a comment field was added to this section in the second 
round of the survey. The category 999 (not applicable to the question) included full-text entries such 
as contact data. 
 
In a second step, eight new items were extracted from these categories, and several 
suggestions were matched with original items from the first round of survey. 
Table 4-5 illustrates the modification and expansion of items in Chapter I. 
Table 4-5 Identical and new questionnaire items (Causes for the treatment deficit) 
Identical items in round one and two Newly added items in round two 
No or inadequate direct public funding for 
research and development (R&D) for 
neglected diseases 
Disease-specific research difficulties (unknown 
etiology, lack of research material) 
No or inadequate private sector 
investment into R&D for neglected 
diseases 
Inadequate research priorities in private sector 
R&D 
No or inadequate incentives for the 
private sector to invest into R&D for 
neglected diseases 
Lack of awareness / visibility of neglected 
diseases 
No or insufficient sustainability of public 
funding for R&D for neglected diseases 
Lack of health-needs driven priority setting in 
public funding 
No or ineffective drugs for neglected 
diseases No or inadequate research coordination 
No or inadequate access to effective drugs 
for neglected diseases 
No or inadequate health delivery infrastructure 
and staff in developing countries 
No or inadequate research infrastructure 
in countries with neglected diseases 
Poverty as disease-proliferating factor (i.a. 
inadequate prevention, inadequate housing, 
lack of clean water) in endemic countries 
 
Poverty as reason for market failure (perception 
of no market for drugs, insufficient R&D) 
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MEASURES TO PROMOTE R&D INTO DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES 
Following the same procedure, eight categories were developed for the 134 
suggestions which the experts offered for the section on measures to promote 
research and development into neglected diseases (Table 4-6) 
Table 4-6 Category legend: Measures to promote R&D for neglected diseases 
Category 
No. Category title 
000 (5) Comment 
100 (11) Measures relating to increased / more sustainable funding and to 
accountability for funds received 
200 (19) 
Measures relating to enhancing research cooperation, incl. interdisciplinary 
cooperation (with i.a. veterinary medicine, traditional medicine, 
epidemiology) 
300 (26) Measures relating to capacity building in and knowledge transfer to endemic (developing) countries 
400 (3) Measures relating to improving access to health care and to drugs 
500 (17) Measures relating to funding priorities 
600 (24) Measures relating to advocacy and increasing visibility / awareness of ND 
700 (12) Measures relating to incentives for and encouragement of the private sector 
800 (23) Measures relating to structural reforms / further development of current 
regulations 
 
Since the suggestions in this section were far more heterogeneous than those in 
Chapter I on the causes for the treatment deficit, 36 new items were extracted. 
Together with seven previous and seven modified items from the first round, the list 
of potential measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases increased from 16 to 
the 50 items.  
Table 4-7 below reproduces the list of items which were repeated in the second 
round, either with unchanged or modified wording, Table 4-8 shows the newly 
included items. 
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Table 4-7 Identical and modified questionnaire items (Measures to promote R&D) 
Identical items in round one 
and two 
Modified items (the wording in italic print is that of 
the second round) 
Exemption of drugs from 
market exclusivity 
Advance market commitments (Incentives for the 
private sector (e.g. advance market commitments, 
governmental incentives)) 
Fee reduction / Fee waivers 
(e.g. for marketing approval, 
scientific advice) 
Existing patent regulations (Existing patent regulations 
(e.g. WTO-TRIPS, Doha-Declaration)) 
Market exclusivity 
Investment obligations into neglected diseases for drug 
producers / sellers (Obligation for the private sector to 
invest x % of profit made from other drugs / treatments 
into neglected diseases) 
Obligations for national 
governments to invest into 
neglected disease R&D 
Patent pools (Patent pools / more flexible patent laws to 
improve access to research tools) 
Open source regulations (e.g. 
for scientific data / compound 
libraries) 
Prize funds for drug innovation (Prize funds with prizes 
awarded based on degree of innovation) 
Public-private partnerships Protocol assistance (Protocol and regulatory advice / 
assistance to neglected disease R&D projects) 
Separation of innovation 
incentives from drug prices Tax credits (Tax credits / tax incentives ) 
 
Table 4-8 New questionnaire items (Measures to promote R&D) 
New items in round two 
o Abolish patents 
o Association of biotechnology to health systems for better delivery of goods 
o Building innovation clusters for low-profit oriented R&D in developing 
countries 
o Building research, technical and regulatory capacity in developing countries 
o Competitive grants to publicly fund research 
o Contribution by foreign donors towards capacity building and strengthening 
the research infrastructure in developing countries 
o Development to phase III trials by public laboratories 
o Educate / inform the public about the individual and societal burden of disease 
of neglected diseases 
o Establishment of accountability systems for funds received 
o Establishment of an international health-needs driven R&D agenda matched to 
technological opportunities 
o Establishment of public (or affordable) preclinical research facilities 
o Exclusive funds for R&D / budgetary set-asides exclusively for purchasing 
medicines for neglected diseases 
o Global funders forum to set priorities 
o Government support and funds for multilateral efforts (e.g. WHO-TDR) 
o Include neglected diseases in university curricula 
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Table 4-8 continued 
New items in round two 
o Interconnection between research projects on different neglected diseases 
o Interdisciplinary research cooperation with e.g. veterinary medicine, 
traditional medicine, epidemiology 
o International / transcontinental research cooperation involving researchers 
from developing countries 
o International regulations regarding the private sector 
o Link between neglected disease R&D and research and clinical care for 
priority diseases such as HIV, TB or Malaria 
o Lower private sector influence on R&D priority setting 
o Neglected disease R&D as priority in relevant European Union funding 
programs (e.g. FP7) 
o New alternative juridical instruments which allow governments to foster 
essential health research and development 
o Parallel measures to improve access to health care and medicines 
o Price increases (10-20%) for brand name drugs paid by public health 
programs to invest this profit in neglected disease R&D 
o Private donations to "real" pharmaceutical companies to develop drugs for 
neglected 
o Raise awareness among policy makers for the impact of neglected diseases on 
development 
o Raising the scientific profile of neglected disease research (better career 
/ publication opportunities) 
o Reorganize intellectual property rights as intellectual monopoly privileges 
o Requirement for developing countries to include research with an adequate 
budget in all health programs 
o Royalty arrangements for the benefit of neglected disease R&D if private 
sector receives exclusive license on government-owned invention for any 
disease 
o Selective investment (as incentive) in companies which invest in neglected 
disease R&D 
o Sharing or transfer of technology to developing countries 
o Simplified / fast-track funding procedures 
o Treaty on cost-effectiveness of new health technologies linked to a 
competitive tender system 
o Voucher systems in developed markets (as with the FDA) for other products 
 
CRITERIA FOR A DEFINITION OF “NEGLECTED DISEASES” IN A REGULATORY 
INSTRUMENT 
In the first round of the survey, the participants were asked to suggest three criteria 
each which they deemed most relevant for a definition of neglected diseases. The 
section did not contain pre-formulated items, but three full-text fields. The number 
of suggestions made was considerable (237); similar to the first chapter on causes 
for the treatment deficit, however, they were rather homogenous. The suggestions 
were clustered into six categories (Table 4-9) from which six criteria for a definition 
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of neglected diseases were extracted. In the second round of the survey, the 
participants would be asked to rate these criteria according to importance. 
Table 4-9 Category legend: Criteria for a definition of neglected diseases 
Category No. Category title 
000 (7) Comment 
100 (72) 
Criteria relating to absence of effective treatment and lack of ongoing 
research 
200 (79) Criteria relating to prevalence, burden of disease   
300 (41) 
Criteria relating to disease severity: life-threatening, serious, debilitating, 
chronic 
400 (13) Criteria relating to lack of access to existing effective treatment 
500 (7) Criteria relating to market failure / lack of purchasing power 
600 (6) Criteria relating to awareness / visibility of relevant diseases 
999 (16) Not applicable to question 
 
4.4.4 Step 4: Second round of the survey including feedback 
On July 10, 2008, the questionnaire for the second round was finalized and mailed 
to the 117 panelists who completed the survey of the first round. The number of 
items for the questions on causes for the treatment deficit and on measures to 
promote R&D increased considerably between round one and two; the item on the 
regulatory instrument remained unchanged, while the question on criteria for a 
definition of neglected diseases changed from full-text replies in the first round to a 
quantitative question in the second round. In the demography section, new 
answering options for professional affiliation and professional background had been 
added to include the panelists suggestions. Following requests from survey 
participants, comment fields had been added to all sections of the questionnaire in 
the second round. Table 4-10 below compares the structure of the questionnaires for 
the first and for the second round. (The questionnaires for both rounds are 
reproduced in the Annex to this document) 
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Table 4-10 Structure of the questionnaires for Round I and II 
Type of Question Question and no. of items 
 Round one Round two 
Closed-ended question / Likert 
Scale / full-text fields 
Causes for the treatment deficit for neglected diseases 
7 items plus 3 full-text 
fields to add items 15 items plus one comment field 
Closed-ended question 
Familiarity with orphan 
drug acts 
not repeated in the second round, 
one full-text field provided to 
comment on the outcome 
displayed in the feedback 
3 options 
Closed-ended question / Likert 
Scale 
Effectiveness of orphan 
drug acts 
Closed-ended question / Likert 
Scale 
Effectiveness of four key 
incentives in orphan 
drug acts 
Closed-ended question / Likert 
Scale / full-text-fields 
Desirability & feasibility of measures to promote R&D for 
neglected diseases 
16 items plus 3 full-text 
fields to add items 50 items plus one comment field 
Closed-ended question / Likert 
Scale 
Desirability & feasibility of a regulatory instrument to 
foster R&D for neglected diseases 
1 item plus two full-text 
fields for comments (one 
for desirability and 
feasibility each) 
1 item plus one full-text field for 
comments 
Full-text fields (Round One), 
Closed-ended question / Likert 
Scale (Round Two) 
Criteria for a definition of “neglected diseases” 
3 full-text-fields for 
suggested criteria 
6 options plus one full-text field 
for comments 
Full-text field Comment on the survey 
Hybrid question, multiple 
answers were allowed 
Professional background 
5 options plus one full-
text field for addition 
8 options plus one full-text field 
for additions 
Hybrid question 
Profession affiliation 
5 options plus one full-
text field for additions 
6 options plus one full-text field 
for additions 
Closed-ended question 
Place of residence 
3 options 3 options 
 
A brief welcoming note opened the survey on page one of the questionnaire; notes 
on the technical procedure followed on page two. The list of questions began on 
page three. As in the first round of the survey, all participants who activated the link 
to the questionnaire, but did not complete it, received a reminder Email. At the 
request of several participants, the deadline to fill in the questionnaire was extended 
from August 8, 2008 to August 15, 2008. Of the 114 experts whom we were able to 
contact for the second round (three Emails were undeliverable), 68% (n=77) 
activated the link to the questionnaire, and 49% (n=56) completed it. 
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4.4.5 Step 5: Analysis of the second round data 
After the closing date for the second round, frequency distributions were prepared 
for the considerably increased number of categorical variables, and displayed in bar 
charts. Frequencies were calculated for all participants who completed the 
questionnaire for the second round (N=56). Comments in full-text fields were 
edited to exclude information that revealed the author’s identity, and collated in pdf-
files. 
4.4.6 Step 6: Second and final feedback 
On December 1, 2008, a personalized link was mailed to the panelists with which 
they could access the survey platform and view the results of the second round of 
survey. (Fig. 4-3) Access to the second feedback was available until January 31, 
2009. No requests to extend the access time beyond this date were received. 
Fig. 4-3 Screenshot: Final feedback after the second round 
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of experts who activated the personalized access code to the survey (Net 
participation 1 and 2). 
Table 5-1 Participation and Attrition 
 Round One Round Two 
 N % N % 
Total sample 388 100 117 100 
Email undeliverable66 62 15.9 3 0.02 
Adjusted total sample 326 100 114 100 
Net participation (1) 159 47.7 77 67.5 
Net participation (2) 159 100 77 100 
Survey Completed 117 73.6 56 72.7 
Survey Suspended 42 26.4 21 27.2 
 
In the first round of the survey, the majority of the potential respondents who 
abandoned the questionnaire did so after having read the introductory page (n=12) 
or the first list of questions (n=15). In the second round, n=21 participants 
abandoned the questionnaire, n=8 of these prior to having accessed the first list of 
questions. 
Of the total number of participants contacted, 84 had signed the accompanying 
letter to the draft Medical Research and Development Treaty. In both rounds of the 
survey, these signatories represented about 25% of the survey participants who 
completed the survey (n=28/round 1, n=14/round 2) 
  
                                                 
66
 A small number of Emails were rejected because the invitation was considered Spam mail. In these cases, the 
author re-sent the Email invitation from a different (personal) Email address. 
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5.2 The Questionnaire Items – Round I and II 
For the purpose of the feedbacks in the course of the survey, frequency distributions 
had exclusively considered fully completed questionnaires, and had been based on 
N=117 for the first and N=56 for the second round. To benefit from answers by 
respondents who filled in only part of the questionnaires, frequency distributions for 
the final data analysis in this chapter are based on N=159 for the first and N=77 for 
the second round, with valid n calculated for each questionnaire item. Frequency 
distributions for all items of the survey as well as cross-tabulations, where 
applicable, are displayed in tabular format in the Annex to this document. 
5.2.1 Demographic Data 
In a questionnaire section labeled “demographic data”, the participants were asked 
to share information on their professional affiliation, their professional background 
and their place of residence. 
In the first round of the survey, the respondents chose from a list of six professional 
affiliations and an option labeled “other”, which was linked to a full-text field. 
Here, the participants were asked to specify their professional affiliation if it was 
not included in the list. Prior to launching the survey, data that were publicly 
available had been used to reckon the professional affiliation of the potential 
participants; these estimates are included as a third column in Table 5-2 below. We 
had estimated that the majority of the experts whom we attempted to contact were 
affiliated with academia; this group indeed represented the majority in both rounds 
of the survey (cf. Table 5-2 below). Between the first and the second round of the 
survey, the percentage of entries in the field “other” decreased from 11.6% to 3.8%; 
a category “public private partnership” was added for the second round to reflect 
full-text entries in the first round.  
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Table 5-2 Professional affiliation of survey participants 
Professional affiliation of survey participants (n) 
 Round one* Round two* Experts attempted to contact** 
Academia 53.6% (60) 54.7%(29) 48.2% (187) 
Non-governmental organization 14.3% (16) 11.3% (6) 13.9% (54) 
Other 11.6% (13) 3.8% (2) 8.3% (32) 
Industry 10.7% (12) 11.3% (6) 8.5% (33) 
National government / parliament 5.4% (6) 7.5% (4) 17.5% (68) 
International organization 4.5% (5) 7.5% (4) 3.6% (14) 
Public Private Partnership n / a 3.8% (2)  
 Total valid 100% (112)) 100% (53) 100% (388) 
Missing 
-77 25.8% (41) 27.3% (21)  
0 3.8% (6) 3.9% (3)  
Total 29.6% (47) 31.2% (24)  
Total 100% (159) 100% (77)  
* Self-reported during the survey / **Professional affiliation assumed prior to the survey on the basis of 
available data 
 
The second item in this section, labeled ‘professional background’, also offered six 
categories in the first round, which increased to eight in the second round to 
accommodate full-text entries of the first round. (Table 5-3) For this item, multiple 
responses were possible. In contrast to the item labeled ‘professional affiliation’ 
above, where it had been possible to draw conclusions to professional affiliation 
from Email-addresses of potential participants prior to the first round of survey, we 
did not endeavor to research the professional backgrounds of the individual experts 
whom we contacted. Table 5-3 thus exclusively displays self-reported data of the 
respondents during both rounds of the survey. As shown in Table 5-3 below, the 
majority of the respondents had a professional background in the life sciences or in 
public health.  
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Table 5-3 Professional background of survey participants 
Professional background of survey participants* (n) 
 Round one Round two 
Medicine 36.4% (43) 32.1% (17) 
Other 33.1% (39) 8.9% (5) 
Public Health 30.5% (36) 26.8% (15) 
Law 8.5% (10) 10.7% (6) 
Political Science 7.6% (9) 12.5% (7) 
Economy 4.2% (5) 0.0% (0) 
Biology / Biomedical Sciences n / a** 30.4% (18) 
Pharmaceutical Sciences n / a** 17.9% (10) 
Veterinary medicine n / a** 1.8% (1) 
*Multiple responses were possible / **n/a: these categories were added in the second round based on details 
given in the “other”-field during the first round 
 
In the last item of this section (Table 5-4 below), we asked the participants to 
indicate their place of residence, for which three categories had been listed, i.e. 
developed country, developing country and threshold country / emerging market. 
Prior to launching the survey, we had estimated from data on professional 
affiliations or Email addresses that 218 of the experts whom we attempted to 
contact came from Europe, 36 from Africa, 21 from North America, ten from Latin 
America, nine from Asia, and one from the Middle East. The distribution of 
participants in the three relevant categories remained rather stable in both rounds of 
the survey (Table 5-4), with the clear majority of the experts residing in a developed 
country.67 
  
                                                 
67
 Caution may have to be exercised when drawing conclusions from these data or when using the items as a 
break variable in cross-tabulations. To illustrate, one participant from a developed country asked to sent in a 
filled-in paper version of the questionnaire by regular mail, and authorized the author to perform the online-entry 
of the data. The background of the request was that the participant currently resided in a developing country (and 
indicated this in the questionnaire) and had very limited access to the internet. We assume that, owing to the fact 
that the question was labeled “place of residence”, the results for this item will include experts from developing 
countries who temporarily / currently reside in developed or threshold countries, or vice versa. 
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Table 5-4 Place of residence of survey participants 
 Round one (n) Round two (n) 
Developed country 74,8% (83) 75,5% (40) 
Developing country 18,9% (21) 20,8% (11) 
Threshold country / emerging market 6,3% (7) 3,8% (2) 
 Total valid 100% (111) 100% (53) 
Missing 
-77 41 (25.8%) 27.3% (21) 
0 7 (4.4%) 3.9% (3) 
Total 48 (30.25) 31.2% (24 
Total 100% (159) 100% (77) 
 
5.2.2 Causes for the Treatment Deficit for Neglected Diseases 
In the first chapter of the survey, we asked the respondents for an assessment of the 
causes of the treatment and R&D deficit for neglected diseases. Seven causes, 
retrieved from literature, made up the list of items in the first round, complemented 
by three full-text fields for each participant. During the first round of the survey, the 
respondents offered more than ninety suggestions for new or modified causes. 
Some participants underlined that the scope of this chapter would have to be 
broadened beyond the issue of medical R&D. The respondents’ suggestions were 
clustered (cf. p. 76), and the list of likely causes was expanded to 15 items in the 
second round. The majority of the respondents’ suggestions related to structural / 
policy deficits in developing countries (category 200), to the inadequacy of current 
incentives (category 300) and to a lack of awareness and advocacy (category 600). 
In both rounds, the causes were to be ranked according to importance. 
As illustrated in Fig. 5-2 below, in the first round, the respondents identified 
insufficient sustainability of public R&D funding as the most important cause for 
the lack of treatments, yet it was by no means the only important cause. Indeed, in 
the first round, only one item (‘no / ineffective drugs for neglected diseases’) 
received less than 80% of aggregated positive responses (most important / 
important). Standard deviations ranged from 0.5 to 0.9, indicating consensus among 
the panelist on the majority of items in the first round. Most consensus was 
established on the importance of a lack of adequate direct public funding ( 0.5) as 
major cause for the treatment deficit for neglected diseases. Least consensus was 
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established on the items “no or inadequate access to drugs” and “no or ineffective 
drugs for neglected diseases” (both  0.9). 
In the second round of the survey, poverty as disease-proliferating factor received 
the highest ranking as the most important cause. It may be argued, however, that, 
strictly speaking, the item does not describe a cause for the treatment or R&D 
deficit, but for the persistence of neglected tropical infectious diseases. Of interest, 
‘Disease-specific research difficulties (unknown etiology, lack of research 
material)’, an item added to the list of causes for the second round, received the 
lowest score in the most-important-category, but was ranked highest of all items in 
the adjacent ‘important’-category. When aggregating the two positive categories, 13 
of the 15 causes listed were considered very important or important by more than 
80% of the panelists; only two items, i.e. disease-specific research difficulties and 
no or inadequate research coordination received less than 80% of aggregated 
positive replies. Most consensus was established on the importance of a “lack of 
health-needs driven priority setting in public funding” and on the item “no or 
insufficient direct public funding for research and development (R&D) for 
neglected diseases” (both  0.6) Least consensual items were ‘no or inadequate 
private sector investment’ ( 0.9). 
 
Fig. 5-2 Causes for the treatment deficit for negl
*Numbers in brackets at the end of the bars 
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Cross-tabulations were performed to explore differences between subgroups in the 
responses for this section. The differences in group sizes in both rounds (e.g. 
academia n=60 / Round I and n=29 / Round II compared to international 
organization n=5 / Round I and n=4 / Round II) and the small size of some 
subgroups ruled out a direct comparison between the subgroups. Neither subgroup 
maintained its ranking for the most important cause between the two rounds of the 
survey. This may be due to changes in the group’s composition between rounds, 
with subsequent new preferences. It may also be due to the availability of new and 
more differentiated items in the second round. The members of the subgroup 
‘academia’ rated items from the initial list of causes to be most important in both 
rounds (‘no or inadequate private sector investment into R&D for neglected 
diseases’ / Round I and ‘no or insufficient direct public funding for research and 
development (R&D) for neglected diseases / Round II). In contrast, the majority of 
the subgroup ‘industry’ ranked ‘no or inadequate incentives for the private sector to 
invest into R&D for neglected diseases’ as most important cause in the first round, 
shifting to the new item ‘no or inadequate research infrastructure in countries with 
neglected diseases’ in the second round. The subgroup ‘national government / 
parliament’ shifted its ranking from ‘no or inadequate direct public funding for 
research and development (R&D) for neglected diseases’ and ‘no or inadequate 
private sector investment in to R&D for neglected diseases’ in the first round to the 
new item ‘inadequate research priorities in private sector R&D’. In the subgroup 
‘non-governmental organization’, ‘no or insufficient sustainability of public funding 
for R&D for neglected diseases’ was rated most important in the first round, giving 
room to the new items ‘inadequate research priorities in private sector R&D’ and 
‘lack of health-needs driven priority setting in public funding’ in the second round. 
Differences in opinion thus not only existed between, but also within subgroups, 
and refined wording and new items re-focused the rating of the causes in the second 
round. Table 5-5 below shows which causes the experts in the different subgroup 
ranked highest in both rounds in the category “most important”. 
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Table 5-5 Most important causes for the treatment deficit * Professional affiliation-Round I and II 
 Academia Industry International Organization 
National 
government 
/ parliament 
Non-governmental 
organization Other 
Public-private-
partnership 
Round I 
(n=60): no or 
inadequate private 
sector investment 
into R&D for 
neglected diseases 
(39%) 
(n=12): no or 
inadequate 
incentives for the 
private sector to 
invest into R&D 
for neglected 
diseases (50%) 
(n=5): no or 
insufficient 
sustainability of 
public funding for 
R&D for neglected 
diseases (60%); no 
or inadequate 
research 
infrastructure in 
countries with 
neglected diseases 
(60%) 
(n=6): no or 
inadequate direct 
public funding for 
research and 
development 
(R&D) for 
neglected diseases 
(50%); no or 
inadequate private 
sector investment 
in to R&D for 
neglected diseases 
(50%) 
(n=16): no or 
insufficient 
sustainability of 
public funding for 
R&D for neglected 
diseases (46.7%)) 
(n=13): no or 
inadequate direct 
public funding for 
research and 
development / 
R&D for neglected 
diseases (46.2%) 
(subgroup existed 
only in Round I) 
 
Round II 
(n=29): no or 
insufficient direct 
public funding for 
research and 
development 
(R&D) for 
neglected diseases 
(67.9%) 
(n=6): no or 
inadequate health 
delivery 
infrastructure and 
staff in developing 
countries (83.3%) 
(n=4): no majority 
for either item in 
the list 
(n=4): inadequate 
research priorities 
in private sector 
R&D (100%) 
(n=6): inadequate 
research priorities 
in private sector 
R&D (66.7%), 
lack of health-
needs driven 
priority setting in 
public funding 
(66.7%) 
  
(n=2): no or 
inadequate private 
sector investment 
into R&D for 
neglected diseases 
(100%) (subgroup 
was created for 
Round two) 
* The table displays only those causes which received the highest ranking for “most important” in the subgroups .Valid n are given for each round of the survey. The percentages in 
brackets refer to the number of participants in the respective group who ranked this item as most important.  
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In the first round, cross-tabulations of the section on causes for the treatment deficit 
by place of residence showed no notable difference to the total results for the 
category “most important”. Respondents from developing, developed as well as 
threshold countries considered the lack of public funding and insufficient 
sustainability of public funding to be most important for the treatment deficit for 
neglected diseases. In the second round, the majority of respondents from 
developed countries (n=22 / 29) rated the lack of public funding, the lack of 
sustainability of public funding (n=21 / 29) and poverty as disease-proliferating 
factor (n=20 / 29) to be most important. In the subgroup of the respondents from 
developing countries, a majority chose the inadequacy of private sector investment 
(n=8 / 11) as most important cause; another seven items were considered most 
important by n=7 / 11 respondents from developing countries. There were only two 
respondents in the subgroup “threshold country / emerging market”; their priorities 
in the category “most important” were evenly spread their over the different items 
in the list. 
The questionnaire for the first round offered full-text fields primarily to add items to 
the list of causes, or to modify them. At the request of the respondents, full-text 
comment fields were added to the section on ‘Causes’ in the second round. The 
comments which were received in the second round are displayed in Text box 5-1 
below. Comments referred to methodological aspects as well as to the content of the 
section. To illustrate, one respondent pointed to the need for further differentiation 
in the question on the lack of health delivery, infrastructure and staff in developing 
countries. Another respondent perceived the scale as being imprecise, and 
commented on overlaps in the list of items. 
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Text box 5-1 Comments on the questionnaire item relating to causes for the treatment deficit / 
Round II 
• Major issue is the lack of funding for research. Scientists wanting to work on 
diseases prevalent in developing countries generally do not get funding for research 
even from the Governments of the country where the diseases may be prevalent. 
• probably a lot of efficient drugs exist ....in the cardboards in private sector R&D 
• questions 2,7 and 8 are essentially the same, the key question being number 7, Like it 
or not the private sector is the driver of bio-medical R&D and is commercially 
driven. Therefore appropriate incentives are vital. 
• Difficult to answer this question, since for each disease different aspects are more or 
less prominent 
• Although there are many contributing factors, the most important is perhaps the lack 
of FINANCIAL incentives for private sector expenditure on commercialising leads, 
where they exist, in a system that is based almost exclusively on patents as the 
motive force. 
• The area will never be of interest to Farma. Therefore funding must be from official 
or Foundation sources 
• Treatments, out of patent most often, exist for treatment of MND, but delivery and 
trained teams are questionable 
• Re: An effective health delivery staff and infrastructure in countries with neglected 
diseases does not mean one that is similar to a developed country infrastructure and 
staff. So its lack may signal a lack of resources and investment for health systems, 
but it may also signal than the globally available health "solutions" are inadapted to 
the specific situation in the countries with neglected diseases. It is a difficult decision 
to put priority on one (adapting the health delivery infrastructure) or the other 
(creating solutions that are more adapted to the existing situation) 
• Q15 : the question on poverty as a cause for market failure could be complemented 
with one on inequality. Emerging countries where a significant middle class develops 
become "solvable markets" for drugs or medical technology: this may actually make 
the situation of the still dominant poor part of the population worse. 
• not sure what you can deduce from this listing - most listed items are clearly 
important (and there's much overlap), so what are we going to learn from "important" 
versus "very important"? 
 
5.2.3 Orphan Drug Regulations for Rare Diseases 
Since orphan drug regulations have long been discussed in the scientific community 
as a possible blue print for incentives to stimulate R&D into neglected diseases, it 
was of interest to learn whether the panelists were familiar with orphan drug acts, 
and how they rated the acts’ provisions for their original purpose, i.e. to promote 
drug development for rare diseases. The first of the three questions in the section on 
orphan drug acts for rare diseases, entitled “Are you familiar with orphan drug 
laws?”, served as a filter question and offered three answering options (active 
knowledge, passive knowledge, no knowledge). 
knowledge” skipped the following two questions on t
drug laws and their incentives. 
whom 42.1% (n=53) 
(Fig. 5-3) 
Fig. 5-3 Familiarity with Orphan Drug Laws
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incentives. Two comments dealt with an obvious lack of visibility of orphan drug 
laws, which was also reflected by the 42.1% of respondents who replied that they 
were not familiar with these laws. 
Text box 5-2 Comments relating to the results of the questionnaire item on orphan drug regulations 
for rare diseases 
• as said before: effective to what goal? to get more neglected diseases R&D 
underway, or new products available to the patients (I do not know of any concrete 
example - maybe that would be a more interesting question)? Or to get more 
products / projects with orphan drug status? for example: Market exclusivity only 
works when there's a market. so how can it be effective for diseases which do not 
represent a market? 
• Drug laws are not well vulgarised in the scientist / researcher communities. 
• I believe the outcome accurately reflects reality. 
• the laws seem to be generally effective if not well known 
• Because there is little or no appropriate funding (ideally competitive grant funding 
from taxpayers) the laws don't matter because the research will not be done 
regardless of what the laws are. 
• The effectiveness of various incentive schemes depends on whether or not they 
involve push or pull mechanisms. Pull mechanisms involving the private sector will 
only work if there is a successful outcome, i.e., the company is successful in 
developing and marketing a drug. I would be more in favour of push mechanisms. 
• Canada is the only developed country in the world not to have an Orphan Drug 
Policy 
• Curious that 43% of persons said they had "no" knowledge of orphan drug 
legislation, and consistently about half that percentage professed to having "no 
judgment" about the value of such laws. I suppose the other half who 'knew nothing 
about orphan drug laws'  had no issues with offering opinions about its 
effectiveness.68 
• looks OK 
• I think participants are battling to give a simple answer to a complex question, 
about which most have "passive" knowledge. That explains the relative dominance 
of the "yes, OK" type responses. 
• Belonging to the 43% who know nothing of the laws I have not answered  
• The high level of lack of active knowledge of laws is quite interesting. This shows 
that these laws although they may exist, do not seem to be very effective or do not 
brought to the knowledge of the public in an effective way (e.g. through the health 
systems). 
  
                                                 
68
 This comment refers to the frequency distributions in the feedback included in the second round of the survey. 
A note was included in the feedback that only those participants who had answered ‚yes‘ to the question on 
knowledge about orphan drug laws (either active or passive) were led to the subsequent questions on the laws‘ 
effectiveness. The conclusion drawn here is thus not correct, but it informs the author that the explanations 
should have been given in more detail. 
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Text box 5-2 continued 
• These outcomes show how the ideology of patents and market exclusivity  persists 
in the area of orphan diseases, which has lead to the exorbitant prices of orphan 
drugs for relatively rich patients. Whereas market exclusivity can lead to an abuse 
of the orphan drug legislations -- as it has already been the case -- it would seem 
appropriate to consider that incentive mechanisms for neglected diseases will have 
to be tailored according to a different logic. Drugs for neglected diseases should, 
quite clearly, be developed as public goods. In fact, this should be a patent free 
territory to develop if we really want to promote availability, affordability and 
access to people in need. 
• I agree with the effectiveness of these tools, but some of them are not relevant for 
neglected diseases ; anyway, the major factor behind orphan drugs success in rich 
countries is their outstanding price, totally irrelevant for neglected diseases. 
 
5.2.4 Measures to Promote R&D into Neglected Diseases 
In both rounds of the survey, measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases 
were to be ranked for desirability and feasibility. Sixteen measures, gathered from 
literature search and from document analyses, had been formulated for the first 
questionnaire. The participants had been asked in the first round to add to, or 
modify, the list of measures, and they contributed 134 suggestions. Based on these 
suggestions (cf. 4.4.3, p. 72), the list was expanded to 50 measures in the second 
round. Complete frequency distributions for these measures are shown in the Annex 
to this document (Table 8-10, Table 8-11, Table 8-12, Table 8-13). In line with our 
research question, this chapter will focus on the results for those items which are 
contained in orphan drug regulations and in the draft Medical Research and 
Development Treaty. The chapter also includes the ranking of all 16 items of the 
first round, as well as those items of the list of 50 which more than 50% of the 
respondents considered most desirable in the second round. 
5.2.4.1 Orphan drug incentives for neglected diseases 
In both rounds of the survey, tax credits, protocol assistance and fee reductions / fee 
waivers were viewed positively both concerning their desirability and as well as 
their feasibility. (Fig. 5-6, Fig. 5-7, Fig. 5-8, Fig. 5-9) One participant contrasted 
tax-based funding for R&D and tax credits, stating that “it has to go through taxes 
and public funding; tax reduction to companies can never be a 'lasting' 
commitment, the research program will be cut as soon as the company realizes that 
it is lost money.” Market exclusivity received the lowest scores for desirability as 
well as for feasibility. Still, over 20% of the res
about 40% considered it a feasible measure to promo
diseases. 
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Fig. 5-8 Feasibility of orphan drug incentives for neglected
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Fig. 5-11 Desirability of MRDT proposals 
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Fig. 5-13 Feasibility of MRDT proposals 
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Fig. 5-14 Desirability and feasibility of measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases-Round I 
 
As illustrated in Fig. 5-14 above, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were also 
considered the most feasible measure to promote R&D into neglected diseases. 
Three of the 16 measures listed above showed a variance exceeding 15% between 
the categories “very desirable” and “very feasible”, i.e. they were considered more 
desirable than feasible: The difference was 26.6% for the separation of innovation 
incentives from drug prices, 20.1% for investment obligations for national 
governments and 15.4% for open source regulations. Of interest, four of the sixteen 
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items (market exclusivity, philanthropic spending, protocol assistance and tax 
credits) were ranked higher in the category “very feasible” than in the category 
“very desirable”. 
5.2.4.4 Desirability and Feasibility of measures to promote R&D into 
neglected diseases (Round II) 
In the second round of the survey, the list of measures comprised 50 items. 
Fig. 5-15 below shows those measures that were rated “very desirable” by more 
than 50% of the participants in the second round. As the three most desirable 
measures, the respondents selected ‘International / transcontinental research 
cooperation involving researchers from developing countries’ (60.7%, n=34), 
‘raising awareness among policy makers for the impact of neglected diseases on 
development’ (60.7%, n=34) and ‘building research, technical and regulatory 
capacity in developing countries’ (59.6%, n=34). 
Fig. 5-15 Most desirable measures
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The respondents contributed numerous comments to this section in the second 
round,69 which are reproduced in Text box 5-3 below; the comments included 
explanations for individual votes as well as feedback on the selection of items. 
Several participants underlined that explanatory notes would have been helpful for 
some items on the list, others called for a more differentiated view or pointed out, 
that many of the items listed need to be seen in conjunction. 
Text box 5-3 Comments on questionnaire items relating to measures to promote R&D into 
neglected diseases (Round II) 
• unclear if you mean promoting medical R&D in general, or medical R&D for 
neglected diseases. I filled it in with the latter in mind, but answers cannot be generised to 
all biomedical R&D. For instance on patents, it would probably by harmful today to abolish 
all medical R&D patents (the whole biomedical R&D model being built on it), however as 
patents have little incentivising effect for ND the issues is very different here. Also, some 
proposals are unclear (cfr no judgment) 
• 14) Existing regulations are very imperfect, but their flexibilities are all we've got 
• Funding for research and delivery of the innovation should be made available. 
Developed nations should be made to realize that research and control of neglected diseases 
is a priority in which they have to participate. 
• The question is unfair to the option of abolishing patents (which I advocate) 
because that option is necessary but not sufficient to foster research. People who don't 
understand that abolishing patents is a good idea need to be told what the replacement is 
before they can understand that abolishing patents is a necessary part of a package that is 
desirable.  
• I have made no judgement on some options simply because I don't understand 
them. I could not answer option 18 because I advocate incentives for-profit and non-profit 
(including university) research (via competitive grants instead of patents) but am strongly 
opposed to advance market commitments (which are associated with keeping the patent 
system). 
• What is common to both points above is that I think more explanation of the 
options (some of which only make sense in combination) is needed before this question 
could produce meaningful results. 
• Some of the options presented, e.g., on IPR, cannot be evaluated as good or bad in 
isolation but need to be seen as part of a larger package of methods to improve the 
provision of medicines for orphan diseases. 
• many of these are politically naive but not necessarily  'undesirable'. 
• This space is still developing, post the WHO IGWG process, and so the "very 
desirable" list may be somewhat vague, but promising. 
  
                                                 
69
 In the first round of the survey, the chapter on measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases did not 
contain a comment field, only three full-text fields to amend or complement the list of measures. 
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Text box 5-3 continued 
• Scientists like myself do not fully understand how legal, regulatory and incentive 
measures will affect drug availability in developing countries. The aim has to be availability 
of treatment for populations that are too poor to pay for it, paid for by  public or private 
sources wherever these can be called on by national or international regulations, resolutions 
or incentives. 
• Refocusing patents as intellectual monopoly privileges is very important 
• Treaty on safety and cost-effectiveness of new health technologies linked to a 
competitive tender system is also very important 
• Q1. I assumed it meant abolishing patents on molecules or gene sequences NOT on 
production processes. 
• Q2. Difficult to answer: could be very useful in a patent-free context and with 
sufficient emphasis on "simple" biotech. 
• Q36. Very desirable, but applicability limited to cases where the upfront evaluation 
of health value of innovation is reliably possible. 
• I am not an economist and cannot answer to several questions, which I therefore 
marked with no judgement 
• Overall this is an over-simplistic way of looking at complex issues and will only 
have value if followed up with a qualitative analysis. Answers to a lot of these questions 
would vary depending upon the governance of the proposal, the degree of compulsion to 
participate etc etc. It would also have been helpful to have a category that we could indicate 
that we didn't think the proposal would make any difference at all. did not understand Q2 or 
24 or 35 or 41 
• Q14. Unclear question. 
• Q25. How is the true question. 
 
5.2.5 A Regulatory Instrument to Promote R&D into Neglected 
Diseases 
At the core of the research project was the question whether the panelists 
considered it desirable and feasible to have a regulatory instrument to promote 
R&D into neglected diseases. In both rounds of the survey, the respondents found 
the option (very) desirable (Fig. 5-17 below). A majority of the participants also 
rated it feasible, but, as illustrated by the comparatively lower number of votes for 
the option “very (definitely) feasible”, they exercised more caution in their votes 
(Fig. 5-18 below). 
Fig. 5-17 Desirability of a Regulatory Instrument 
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organization and other affiliations again gave over 90% of support for a regulatory 
instrument. Opinions in the subgroup “industry” remained diverse (66.7% for and 
33.3% against a regulatory instrument). Also, representatives of international 
organizations were less agreed in the second round; one representative considered it 
desirable, one undesirable and two expressed no judgment. Similarly, the two 
experts in the newly established subgroup ‘public private partnership’ were 
disagreed on the subject. 
The feasibility of a regulatory instrument was judged positively in both rounds of 
survey by experts from academia (80% / 85.7%), national governments / 
parliaments (83.3% / 100%) and from NGOs (87.6% / 83.3%) Respondents 
affiliated with an international organization considered a regulatory instrument to be 
a feasible option in the first round; in the second round, however, three out of four 
experts said it was possibly unfeasible. Experts affiliated with industry were equally 
skeptical regarding the implementation of such instrument (50% / 66.7%). 
Cross-tabulations by place of residence showed that in both rounds of the survey, 
the respondents who considered a regulatory instrument undesirable or very 
undesirable came from developed countries, which formed the largest group of 
respondents. The feasibility of a regulatory instrument, however, was also doubted 
by respondents from developing countries and from threshold countries / emerging 
markets (only Round II). (s. Table 8-22, Table 8-23, Table 8-24, Table 8-25 in the 
Annex to this document) 
Nearly 60 comments were offered during both rounds of the survey on the 
desirability and on the feasibility of a regulatory instrument to promote R&D into 
neglected diseases. Supportive comments stressed that such instrument would 
promote sustainable funding flows for essential health R&D, encourage 
philanthropic spending and the formation of PPPs, increase collaboration, lay down 
funding obligations for developing and developed countries according to their 
means, and increase the visibility of NDs. Opinions differed whether regulations 
should be implemented at national or international level. (cf. Text box 5-4 below) 
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Text box 5-4 Comments from both survey rounds expressing support for a regulatory instrument 
• Regulatory instruments will make more people to collaborate in the project 
• I believe that a regulation should not only relate to neglected diseases, in fact if 
there were to be a regulation it should clearly make a reference to essential health 
research and development, in other words to needs-driven research, across the three 
typologies categorized in the CIPIH report. Immense needs for developing 
countries do exist in the area of type 1 and type 2 diseases as well. The idea that we 
should only concentrate on non-market pathologies can be very misleading indeed! 
• A Treaty of some description. Political commitment will be essential. 
• I believe it necessary to create some binding norms to make the public investment 
in essential health R&D sustainable and more democratic than it is today 
• A Treaty will make possible a sustainable commitment for essential R&D with 
obligations and incentive for every country according to it means 
• The UN should ennack a universal treaty bringing NIDs to the fore. UN should 
make it mandatory for ountries to invest in NID reseaexh and prvide funds for that 
purpos.inrease funding for the training of young sientists from the developing 
ountries. North south transfer of technology  
• It must be an instrument aiming at both development and developing countries 
commitment equally and proportional to the economical capacity of each. 
• Not much to say other than the failure to date to get sufficient investment in this 
area suggests that regulation is necessary 
• if there no regulatory instrument not much attention will be given  to these diseases 
which continue to affect most rural populations 
• This is a purely national decision unlikely to be easily introduced into legislative 
bodies, but definitely worth trying. Once a few countries install some such 
instrument others will follow. 
• would best be done under the auspices of the WHO  
• would cover all aspects from discovery to delivery, with followup monitoring 
• Only a legal instrument will extract a tacit commitment / obligation from 
governments.  
• It is very unlikely that any change would occur in this field, if there is no concrete 
ruling / regulation demand a change in the R&D paradigm.  
• I think it is the only approach that is likely to work, and millions of people's health 
is at stake. 
• A collective position from governments such as in a treaty might encourage imput 
from phylantropic organizations, the development of public-private partnerships 
and might facilitate decisions such as open sourcing or limitation of fees for 
developed drugs in the field of neglected diseases especially through the visibility it 
would give the topic 
• It is not possible to developp a program without a regulatory instrument.  
• without regulatory instrument private R&D industry will not move 
• It is a public responsability to ensure that all people can benefit for the advances in 
science, technology and the health sciences, and to correct possible distortions of 
the "free market", such as in the case of neglected diseases. The best tool available 
for that is to set an international regulation, or treaty. The critical issue will be its 
enforcability, and who will bear the cost. 
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Text box 5-4 continued 
• Such an instrument could encourage R&D, federating financial supports from 
public and private parts. An additional structure will authorize a best attention 
towards the neglected diseases, like the new journal PLoS NTD did. More we are 
speaking about ND, and less they will be (neglected). 
Some respondents were supportive, yet skeptical, as illustrated by the comments in 
Text box 5-5 below. 
Text box 5-5 Comments from both survey rounds expressing skepticism regarding a regulatory 
instrument 
• Similar to limitations and exceptions to copyright: not a perfect solution, but a 
necessary one. Does not look possible until it looks unavoidable. Generated 
bureaucracy a real problem, but not a specific one. 
• Regulatory instruments are only going to be useful if there is political will to 
implement them and the necessary resources. Without these a regulatory instrument 
is a hollow statement. So far, despite nice sounding words from developed 
countries there has not been a great deal of commitment. 
• Support the R&D treaty but would lik eto see either a separate or incorporate treaty 
on cost-effectivness assessment of new health technologies linked to a tender 
system 
• Desirable if the instrument is made up of "carrot" not sticks 
• In principle, it would be desireable to have consensus and / or the rule of law or 
regulation foster R&D but see below 
• Although regulatory instruments cannot be considered sufficient to stimulate 
necessary R&D, there is evidence from the paediatric requrements in US law that 
these can promote necessary research 
• very desirable but very difficult to implement without a real commitment of the 
states and the WHO 
• Regulatory instruments are effective when appropriate to R&D of neglected 
diseases, however it is difficult to implement a treaty or legislate in this area 
• Market forces are not working therefore some form of government intervention is 
likely warranted. 
• If the emergence of the 'rare' in poor nations is not seen as markets to be captured, 
and neglected diseases for which not always new drugs but a new perspective in 
required are made the focus then, a treaty is meaningful for the majority of the 
worlds people. Issues of access, poverty, national policy priorities are issues that 
treaties on R&D do not address and hence will play a subsidiary role unless their 
context changes. 
• As in my opinion this is mostly a matter of policy, a law should only define a 
framework (for instance on funding targets and mechanisms such as minimum 
contributions in proportion of GDP, on balance of incentives) and not too detailed 
provisions. 
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Bureaucracy, overregulation and a narrow focus on R&D were the tenor of those 
respondents, who expressed disapproval of the idea of a regulatory instrument 
(Text box 5-6 below) 
Text box 5-6 Comments from both survey rounds expressing disapproval for a regulatory 
instrument 
• This approach is very unlikely to succeed politically and so time spent on it will be 
wasted. The landscape of R&D into neglected diseases has been transformed in 
recent years by the PPPs. We need to build on that success and model and not try 
and reinvent the wheel 
• I don't see how this can really gurantee more useful R&D and it may cause more 
bureaucracy for the R&D that is already going on 
• This concept overly focuses on R&D over access to existing (and new) products. 
The political feasibility of such an approach is minimal, and runs counter to the 
proven methods of incentivising R&D. We need to build on what we know works, 
such as PPPs and incentives, rather than risking throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater 
• We have too much regulation already and implementation on a global basis is 
simply not practicable 
• It is not a problem of law because in this way a law is ineffective 
• Within the EU there are too many rules and regulations and funding has been very 
fragmented within different programmes; in neglected diseases there is the EU 
problem concerning migration and blood banks that needs to be attended. Laws and 
regulations do not replace a good educational and training system taking into 
account sustainability of staff and labs. 
 
5.2.6 Criteria for a Definition of Neglected Diseases 
In view of the debate to apply orphan drug regulations to neglected diseases, or to 
implement a medical R&D Treaty, we requested the panelists in the first round of 
the survey to list three criteria each that they deemed essential for a definition of 
neglected diseases. In total, we received 235 suggestions; owing to their 
homogeneity, we were able to cluster them into six key items which the respondents 
ranked according to importance in the second round of the survey. As illustrated in 
Fig. 5-19 below, close to or more than 80% of the respondents agreed on the 
importance for all six measures listed, whereby the degree of importance (most 
important / important) varied. Thus, more than 40% of the respondents considered 
the absence of treatments most important for the definition of neglected diseases; in 
contrast, only about 20% would consider disease severity to be most important. 
Fig. 5-19 Criteria for a definition of “neglected diseases”
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Text box 5-7 Participants’ comments expressing support for the method 
• The results will interesting and helpful for policy development 
• I think it is a good idea to collect this kind of information in order to develop may be 
a strategy as to how more attention can be drawn towards ND's. 
• Well done and clear to follow 
• IT IS USEFUL IF IT IS TO BE FOLLOWED BY ACTION 
• Very interesting and useful. I guess sometimes one would like more nuanced options 
for a more appropriate answer 
• Its a very important initiation that must be followed by other institutions in order 
reflect and solve the problem. 
• Comprehensive 
• The results of this survey should be made available to governments and the private 
sector to help create some awareness. 
 
Text box 5-8 Participants’ comments critical of the survey design 
• Some proposed options are not directly related to neglected diseases. Ranking as to 
importance ignores interplay among listed factors. 
• Even though the scale was based on a 1 to 5, it would have been convenient to 
include a middle ground, which in most of the cases was not available. 
• Boxes for open answers only allowed a limited number of characters limiting the 
ability to provide explanation for the answers given 
• The survey questions are a bit blunt in relation to the current discussions at WHO. It 
does not reflect the reality that it is likley to require a mix of interventions to solve 
this problem 
• I am not sure the methodology may help to solve the problem; not sure breakthrough 
ideas win in polls... The terms of this survey are not very intuitive. It is also 
questionable whether policy should be made based on the results of a survey. 
• My key point relates to the simplistic quantitative nature of the survey as previously 
mentioned. If not followed up by a more qualitative approach I would question the 
value in the findings 
• It does take into consideration the current debate, yet sometimes it draws too neat 
lines about different options, which makes answering a rather complex exercise, and 
potentially an ambiguous one 
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6 Discussion 
6.1 Methodological Approach 
“The Policy Delphi also rests on the premise that the decision maker 
 is not interested in having a group generate his decision;  
but rather, have an informed group present  
all the options and supporting evidence  
for his consideration.” (Turoff, 2002, p. 80)  
The aim of this research project was to solicit stakeholders’ opinions on the 
desirability and the feasibility of a regulatory instrument and of measures to 
promote R&D into neglected diseases. We chose the Delphi method to collect our 
data, complemented by the Text-Sorting Technique for the qualitative analysis 
between survey rounds, for the reasons outlined below. 
A broad range of stakeholders is engaged in the debate about the R&D deficit into 
neglected diseases. Plentiful publications discuss the different perspectives 
surrounding the R&D deficit and its elimination. Expert conferences and public 
(web-based) hearings take place, which ensure a continuous flow and exchange of 
information among relevant parties. Conference documentation and proceedings, 
also available online, inform the interested reader comprehensively and in detail of 
the state of discussion, and of the different stances of the stakeholders involved. In 
view of these activities, we concluded that an opinion survey would not yield 
additional benefit to the research question at this stage. Since the project was not 
funded, the options for focus groups or face-to-face meetings were very limited. 
Telephone interviews, telephone conferences with a small number of stakeholders, 
or requests for written statements could have been another approach. From the 
available methods, we chose the Delphi method for four reasons: Firstly, the R&D 
deficit for neglected diseases is a global and a systemic issue. We considered a 
Policy Delphi to be the appropriate tool, since it is the stated aim of this method to 
cover as broad a spectrum of perspectives as possible for a matter under 
consideration. To this end, it aims to engage a survey panel of stakeholders who 
share a level of expertise, yet contribute various interests, professional backgrounds 
or affiliations. Additionally, Policy Delphi surveys can be conducted online which 
enabled us to contact a large number of potential participants globally. Secondly, 
the R&D deficit for neglected diseases is a contentious issue. It is hardly possible to 
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determine, retrospectively, whether the respondents would have argued differently 
in a non-anonymous setting. Still, we preferred to select the Delphi method as an 
anonymous exercise which is said to allow the participants to freely express their 
opinion, irrespective of any expectations and free from negative group processes. 
Thirdly, applying a Policy Delphi, we were able to obtain quantifiable results which 
allowed us to identify trends in the participants’ answers. Lastly, as we had 
mentioned above, many fora for face-to-face debate and exchange of opinion 
already exist, so we were interested to explore the method’s acceptance and 
feasibility for this area of research. From the experience gained in this project, we 
hoped to infer on the transferability or the extension of our methodological 
approach to similar, larger-scale or more in-depth follow-on projects on neglected 
diseases. 
Of the 326 potential participants which we contacted, 159 activated the access code 
to the survey. Of these, 73.6% (n=117) completed the first round of the survey. In 
the second round, 49% of the participants (n=56 / 114) completed the survey. From 
the number of stakeholders who responded to the survey over a period of five 
months, and even more from the extent to which the participants contributed to the 
survey, we conclude that the method and its online implementation were practicable 
and well received. Positive comments which we received from the participants 
underscore this conclusion, while critique informed us of shortcomings in the 
survey design. (cf. Chapter 5, Results, Text box 5-7, Text box 5-8) From the latter, 
we conclude that the first round of the survey, which was based on literature review 
and document analysis, would have benefited from a pre-round dedicated to the 
development of the questionnaire items. Similar experiences were made in other 
Delphi surveys. (cf. Schopper et al., 2000) Some respondents criticized overlap and 
a lack of differentiation in some questionnaire items; others suggested explanatory 
notes on the concepts behind some questionnaire items. The necessity was 
underlined to complement the quantitative results with further qualitative data and 
qualitative analysis. Several participants pointed out that a list of items, such as 
were presented in this questionnaire, failed to acknowledge the link or interplay 
between, e.g., different causes for the treatment deficit for neglected diseases, or 
measures to promote R&D. Lastly, on the introductory page of the survey, we 
referred to a ‘research project on neglected and orphan diseases’. Since we did not 
collect data on rare diseases, but only on orphan drug acts and their incentives, it 
 120 
might have been more appropriate not to refer to rare diseases in the survey title; 
one participant communicated his surprise that the second round of the survey did 
not consider rare diseases or orphan drug acts for rare diseases anymore. 
The Text-Sorting-Technique proved to be a valuable tool for the qualitative analysis 
between the first and the second round of the survey, for analyzing and clustering 
the participants suggestions, incorporating them into the second questionnaire, and 
keeping the number of items in the second round manageable. Working in a team of 
coders would have been helpful to increase the objectivity of the development of 
the category system, the newly created or modified items, and the attribution of 
suggestions to existing items. To illustrate, O’Loughlin et al. (2004) conducted a 
three-round Policy Delphi involving 52 participants, in which they used three 
coders for this task; if two coders assigned a contribution to the same category, it 
was accepted. 
To conclude, the following points can be summarized as the key lessons learned for 
the methodological approach of this project: 
• Include experts / stakeholders in the formulation of questionnaire items to 
ensure i.a. the relevance and differentiation of questionnaire items 
• Include explanatory notes for questionnaire items 
• Increase the research team for the qualitative analysis to enhance the 
objectivity of the process and its results 
A Policy Delphi is a “forum for ideas” (Turoff, 2002, p. 96), aimed at 
complementing and supporting decision-making processes of committee debates. Its 
objective, as we have noted in the introduction to this thesis, is to collect, explore 
and correlate views from a heterogeneous panel, and to present to political decision 
makers a range of options on which they may base their informed decision. 
(Linstone & Turoff 2002). Many valuable suggestions which the respondents 
contributed still await further in-depth analyses. Particularly the section on 
measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases increased considerably between 
the first and the second round. A third round could have been meaningfully added 
solely focusing on measures which shall be included in a regulatory instrument, 
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perhaps distinguishing push- from pull mechanisms within such third round. Also, it 
could have been of interest to explore among the participants whether a potential 
regulation should specifically be devoted to neglected diseases, as orphan drug acts 
target rare diseases, or whether it is preferable to have a document which embraces 
all medical research and development relevant for developing countries, also for 
Type I diseases, as one respondent commented. Lastly, it would have been of 
interest to learn whether, in the long run, a biomedical R&D treaty would also 
embrace rare diseases. 
To further benefit from the data gathered, they could serve to develop a follow-on 
Delphi survey, perhaps a consensus exercise, endowed with adequate financial and 
personnel infrastructure and resources, to take the research question from 
exploration to consensus-building. To this end, the issue will have to be narrowed 
and focused, e.g. on measures to be included in a regulatory instrument. The 
process of iteration will have to be based on a manageable agreed list of items, 
preferably developed by a team of researchers and experts in a pre-round to the 
actual survey. The number of rounds, and / or threshold levels for consensus, would 
have to be determined. To explore dissensions (Turoff, 2002) and to underline the 
concept of Delphi surveys as a communication device among experts (Helmer, 
1977), or stakeholders, questionnaires should provide ample room for comments.  
It is recommended that a Policy Delphi is followed by a working group which may 
utilize the results to formulate policy recommendations. (Turoff, 2002) Several 
respondents to the survey indeed suggested that the results be made available to 
decision-makers to complement, and maybe further stimulate, current debates on 
the issue. The results of the survey were initially presented as a poster and abstract 
at the 7th European Congress on Tropical Medicine (Oct.3-6,2011). (Fehr et al., 
2011a). A first analysis of the survey data was published in November 2011 in 
BMC Health Services Research. (Fehr et al., 2011b) Based on this publication, 
Professor John-Arne Røttingen, who chaired the WHO Consultative Expert 
Working Group: Finance and Coordination, included selected outcome data of our 
survey in his presentation of the Final Report of the Working Group on the occasion 
of a public seminar (“Strengthening the Global R&D System - Innovation for 
 122 
Health Needs in Developing Countries”, Global Health Programme, Graduate 
Institute, Geneva, May 4, 2012) 70 
Taking into consideration the qualifying aspects mentioned above, we thus 
conclude that the method allowed us to engage a large number of stakeholders and 
to collect, analyze and present data which attracted interest in the public health 
community. The following section will discuss the results of the survey. 
 
“We need to tackle the political 
determinants of health.” (Kickbusch, 
2005, p. 247) 
6.2 Results 
6.2.1 A Regulatory Instrument to Promote R&D into Neglected 
Diseases 
The research project centered on the question whether a regulatory instrument is 
desirable and feasible to facilitate and promote R&D into neglected diseases. From 
the longstanding and ongoing debates about the application of orphan drug acts to 
neglected diseases and the implementation of a draft Medical Research and 
Development Treaty, we had inferred on a sustained interest in such option. This, 
we could confirm with our Delphi survey. Close to 90% of the respondents gave a 
positive answer (very desirable / desirable) to the question of the desirability of a 
regulatory instrument; nearly 80% in both rounds also considered it (definitely) 
feasible. In their comments, the respondents expressed the hope that a regulatory 
instrument would ensure sustainable funding, encourage philanthropic spending, 
firm up obligations by developed and developing countries, increase collaboration, 
democratize investment in essential R&D, increase the visibility of neglected 
diseases, and enable the development of public private partnerships. Several 
participants expressed doubts as to the necessary political will for such instrument. 
One respondent commented: “Regulatory instruments are only going to be useful if 
there is political will to implement them and the necessary resources. Without these 
                                                 
70
 http://graduateinstitute.ch/globalhealth/Events_Global_Health_Programme/Seminar4May/page12766.html 
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a regulatory instrument is a hollow statement. So far, despite nice sounding words 
from developed countries there has not been a great deal of commitment.” Some 
respondents criticized the focus of such instrument on biomedical R&D; others 
considered the approach of a regulatory instrument unnecessary and inappropriate, 
anticipating further red tape. 
6.2.2 Causes for the Treatment Deficits and Measures to Promote R&D 
into Neglected Diseases 
When conceptualizing the survey, we considered it important to ask the respondents 
to rank and identify likely causes for the R&D and treatment deficit so as to identify 
causes to which a regulatory instrument would have to respond. Most important, in 
the view of the respondents, were the lack of (sustainable) public funding, a lack of 
private sector funding, and a lack of R&D infrastructure in developing countries. 
Further to these, the respondents named inadequate priority-setting both in the 
public and in the private sector, market failure, a lack of incentives and of the 
visibility of neglected diseases. To respond to these deficits, national funding 
obligations, as well as grants and relevant priority-setting, e.g. in EU Framework 
Programmes, were advocated.71 Over 90% of the respondents highlighted the 
importance of government support and funding for multilateral efforts, such as 
WHO-TDR; further proposals for investment of public funds included the 
establishment of public (or affordable) preclinical research facilities’ and public 
funding to phase III clinical trials. Proposals to increase private sector funding 
included incentives as well as obligations for the private sector. More than 60% of 
the survey participants advocated investment obligations by the private sector for 
the benefit of neglected diseases; the assessment of the feasibility of the latter 
concept was 50% in the first round, and below 30% in the second round. 
Philanthropic spending has played an increasingly important role in recent years in 
promoting R&D into neglected diseases, and the majority of respondents considered 
philanthropic spending (very) desirable to promote R&D into neglected diseases. 
Yet while the contribution of large funders, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
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 At the time of this writing, the 7th European Framework Programme (2008-2013)-program includes a priority 
area on neglected infectious diseases, focusing on trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), leishmaniasis, Chagas’ 
disease, Buruli ulcer, leprosy, trachoma, infantile diarrhea, lymphatic filariasis, schistosomiasis and soil-
transmitted nematodes.  
(http://ec.europa.eu/research/health/infectious-diseases/neglected-diseases/pdf/nid-leaflet_en.pdf) 
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Foundation, is widely acknowledged, philanthropic spending does not address what 
have been named inherent flaws in the systems, i.e. patents and high drug prices to 
recoup investment. Moreover, by the sheer volume of the Gates Foundation’s 
involvement, it necessarily sets priorities in public health, which, as some argue, 
should be the responsibility of the public sector and its democratically elected 
bodies. (cf. Lob-Levyt & Schaaber, 2009; Hein & Kickbusch, 2010) Perhaps 
correspondingly, philanthropic spending was one of the items which was rated more 
feasible than desirable in this survey. On the other hand, based on suggestions by 
the survey participants, two items relating to philanthropic spending were included 
in the questionnaire; the first one referring to foreign donor contributions towards 
capacity building and strengthening research infrastructure in developing countries, 
the second item to private donations to ‘real’ pharmaceutical companies to develop 
drugs for neglected diseases. The first proposal was supported by over 90% of the 
respondents, the second suggestion was considered desirable by about 40%. 
According to the respondents, measures to increase the visibility of neglected 
diseases would have to be directed at academia, political decision-makers and at the 
general public. Proposals to correct the lack of priority-setting for neglected 
diseases in the public as well as in the private sector included suggestions to lower 
private sector influence, to establish an international health-needs driven R&D 
agenda and to have a global funders forum to set priorities. It may be considered in 
this context that patient advocacy has greatly contributed to the development and 
implementation of orphan drug regulations. A shared feature of patients afflicted 
with neglected diseases, however, is their low political voice. (WHO, 2010g; 
Hampel, 2004) In the absence of strong and well-organized patient advocacy groups, 
international, non-governmental and humanitarian organizations attend to and plead 
the cause of patients with neglected diseases. It has been noted, however, that a 
growing number of actors may also pose a risk of a duplication of work, requires 
high coordinative efforts, and sometimes may even overstrain the recipient 
countries. (Hein & Kickbusch, 2010; Moran et al., 2009c)  
A lack of research infrastructure in developing countries was identified as a key 
cause for the R&D deficit for neglected diseases. Consequently, several proposals 
were made to the effect of building research infrastructure as well as research 
capacity in developing countries. Of the ten most desirable measures selected in the 
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second round of the survey, three referred to international cooperation involving 
researchers from developing countries and to the building of research, technical and 
regulatory capacity in developing countries. In fact, international / transcontinental 
research cooperation involving researchers from developing countries was the most 
desirable of all measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases. This outcome 
highlights a strong interest both in building expertise in endemic countries, and in 
benefiting from existing expertise of researchers from developing countries. Broad 
support was also given to items referring to the interconnection of research projects 
on different neglected diseases, the establishment of interdisciplinary cooperation 
and innovation clusters and of links to existing infrastructures for HIV / Aids, 
malaria, and tuberculosis.  
In addition to the above aspects of promoting R&D into neglected diseases, the 
respondents underlined the importance of taking measures to promote access to 
existing drugs. 
6.2.3 Orphan Drug Acts for Rare and for Neglected Diseases 
Orphan drug acts include push and pull mechanisms to promote drug development 
for rare diseases.72 The acts have been hailed for their performance in stimulating 
the development of products for rare diseases, and criticized for enabling block-
buster orphan products, double-burdening tax-payers, generating pseudo-orphan 
products or impeding access to orphan drugs. The ongoing debate about orphan 
drug acts’ application to neglected diseases raised our interest in the stakeholders’ 
assessment whether orphan drug incentives could be of benefit for neglected disease 
product development. As a precursor to this assessment, we had been interested to 
learn how many of the respondents were familiar, and to what degree, with orphan 
drug acts, and how they assessed the effectiveness of orphan drug incentives for 
rare disease R&D. It was not the aim of these questions, however, to proceed to an 
in-depth discussion on the performance of orphan drug acts for rare diseases; this 
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 Push mechanisms, such as grants or tax credits, encourage and assist the launching of research projects, while 
pull mechanisms aim to compensate a drug producer for the absence of a profitable market. Callan and Gillespie 
(2007) concluded that push mechanisms bear a greater risk for intransparency than pull mechanisms, since they 
cannot always be traced back to a specific product. Pull mechanisms, so it is argued, are considered politically 
attractive, since they are outcome-oriented, address a specific need, and are limited in funding and time. (Callan 
& Gillespie, 2007) 
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debate is being conducted elsewhere with detailed and comprehensive data. We 
found that, despite the fact that orphan drug schemes have long been debated as 
blueprints for mechanisms to promote R&D into neglected diseases, most recently 
in the WHO Consultative Working Group (WHO, 2012g), more than 40% of the 
N=126 participants who replied to the question in our Delphi survey, were not 
familiar with orphan drug laws, meaning that they had neither active nor passive 
knowledge of such regulations. The subsequent two questions in our survey, dealing 
with the regulations’ performance for rare diseases, were rated by about 60% of the 
N=126 respondents who had indicated that they had either active or passive 
knowledge of orphan drug acts. The majority (61.4%) of these considered orphan 
drug acts very effective or effective, whereby only 7.1% selected the ranking “very 
effective”. With 22.1%, market exclusivity was given the highest ranking in the 
category “very effective” of the four listed incentives; the highest aggregated 
positive reply (very effective / effective) was given to tax credits (62.3%). The 
quota for “no judgment”-replies in this section was rather high (20-30%), which 
may link to the number of respondents who, in the initial question about the 
familiarity with orphan drug laws, reported only passive knowledge (47.6%), versus 
10.3% who had active knowledge (e.g. having been involved in applications for 
orphan drug status).  In sum, we found that orphan drug acts were not very well 
known among the participants of our survey. It may be of interest to correlate this 
outcome with findings which show that orphan drug acts, even where applicable to 
neglected diseases R&D, are barely utilized. (cf. WHO, 2010e) We assume that the 
concept raises little interest in the neglected disease scientific community, owing to 
the fact that the debate about orphan drug acts centers on market exclusivity and its 
inapplicability to resource-poor settings. In fact, in both rounds of the survey, the 
respondents considered market exclusivity to be among the least desirable measures 
to promote R&D into neglected diseases. This assessment underlined once more 
that this incentive, which is conceptualized for financially well-equipped health 
systems and affluent (compared to neglected disease patients) patient populations, is 
not of benefit in settings where patients cannot, or barely can afford to pay for drugs 
out of pocket, and lack social security systems to turn to. One respondent to the 
survey remarked: 
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“These outcomes show how the ideology of patents and market exclusivity 
persists in the area of orphan diseases, which has lead to the exorbitant 
prices of orphan drugs for relatively rich patients. Whereas market 
exclusivity can lead to an abuse of the orphan drug legislations -- as it has 
already been the case -- it would seem appropriate to consider that incentive 
mechanisms for neglected diseases will have to be tailored according to a 
different logic. Drugs for neglected diseases should, quite clearly, be 
developed as public goods. In fact, this should be a patent free territory to 
develop if we really want to promote availability, affordability and access to 
people in need.” 
 
Further results of the section on measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases 
revealed, however, that more than two thirds of the respondents in both rounds 
considered push incentives of orphan drug acts, i.e. tax credits, fee waivers and 
protocol assistance / scientific advice, desirable and feasible to foster R&D for 
neglected diseases. A majority of the respondents advocated selected pull 
mechanisms for neglected diseases. In both rounds of the survey, nearly three 
quarters of the respondents supported exclusive funds for neglected disease R&D, 
or budgetary set-asides to purchase drugs for neglected diseases. About two thirds 
of the participants considered it a feasible option. Advance market commitments 
(AMCs) and prize funds to promote R&D into neglected diseases were considered 
desirable as well as feasible options.73 
From these outcomes, three scenarios could be developed with regard to applying 
orphan drug incentives to neglected diseases, whereby push and pull incentives 
would be considered separately: 
 Keep the status quo 
 Adopt measures to increase the visibility of orphan drug push mechanisms 
for neglected diseases 
 Create appropriate pull-mechanisms for neglected diseases product 
development under orphan drug acts. 
                                                 
73
 In the first round of the survey, the relevant items read: “Prize funds for drug innovation” and “Advance 
market commitments”. The wording was modified for the second round to read: “Prize funds with prizes 
awarded based on degree of innovation” and “Incentives for the private sector (e.g. advance market 
commitments, governmental incentives)” 
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Under the first scenario, neglected diseases remain eligible for orphan drug 
incentives, yet no particular efforts are being taken to promote an expanded 
application of these incentives to neglected disease R&D projects. 
Under the second scenario, targeted needs-assessments could be conducted among 
stakeholders, to learn which form of assistance is required that could be provided 
under orphan drug acts, which incentives provided for in orphan drug acts respond 
best to sponsors’ and researchers’ needs, and which modifications of existing push 
incentives are considered beneficial for R&D projects into neglected diseases. 
Based on the outcome of such needs-assessments, push incentives could be adapted 
or developed within the existing framework of orphan drug acts, and their 
utilization could be actively encouraged and promoted in the scientific community. 
To illustrate, protocol assistance under the European orphan drug regulation 
describes an expanded form of scientific advice to sponsors of designated orphan 
products, which includes information on the issue of significant benefit for rare 
disease products. Protocol assistance for neglected disease projects could cover 
special requirements such as the suitability of a product for use in developing 
countries. (cf. WHO, 2010e) By the same token, the majority of the respondents in 
the survey agreed that a lack of (sustainable) public funding was the most important 
cause for the R&D deficit for neglected diseases; correspondingly, they advocated 
relevant priority-setting in public funding programs. Grants earmarked for R&D 
into rare diseases are included in the U.S. orphan drug act; furthermore, in 2009 a 
program to fund preclinical research into rare and neglected diseases was launched 
by the U.S. National Institutes of Health. (NIH, 2009) The EU regulation does not 
include a proper grant program for rare diseases, yet sponsors of designated orphan 
products are eligible for EU funding allocated to rare disease research. Further 
research could inform of the feasibility and of possible benefits of installing or 
expanding grant programs for rare and neglected diseases under current orphan drug 
acts.  
Tax credits, another push mechanism, were also rated positively by the respondents 
as a measure to promote R&D into neglected diseases. Under the U.S. orphan drug 
act, sponsors of rare disease R&D benefit from tax credits for clinical research. In 
the context of a proposal for legislation to create tax credits for preclinical research 
into neglected diseases, introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009, it 
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has been argued that tax credits, while not covering the total costs for R&D 
investment into a product for neglected diseases, would still function as an 
incentive, because of the private sector’s additional interest in showing his global 
responsibility. (Anderson, 2009) In the European Union, tax exemptions or tax 
credits for activities relating to rare disease R&D have to be offered by member 
states, and are included in the Inventory of national incentives. (European 
Commission, 2006b) The same procedure could apply to tax credits and tax 
exemption for neglected diseases R&D. The recent WHO Expert Working Group 
had excluded tax credits from the list of eligible potential incentives to promote 
neglected disease R&D (WHO, 2010e); equally, the follow-on WHO-Consultative 
Expert Working Group considered tax breaks for companies to be of little value to 
promote R&D into neglected diseases. (WHO, 2012g) 
The third scenario concerning the application of orphan drug incentives could be 
to include suitable pull-mechanisms for neglected diseases under orphan drug acts. 
Having considered the option of orphan drug schemes for neglected diseases, the 
WHO-CIPIH had concluded that “[a]ny proposal of this nature, therefore, also 
needs to address the absence of a paying market, and affordability.” (WHO, 2006e, 
p. 86) Pull mechanisms include differential, or tiered, pricing, advance market 
commitments, priority review vouchers or prize funds. Differential pricing (for this 
and the following s. Danzon, 2007) for an identical product can be applied between 
countries or within countries, proceeding from the assumption that more affluent 
middle and upper classes also exist in developing nations. It has been argued, 
however, that as a stand-alone measure, differential pricing is not considered 
helpful for Type III neglected diseases. If this incentive were to be applied to 
neglected diseases, it would have to be complemented by other mechanisms, such 
as advance market commitments. (Danzon, 2007) Advance market commitments 
were primarily conceptualized for vaccine development and are a “financial 
commitment to subsidise the future purchase of a vaccine not yet available if an 
appropriate vaccine is developed and if it is demanded by the poorest developing 
countries.” (GAVI Alliance, 2007) Advance market commitments (for this and the 
following, s. Light, 2009) are donor-funded. In return for donor payments, drug 
developers agree to make a product available at a close-to cost price for developing 
countries whereby the company keeps its intellectual property rights for the AMC-
funded product. Since AMCs are disbursed for a developed product, and R&D costs 
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have to be borne in advance, this incentive targets large multinational companies 
which are able to raise sufficient funds for the R&D process. (Light, 2009) 
Weaknesses and risks that have been identified for AMCs refer both to the concept 
(e.g. the difficulty to set product prices in advance) and to its implementation (i.a. 
the payment of AMCs for pseudo-innovations, high prices both for developing 
countries and for donors). (cf. Love & Hubbard, 2007) Priority review vouchers for 
a defined list of tropical infectious diseases were established under the U.S. Federal 
Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007. (United States Congress, 2007) Recently, 
Ridley et al. (2010) recommended that they also be introduced in the European 
Union. Priority review vouchers are awarded for the successful market application 
of a drug for a neglected disease. (for this and the following cf. DiMasi & 
Grabowski, 2007; Herrling, 2007; Ridley et al., 2006; Anderson, 2009) The voucher 
gives the holder access to a shortened priority review period (six months instead of 
10 months for standard review) for a potentially profitable product for a non-
neglected disease of his choice, thereby enabling early market entrance for the 
profitable drug; the additional profit from early marketing approval shall recoup the 
investment spent on R&D for the neglected disease product. Priority review 
vouchers can be traded between companies. As with AMCs, priority review 
voucher may be a functioning incentive for large multinational companies; the fact 
that R&D costs have to be pre-paid, however, excludes small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) with no block-buster drug in their portfolio from the benefits of 
such incentive. Lastly, prize funds as pull-mechanisms (for this and the following 
cf. Love & Hubbard, 2007), aim to separate the costs of an innovation from the 
price of a product; they can be disbursed as milestone prizes or large end-stage 
prizes. Prize funds can reward medical innovation based on health impacts, thereby 
intending to discourage investment in me-too products. In contrast to AMCs, prize 
funds are linked to an obligation to allow generic production of the prized product. 
In the first round of our Delphi survey, prize funds were preferred over AMCs and 
differential pricing. In the second round, the item ‘incentives for the private sector 
(e.g. advance market commitments, governmental incentives)’ was considered more 
desirable than prize funds, whereby the quota for ‘no judgment’ was 5.3% for the 
item which included AMCs, and 14.3% for prize funds. One respondent explained 
his/her vote on this item and clearly pointed out the need for a differentiated 
interpretation of the quantitative survey results: “I have made no judgement on some 
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options simply because I don't understand them. I could not answer option 18 
because I advocate incentives for-profit and non-profit (including university) 
research (via competitive grants instead of patents) but am strongly opposed to 
advance market commitments (which are associated with keeping the patent 
system).” The item ‘Voucher systems in developed markets (as with the FDA) for 
other products’ was introduced into the list of measures in the second round; 39% of 
the respondents considered the option very desirable, one third answered ‘no 
judgment’. About 45% of the respondents indicated that such vouchers were 
feasible. 38,5%, of the respondents answered ‘no judgment’; correspondingly, 
several respondents commented that they were not familiar with some of the 
concepts introduced in the list of measures in our survey. 
To conclude, from the early concepts onward which explored mechanisms to foster 
R&D for drugs of limited commercial value (cf. Interagency Task Force to the 
Secretary of Health, 1979) up until the most recent WHO deliberations on 
innovative financing mechanisms and neglected diseases (cf. WHO, 2012g), orphan 
drug acts have played a role in the debate about promoting R&D for neglected 
diseases. It is widely agreed that the pull-incentive of market exclusivity does not 
respond to the needs of neglected diseases. Furthermore, orphan drug acts do no 
compensate for the main causes of the R&D deficit which the participants in our 
survey named for neglected diseases, i.e. a lack of R&D funding, of adequate 
priority setting, let alone poverty in endemic countries. Neither will they promote 
capacity building or technology transfer, as the WHO-CEWG Final Report noted. 
(WHO, 2012g, p. 56) Still, the question has been asked whether some benefit can 
be drawn from this established infrastructure also for neglected diseases. (cf. Milne 
et al., 2001) Proceeding from the results of our survey, we would argue that it is 
worthwhile to further explore whether the existing infrastructure of orphan drug 
regulations can be of benefit to neglected diseases. Addressing public health needs, 
particularly unmet medical needs for rare and neglected diseases, is named as a 
strategic area in the recent EMA Roadmap to 2015. (EMA, 2010b) The question of 
the applicability of orphan drug infrastructures could be linked to and benefit from 
existing analyses of push and pull mechanisms for neglected diseases. (cf. Schaaber 
& Wagner-Ahlfs, 2011) As Callan et al. (2007) underlined, studies and appropriate 
metrics are crucial to determine a proper mix of push and pull incentives for 
different neglected diseases. If push incentives of orphan drug acts were to be 
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increasingly utilized also for neglected disease product development, budgetary 
allowances for orphan drug acts will have to be expanded so that an extension of 
such services would not be to the detriment of rare diseases. With respect to the 
European regulation on rare diseases, this could mean an increase in the special 
budgetary allowance which EMA receives from the European Commission to 
compensate for the financial incentives under orphan drug acts. 
In the face of market failure and often inadequate health and social security systems 
in endemic countries, pull mechanism for neglected diseases, whether or not 
installed under orphan drug regulations, will have far-reaching budgetary 
implications. As Villa et al. (2009) noted, it may be difficult to generate public 
support for such measures in times of cuts in health spending. Therefore, another 
debate should be prioritized and accompany the above analyses, which would focus 
not so much on the applicability of individual orphan drug incentives. Instead, it 
would address the issue that, after many years of thought and deliberation, it is time 
to act on the realization that the motives which led to the development of orphan 
drug acts, equally apply to neglected diseases. Measures should now be taken to 
translate this knowledge into political commitment and into a suitable public health 
strategy for neglected diseases. Orphan drug incentives were developed under 
premises which are different from those that apply to neglected diseases. 
Consequently, not all of the incentives of orphan drug acts can be meaningfully 
transferred. Orphan drug acts were built on the pillars of functioning health care and 
health insurance systems in developed countries. These prerequisites do not exist in 
developing countries. Contrary to the vast number of rare diseases, each of which 
afflict a small number of patients, WHO labels only about 14 diseases as being 
‘neglected’, and only four of these are considered tool-deficient, i.e. no effective 
treatments are available for them. However, Chagas’ disease, considered tool-
deficient, had an infection rate of 10 million in 2009, with 35 million people at risk 
in 21 Latin American countries. (WHO, 2010a) Buruli ulcer, another tool-deficient 
disease, is endemic in approximately 33 countries; in 2010, 4.907 new cases were 
reported globally, 4.846 of these in Africa   
(http://apps.who.int/neglected_diseases/ntddata/buruli/buruli.html, Accessed 
8.6.2012) For Buruli Ulcer, these numbers may seriously under-represent the true 
caseload, since it is not compulsory to report Buruli ulcer, and patients often do not 
have access to health care. In addition to tool-deficient diseases, treatments for tool-
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ready diseases such as lymphatic filariasis, the world’s second largest cause of 
disability with about 40 million people seriously incapacitated and disfigured 
(WHO, 2012e), are not accessible or available in sufficient quantities to prevent the 
disease or treat affected patients. Orphan drug acts pronounce a clear commitment 
that patients with rare diseases have a right to the same quality of treatment as other 
patients. There can be no doubt that the millions of patients who suffer from a small 
number of neglected diseases are as deserving of such a long-term, sustainable 
commitment from political decision makers as the millions of patients diagnosed 
with one of the 6000 to 8000 rare diseases. The figures reflecting the burden of 
neglected diseases, and of their effect on social and economic development in 
endemic regions, support an urgent call for action. 
6.2.4 The draft Medical Research and Development Treaty 
The draft Medical Research and Development Treaty goes far beyond the concept 
of orphan drug acts, and aims to respond to issues of sustainable and predictable 
R&D funding, of equitable access to medicines, of cost-effective incentives, needs-
based medical R&D and sharing, building and transfer of knowledge, technology 
and capacity. Advocates of the Treaty highlight its objectives to remove economic 
access barriers to medical innovation by de-linking innovation incentives from drug 
prices, to establish needs-based priority setting and to discourage investment in me-
too R&D by linking prize-funds to health impact. Perhaps owing to the far-reaching 
reform which it proposes, the Treaty has been called undesirable as well as 
politically and technically unfeasible by some. It has been criticized for its lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, for the anticipated need for sophisticated infrastructure to 
monitor funding flows, for shifting priority setting for medical R&D from the 
private to the public sector74 and for its unclear relations with existing patent 
regimes. 
The Treaty proposes to ensure sufficient and predictable funding flows through 
national funding obligations for medical R&D based on GDP or per capita income 
of signatory states. In the first round of our survey, this proposal generated more 
                                                 
74
 In fact, over 60% of the survey participants advocated to lower the private sector’s influence on R&D priority 
setting as a measure to promote R&D into neglected diseases; about 40% considered it a feasible measure. 
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than 80% support in the categories ‘very desirable’ and ‘desirable’; close to 70% 
also considered it ‘very feasible’ or ‘feasible’. In the second round of the survey, the 
aggregated ranking in the categories ‘very desirable’ and ‘desirable’ remained high 
(>70%), yet the ranking in the categories ‘very feasible’ and ‘feasible’ dropped to 
an aggregated 55%; the votes for the category ‘possibly unfeasible’ increased from 
20% in the first round to 36% in the second round. The percentage of ‘no judgment’ 
answers to this question ranged between four and seven percent for desirability and 
feasibility in both rounds of the survey. We would conclude from these outcomes, 
that the majority of the respondents adopted a clear stance on the item, yet 
anticipated difficulties for the concept’s implementation. (The category ‘possibly 
unfeasible’ was defined as: ‘some indication this is unworkable / severe political 
resistances / difficult to communicate to the public). Whether this means that the 
respondents doubt that states would sign a treaty, or whether they doubt that 
signatory states will fulfill their funding obligations – the latter doubt perhaps being 
nourished by longstanding debates about meeting goals for official development aid 
or fulfilling national commitments under the Global Fund – would have to be 
clarified. 
Another core concept of the MRDT, which contrasts market exclusivity of orphan 
drug acts, is the separation of innovation incentives from drug prices to ensure 
equitable access to innovation. From the percentages of ‘no judgment’-votes in both 
rounds (16.4% to 29.7%) we infer that several respondents felt not familiar enough 
with this concept to offer an opinion. As has been discussed in the method section 
above, definitions, explanatory notes or links to explanatory publications / websites 
may have been helpful for the respondents and would have decreased the number of 
‘no judgment’-replies. Of those who ranked the item, however, close to 70% 
considered the concept ‘very desirable’ or ‘desirable’ in the first round; the number 
slightly dropped to 65.5% in the second round. Aggregated votes for the categories 
‘definitely feasible’ and ‘possibly feasible’ remained at about 55% for this item in 
both rounds of the survey. To implement the de-linking of incentives from drug 
prices, the MRDT proposes the establishment of prize funds for innovative products 
based on health impact, a concept which the majority of the survey respondents 
supported. Aggregated positive replies regarding the desirability of this proposal 
dropped by ten percent (79.7% / 69.6%) between the first and the second round, 
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while positive ratings for the feasibility of this option stayed at 80% in both rounds. 
The percentages for ‘no judgment’ replies ranged from seven to 14 percent. 
The survey did not include questions on the distributed infrastructure which the 
Treaty proposes, and on structures to monitor funding flows; however, more 80% 
the survey respondents agreed on the general desirability and the feasibility of the 
‘establishment of accountability systems for funds received’. The MRDT includes 
proposals to change patent laws or to enable exemptions from existing patent laws 
for the benefit of neglected diseases. Regarding the controversial issue of the 
configuration of the Treaty’s relation to the WTO-TRIPS Agreement, the recent 
WHO-CEWG underlined that a treaty would not replace, but complement current 
patent regulations (WHO, 2012g, p. 53). Of interest, a considerable shift took place 
in our Delphi survey regarding the issue of patents to promote R&D into neglected 
diseases. In the first round of the survey, close to 50% of the respondents 
considered existing patent regulations (very) undesirable to promote R&D into 
neglected diseases; in the second round, only 30.3% expressed this opinion. With 
23% of ‘no judgment’-replies in both rounds, a considerable number of respondents 
did not wish to express an opinion on the issue of patents to promote R&D into 
neglected diseases. 
In addition to addressing funding flows for medical research and development, the 
MRDT would encourage signatory states to promote capacity building and 
knowledge/technology transfer to endemic countries. This objective corresponds 
closely with the measures which the survey respondents considered most desirable 
to promote R&D into neglected diseases. In fact, of the 135 proposals for additional 
measures, 26 related to capacity building, which was the highest number of 
proposals for one item in the relevant category system. (s. Table 4-6, p. 78) 
To conclude, the draft Medical Research and Development Treaty is a complex and 
a comprehensive approach to promoting not only R&D into neglected diseases. It 
addresses a variety of the issues identified by the survey respondents as key causes 
for the R&D and treatment deficit as well as desirable measures to remove such 
deficits. In its Final Report to the Sixty-fifth World Health Assembly (May 21-26, 
2012), the WHO-CEWG considered two proposals for a biomedical research and 
development treaty and concluded that “the time had now come for considering a 
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coherent and comprehensive international framework or convention”. Details of the 
provisions of such treaty, or convention, shall be developed in the negotiation 
process among WHO member states. (WHO, 2012g, p. 53) The very near future 
will thus show whether the concept of a biomedical R&D treaty will be 
implemented, and which mechanisms, both regarding funding sources as well as 
allocation of funds, it will contain. 
6.2.5 Criteria for a Definition of Neglected Diseases 
At present, no precise definition exists for neglected diseases, comparable to that of 
rare diseases under orphan drug acts. Even though prevalence rates had initially 
been set arbitrarily for rare diseases, and problems have been identified with rising 
prevalences and indications for designated orphan products, as well as with 
medically plausible subsets, the epidemiological criterion offers a guideline as to 
what constitutes a rare disease. Furthermore, the definition of rarity in orphan drug 
acts acknowledged it as a unique disease-spanning feature which caused structural 
R&D deficits. Prior to the enforcement of orphan drug acts, drugs for neglected and 
rare diseases had also been termed ‘significant drugs of limited commercial value’ 
(Interagency Task Force to the Secretary of Health, 1979). For the 6th Millennium 
Development Goal, the wording chosen to also refer to neglected diseases was to 
‘combat HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases’. Today, in the course of the shift 
from vertical, disease-specific to population-based approaches to combat neglected 
diseases, various disease-spanning features characterize the group of neglected 
diseases. (cf. WHO, 2010g, p. 5) 
Being aware of the complexity of the task to define the neglect of tropical infectious 
diseases, we were still interested to learn from the survey participants which criteria 
they deemed important for a definition of a neglected disease. Our interest arose, 
primarily, from the fact that currently the diseases which fall under this label differ 
within and between organizations. We further assumed that, if a regulatory 
instrument were to be developed to promote R&D into neglected diseases, some 
form of a definition and underlying criteria would have to be developed. The draft 
Medical Research and Development Treaty stipulates that a Committee on Priority 
Medical Research and Development (CPMRD) will adopt targets for priority 
medical research and development, which includes neglected diseases. (CPTech, 
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2005b) The Discussion Draft 4 of the Treaty, however, did not include a definition 
of neglected diseases. In line with the exploratory nature of our project, we 
requested the participants in the survey to name three criteria each in the first round 
of the survey which they deemed most important to define neglected diseases. The 
numerous, yet homogeneous suggestions that were contributed were condensed into 
the following six criteria (in descending order for the ranking in the category “most 
important” in the second round of the survey): 
 Absence of treatment and lack of ongoing research 
 Lack of access to existing treatments 
 Prevalence, burden of disease 
 Economic situation of affected population 
 Lack of awareness / visibility of relevant diseases. 
 Disease severity: life threatening, serious, debilitating, chronic 
The above criteria are commonly used to describe the group of neglected diseases. 
As has been shown in the preceding Chapter 2, however, difficulties have been 
encountered in gathering data and applying appropriate tools to quantify the neglect 
of tropical infectious diseases. The Médecins sans Frontiers (MSF) / Drugs for 
Neglected Diseases (DND) working group (Depoortere & Legros, 2001) connected 
the geographical spread, the disease’s magnitude and severity, the number of drugs 
under clinical development, the number of publications, of people working on a 
specific disease and of targeted initiatives, to identify neglect and R&D priorities. 
Trouiller et al. (2002) correlated the number of new chemical entities (NCEs) with 
the number of DALYs to illustrate the absence of needs-based R&D, while G-
Finder reports gather, compare and analyze data on funding flows for Type II and 
Type III diseases. (Moran et al., 2009a; Moran et al., 2011; Moran et al., 2009c) 
These efforts serve to identify deficits and needs, and to assist potential funders to 
direct funds to relevant research areas.  
Apart from R&D deficits, the survey participants considered access deficits to be an 
important criterion for neglected diseases. Access deficits arise i.a. from 
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infrastructural problems in endemic countries, when health facilities and staff are 
absent or not within reach for patients, or from economic issues, when medicines 
are not affordable for patients, because of high prices and a lack of health plans to 
reimburse them. Orphan drug regulations do not address this issue. On the contrary, 
it has been shown that liberty of pricing for rare disease products contribute to 
access deficits and to debates on the effectiveness of orphan drug regulations even 
in affluent developed countries, in which these regulations apply. Remedying 
economic access deficits, however, is one of the pillars of the draft Medical 
Research and Development Treaty which raises the question if, and how, access 
deficits could be operationalized if they were to become a criterion to determine the 
neglect of a certain disease. 
Prevalence and burden of disease were also named as criteria for a definition of 
neglected diseases. We assume that in the context of this question, prevalence and 
burden of disease are synonymous to high prevalences and high burden of disease. 
Some aspects may have to be considered if these items were to serve as criteria for a 
definition. It has been shown that, owing to the infrastructural situation in many 
endemic countries, data on prevalences often do not reflect true prevalence rates. 
Furthermore, if prevalence were a criterion for the definition of a neglected disease, 
prevalence limits or ranges would have to be set, prompting the questions whether a 
neglected disease is always a highly prevalent disease, and what does highly 
prevalent mean in numbers? The Médecins sans Frontiers (MSF) / Drugs for 
Neglected Diseases (DND) working group concluded that “[…] nobody knows the 
exact incidence of sleeping sickness, the exact mortality of malaria, or where 
exactly Buruli ulcer is prevalent. The figures we have are useful because they give 
an estimate, but that is exactly what they are, (gu)estimates. Basing all decisions on 
these figures induces the risk of creating false guarantees of objectivity.” 
(Depoortere & Legros, 2001, p. 47)  
In the list of criteria for a definition of neglected diseases, disease severity received 
the lowest ranking in the category “most important”; this may echo the debate about 
difficulties in using DALYs to properly measure disability from or co-morbidity of 
neglected diseases. Since disease severity also included the aspect ‘life-threatening’, 
the lower ranking for this item in relation to the other items may also be an 
expression of caution not to allow low mortality rates to de-prioritize medical R&D 
 139 
activities for neglected diseases. The fourth criterion in the list, i.e. the economic 
situation of affected populations, describes what has been labeled ‘neglected 
communities’. Neglected diseases are diseases of poverty, seen from the perspective 
of their causes as well as from the perspective of their lack of available treatments, 
or access to existing treatments. A strict separation of both perspectives does not 
seem possible, as has also become apparent in the discussion of the causes for the 
R&D, or treatment deficit. A criterion labeled ‘economic situation of affected 
populations’ will include the issue of market failure for medical R&D as well as the 
social determinants which cause the burden of neglected diseases in the endemic 
countries. Consequently, numerous indicators would be required to operationalize 
this criterion with a view to including it into a definition of neglected diseases. 
Lastly, the lack of awareness and visibility, which characterizes rare as well as 
neglected diseases, was named important by the survey respondents to define a 
neglected disease. Perhaps because of the volatility of such indicators, a lack of 
awareness and visibility is not considered a measurable criterion for rare diseases in 
orphan drug regulations. Publications have been used as surrogate parameters to 
measure the visibility of rare or neglected diseases. The statutory report of 2005 
about the performance of the European orphan drug regulation noted an increase in 
the visibility of orphan diseases, following the regulation’s implementation, 
manifest in a rising number of publications and a growing network of experts. 
Similarly, in their effort to define the concept of neglected diseases, the Médecins 
sans Frontiers (MSF) / Drugs for Neglected Diseases (DND) working group 
included the number of publications as well as the number of people who worked 
on a specific disease in their list of parameters. Troullier et al. (2002) illustrated, 
however, that advances in basic research for leishmaniasis and trypanosomes, 
manifest in relevant publications, had not translated into new products for these 
diseases. A growing number of publications or people working on a specific disease 
may thus testify to an increasing visibility and awareness, but this will not 
necessarily translate into the development of treatments. Hence, a criterion which 
referred to the awareness and visibility of neglected diseases, will require a set of 
indicators which document long-term involvement and specific outcomes, such as 
marketed drugs, or document the (dis)continuation of published projects or of 
disease-related working groups, including, in case of discontinuation, the 
identification of relevant reasons. 
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To conclude, ‘neglect’ is a very multifaceted concept in relation to tropical 
infectious diseases. If the need for the development of relevant indicators to 
establish a definition of neglected diseases arises, i.a. for a regulatory instrument, 
the Delphi method could be a suitable tool to assist in this process. 
 
 
 […] “the resources and know-how 
exist to save millions of lives.” 
(WHO, 2010g, p. ix) 
[…]”: the concept of ‘neglect’ is 
confined to the history of public 
health.”(WHO, 2010g, p. 7) 
6.3 Summary of Results and Conclusion 
The aim of a Policy Delphi is to gather as many perspectives to an issue as 
possible to ensure that all relevant aspects will be taken into account in political 
decision making. As Turoff predicted in his writings about the Policy Delphi, 
the questionnaire expanded considerably between the first and the second round 
of our survey. We are very grateful to all survey respondents for their 
participation in this project. Unfortunately, the scope of this project did not 
allow us to discuss all items of the questionnaire in detail, and we will continue 
to analyze the data which the survey respondents contributed. 
The presence and the neglect of tropical infectious diseases cannot be attributed 
to a single cause, nor can it be remedied by a single measure. The outcome of 
the question on likely causes for the R&D and treatment deficit in our survey 
reflected the findings and arguments of WHO reports and other relevant 
publications, which attribute the R&D deficit for neglected diseases to market 
failure and to a lack of public and private investment. In the course of the 
survey, and from the suggestions for additional causes which the respondents 
contributed, it became apparent that it was difficult to separate the causes for the 
R&D deficit from the causes for the prevalence of neglected diseases, and the 
lack of access to treatment. The contributions by the participating stakeholders 
emphasized once more that health in developing countries will not be improved 
by promoting biomedical research and development alone. Poverty, both as a 
reason for market failure and as disease-proliferating factor, became the most 
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important cause in the second round. High rankings were also given to 
inadequate health systems, inadequate research infrastructure and the lack of 
access to treatments in endemic countries. These rankings support any shift in 
focus from vertical, disease-related programs to a comprehensive public health 
strategy, including intersectoral and population-based approaches, the 
strengthening of health systems, from local delivery infrastructure to national 
social security systems, and fostering an approach of ‘health in all policies’. (cf. 
Kickbusch, 2010b; Ault, 2008; Ehrenberg & Ault, 2005; Hein, 2007)  
The majority of the survey participants advocated a regulatory instrument to 
promote R&D into neglected diseases. With their comments, they expressed the 
hope that such an instrument will not only encompass funding flows for R&D, 
but also be dedicated to increasing international research cooperation and 
building relevant capacity in endemic countries. The draft Medical Research 
and Development Treaty explicitly includes these objectives, while orphan drug 
acts have promoted cooperation and network building among experts and with 
patient organizations. Substantial differences between orphan drug acts and the 
draft Medical Research and Development Treaty precluded a comparative 
analysis of the performance of both instruments. Still, if the priorities of both 
instruments were to be compared, one may conclude that orphan drug acts 
compensate structural R&D deficits, while the MRDT aims to correct them. 
Current push incentives of orphan drug acts were considered desirable and 
feasible to promote R&D into neglected diseases; their adaptation to the needs 
of neglected disease product development on the basis of a structured needs-
assessment among stakeholders could be a next step. Orphan drug pull-
incentives do not compensate for the market failure for neglected diseases. If the 
infrastructure of orphan drug acts were to be used for neglected diseases, proper 
pull-mechanisms could be installed under orphan drug acts, such as prize-funds 
on the basis of health impact and with the aim of ensuring patients’ access to 
new products. We anticipate that such a step to amend and extend orphan drug 
acts would prompt another discussion about market exclusivity for rare disease 
products, about access and the prices of orphan products. This must not be for 
the worse, however. The drafting of the European regulation on rare diseases 
took account of shortcomings that had been identified in the process of 
implementing the U.S. Orphan Drug Act, on which it was partly modeled. By 
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the same logic, and in view of the most recent developments, an extension of 
orphan drug regulations to neglected diseases could equally stimulate a review 
of the regulation, taking into account public health concerns voiced so far, and 
addressing aspects such as access to orphan products, or the pricing of products 
which are developed with public funding. The envisaged international medical 
R&D treaty will focus on R&D needs for patients in developing countries. 
Perhaps, in the long run, the change of paradigm which it initiated could benefit 
rare diseases as well as neglected diseases, and both orphan drug regulations 
and a Medical Research and Development Treaty will complement each other 
for the benefit of both patient groups. 
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8 Annex I – Survey Results 
I. Causes for the treatment deficit for neglected diseases 
Table 8-1 Causes for the treatment deficit -Round I 
Causes for the treatment deficit (Round I) N=159) 
 Count 
Row 
Valid N 
% 
Count 
Row 
Valid N 
% 
Count 
Row 
Valid N 
% 
Count 
Row 
Valid N 
% 
Count 
Row 
Valid N 
% 
Total 
Row 
Valid N 
% 
Count Count Valid N 
 most important important unimportant least important no judgment  abandoned missing  
No or insufficient 
sustainability of public 
funding for R&D for 
neglected diseases   
48 40,3% 57 47,9% 9 7,6% 1 0,8% 4 3,4% 100,0% 24 16 119 
No or inadequate direct 
public funding for research 
and development (R&D) 
for neglected diseases  
44 35,2% 75 60,0% 4 3,2% 0 0,0% 2 1,6% 100,0% 24 10 125 
No or inadequate 
incentives for the private 
sector to invest into R&D 
for neglected diseases  
42 33,9% 61 49,2% 11 8,9% 6 4,8% 4 3,2% 100,0% 24 11 124 
No or inadequate private 
sector investment into 
R&D for neglected 
diseases   
42 33,6% 73 58,4% 6 4,8% 1 0,8% 3 2,4% 100,0% 24 10 125 
No or inadequate access to 
effective drugs for 
neglected diseases  
40 33,1% 57 47,1% 11 9,1% 10 8,3% 3 2,5% 100,0% 24 14 121 
 No or inadequate research 
infrastructure in countries 
with neglected diseases  
36 29,5% 68 55,7% 9 7,4% 8 6,6% 1 0,8% 100,0% 24 13 122 
No or ineffective drugs for 
neglected diseases   24 20,5% 57 48,7% 18 15,4% 10 8,5% 8 6,8% 100,0% 24 18 117 
  
Table 8-2 Causes for the treatment deficit -Round II 
Causes for the treatment deficit (Round II) N= 77 
 Count 
Row 
Valid N 
% 
Count 
Row 
Valid 
N % 
Count 
Row 
Valid 
N % 
Count 
Row 
Valid 
N % 
Count 
Row 
Valid N 
% 
Total 
Row 
Valid 
N% 
Count Count Valid N 
 most important important unimportant least important no judgment  Abandoned missing  
Poverty as disease-proliferating factor (i.a. 
inadequate prevention, inadequate housing, lack 
of clean water) in endemic countries  35 57,4% 20 32,8% 4 6,6% 2 3,3% 0 0,0% 
 
12 4 61 
Poverty as reason for market failure (perception 
of no market for drugs, insufficient R&D)  33 55,0% 21 35,0% 3 5,0% 2 3,3% 1 1,7% 100,0% 12 5 60 
No or insufficient direct public funding for 
research and development (R&D) for neglected 
diseases   34 54,8% 25 40,3% 3 4,8% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 100,0% 12 3 62 
No or insufficient sustainability of public 
funding for R&D for neglected diseases   33 54,1% 25 41,0% 2 3,3% 1 1,6% 0 0,0% 100,0% 12 4 61 
Inadequate research priorities in private sector 
R&D   30 48,4% 23 37,1% 7 11,3% 2 3,2% 0 0,0% 100,0% 12 3 62 
No or inadequate health delivery infrastructure 
and staff in developing countries  28 45,9% 25 41,0% 6 9,8% 1 1,6% 1 1,6% 100,0% 12 4 61 
No or inadequate private sector investment into 
R&D for neglected diseases   28 45,2% 25 40,3% 3 4,8% 5 8,1% 1 1,6% 100,0% 12 3 62 
Lack of health-needs driven priority setting in 
public funding   27 44,3% 31 50,8% 3 4,9% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 100,0% 12 4 61 
No or inadequate incentives for the private 
sector to invest into R&D for neglected diseases  26 41,9% 28 45,2% 5 8,1% 2 3,2% 1 1,6% 100,0% 12 3 62 
No or inadequate access to effective drugs for 
neglected diseases  25 41,0% 29 47,5% 3 4,9% 4 6,6% 0 0,0% 100,0% 12 4 61 
Lack of awareness /visibility of neglected 
diseases   20 32,8% 32 52,5% 8 13,1% 1 1,6% 0 0,0% 100,0% 12 4 61 
No or ineffective drugs for neglected diseases   18 30,0% 35 58,3% 5 8,3% 2 3,3% 0 0,0% 100,0% 12 5 60 
No or inadequate research infrastructure in 
countries with neglected diseases   17 27,9% 37 60,7% 5 8,2% 2 3,3% 0 0,0% 100,0% 12 4 61 
No or inadequate research coordination    5 8,2% 30 49,2% 20 32,8% 4 6,6% 2 3,3% 100,0% 12 4 61 
Disease-specific research difficulties (unknown 
etiology, lack of research material)  3 4,9% 38 62,3% 11 18,0% 7 11,5% 2 3,3% 100,0% 12 4 61 
  
Table 8-3 Causes for the R&D and treatment deficit–Statistics-Round I 
Causes for the treatment deficit-Statistics-Round I 
N Mean Median Std. Deviation Valid Missing* 
No or inadequate direct public funding for research and 
development (R&D) for neglected diseases 123 36 1,7 2,0 0,5 
No or inadequate private sector investment into R&D for 
neglected diseases 
122 37 1,7 2,0 0,6 
No or inadequate incentives for the private sector to 
invest into R&D for neglected diseases 
120 39 1,8 2,0 0,8 
No or insufficient sustainability of public funding for 
R&D for neglected diseases 
115 44 1,7 2,0 0,7 
No or ineffective drugs for neglected diseases 109 50 2,1 2,0 0,9 
No or inadequate access to effective drugs for neglected 
diseases 
118 41 1,9 2,0 0,9 
No or inadequate research infrastructure in countries with 
neglected diseases 
121 38 1,9 2,0 0,8 
* Includes participants who abandoned the questionnaire prior to this question, who did not answer the question and who answered “no judgment” 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8-4 Causes for the R&D and treatment deficit-Statistics-Round II 
Causes for the treatment deficit-Statistics-Round II 
N 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Valid Missing* 
Disease-specific research difficulties (unknown etiology, lack of 
research material) 59 18 2,4 2,0 0,8 
Inadequate research priorities in private sector R&D 62 15 1,7 2,0 0,8 
Lack of awareness /visibility of neglected diseases 61 16 1,8 2,0 0,7 
Lack of health-needs driven priority setting in public funding 61 16 1,6 2,0 0,6 
No or inadequate access to effective drugs for neglected 
diseases 61 16 1,8 2,0 0,8 
No or inadequate health delivery infrastructure and staff in 
developing countries 60 17 1,7 2,0 0,7 
No or inadequate incentives for the private sector to invest into 
R&D for neglected diseases 61 16 1,7 2,0 0,8 
No or inadequate private sector investment into R&D for 
neglected diseases 61 16 1,8 2,0 0,9 
No or inadequate research coordination 59 18 2,4 2,0 0,7 
No or inadequate research infrastructure in countries with 
neglected diseases 61 16 1,9 2,0 0,7 
No or ineffective drugs for neglected diseases 60 17 1,9 2,0 0,7 
No or insufficient direct public funding for research and 
development (R&D) for neglected diseases 62 15 1,5 1,0 0,6 
No or insufficient sustainability of public funding for R&D for 
neglected diseases 61 16 1,5 1,0 0,6 
Poverty as disease-proliferating factor (i.a. inadequate 
prevention, inadequate housing, lack of clean water) in endemic 
countries 
61 16 1,6 1,0 0,8 
Poverty as reason for market failure (perception of no market 
for drugs, insufficient R&D) 59 18 1,6 1,0 0,7 
* Includes participants who abandoned the questionnaire prior to this question, who did not answer the question and who answered “no judgment” 
  
Table 8-5 Causes for the treatment deficit * Place of residence -Round II 
Causes for the treatment deficit * Place of residence Round II 
Developed country Developing country 
Threshold country / 
emerging market 
 
Count Column Valid N % Count 
Column Valid N 
% Count 
Column Valid N 
% 
Disease-specific research difficulties (unknown etiology, 
lack of research material) 
most important 2 5,3% 1 9,1% 0 0,0% 
important 25 65,8% 7 63,6% 0 0,0% 
unimportant 7 18,4% 1 9,1% 0 0,0% 
least important 2 5,3% 2 18,2% 2 100,0% 
no judgment 2 5,3% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
Inadequate research priorities in private sector R&D 
most important 18 46,2% 7 63,6% 1 50,0% 
important 13 33,3% 4 36,4% 0 0,0% 
unimportant 6 15,4% 0 0,0% 1 50,0% 
least important 2 5,1% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
Lack of awareness / visibility of neglected diseases 
most important 9 23,7% 6 54,5% 0 0,0% 
important 21 55,3% 5 45,5% 2 100,0% 
unimportant 7 18,4% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
least important 1 2,6% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
Lack of health-needs driven priority setting in public 
funding 
most important 16 42,1% 7 63,6% 1 50,0% 
important 20 52,6% 3 27,3% 1 50,0% 
unimportant 2 5,3% 1 9,1% 0 0,0% 
least important 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
No or inadequate access to effective drugs for neglected 
diseases 
most important 16 42,1% 5 45,5% 1 50,0% 
important 16 42,1% 6 54,5% 0 0,0% 
unimportant 2 5,3% 0 0,0% 1 50,0% 
least important 4 10,5% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  
Table 8-5 continued 
Causes for the treatment deficit * Place of residence Round II 
Developed country Developing country 
Threshold country / 
emerging market 
 
Count Column Valid N % Count 
Column Valid N 
% Count 
Column Valid N 
% 
No or inadequate health delivery infrastructure and staff 
in developing countries 
most important 16 42,1% 7 63,6% 1 50,0% 
important 16 42,1% 2 18,2% 1 50,0% 
unimportant 4 10,5% 2 18,2% 0 0,0% 
least important 1 2,6% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 1 2,6% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
No or inadequate incentives for the private sector to invest 
into R&D for neglected diseases 
most important 14 35,9% 6 54,5% 0 0,0% 
important 18 46,2% 5 45,5% 1 50,0% 
unimportant 4 10,3% 0 0,0% 1 50,0% 
least important 2 5,1% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 1 2,6% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
No or inadequate private sector investment into R&D for 
neglected diseases 
most important 14 35,9% 8 72,7% 1 50,0% 
important 16 41,0% 3 27,3% 1 50,0% 
unimportant 3 7,7% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
least important 5 12,8% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 1 2,6% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
No or inadequate research coordination 
most important 2 5,3% 2 18,2% 0 0,0% 
important 20 52,6% 5 45,5% 2 100,0% 
unimportant 11 28,9% 3 27,3% 0 0,0% 
least important 3 7,9% 1 9,1% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 2 5,3% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
No or inadequate research infrastructure in countries with 
neglected diseases 
most important 6 15,8% 7 63,6% 1 50,0% 
important 27 71,1% 3 27,3% 1 50,0% 
unimportant 3 7,9% 1 9,1% 0 0,0% 
least important 2 5,3% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  
Table 8-5 continued 
Causes for the treatment deficit * Place of residence Round II 
Developed country Developing country 
Threshold country / 
emerging market 
 
Count Column Valid N % Count 
Column Valid N 
% Count 
Column Valid N 
% 
No or ineffective drugs for neglected diseases 
most important 10 26,3% 3 30,0% 1 50,0% 
important 24 63,2% 5 50,0% 0 0,0% 
unimportant 2 5,3% 2 20,0% 1 50,0% 
least important 2 5,3% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
No or insufficient direct public funding for research and 
development (R&D) for neglected diseases 
most important 22 56,4% 7 63,6% 1 50,0% 
important 15 38,5% 3 27,3% 1 50,0% 
unimportant 2 5,1% 1 9,1% 0 0,0% 
least important 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
No or insufficient sustainability of public funding for 
R&D for neglected diseases 
most important 21 55,3% 6 54,5% 1 50,0% 
important 15 39,5% 4 36,4% 1 50,0% 
unimportant 1 2,6% 1 9,1% 0 0,0% 
least important 1 2,6% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
Poverty as disease-proliferating factor (i.a. inadequate 
prevention, inadequate housing, lack of clean water) in 
end 
most important 20 52,6% 7 63,6% 1 50,0% 
important 13 34,2% 4 36,4% 0 0,0% 
unimportant 4 10,5% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
least important 1 2,6% 0 0,0% 1 50,0% 
no judgment 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
Poverty as reason for market failure (perception of no 
market for drugs, insufficient R&D) 
most important 18 48,6% 7 63,6% 1 50,0% 
important 16 43,2% 2 18,2% 1 50,0% 
unimportant 2 5,4% 1 9,1% 0 0,0% 
least important 0 0,0% 1 9,1% 0 0,0% 
no judgment 1 2,7% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
  
II. Orphan drug regulations for rare diseases 
Table 8-6 Familiarity with orphan drug laws 
Orphan drug regulations for rare diseases (Round I) N= 159 
 Count Row Valid N% Count Row Valid N% Count Row Valid N% 
Total Valid 
Row N% Valid N Missing 
 Active knowledge of orphan drug laws 
(through e.g. application for OD status) 
Passive knowledge of orphan 
drug laws  
No knowledge about orphan 
drug laws    
1. Are your familiar 
with orphan drug laws? 13 10,3% 60 47,6% 53 42,1% 100,0% 126 33 
 
Table 8-7 Effectiveness of orphan drug laws 
 Count 
Row Valid 
N% Count 
Row Valid 
N% Count 
Row Valid 
N% Count 
Row Valid 
N% Count 
Row Valid 
N% 
Total 
Valid Row 
N% Count Count 
Total 
Valid N 
 very effective effective ineffective very ineffective no judgment  abandoned missing  
2. How effective do 
you consider orphan 
drug laws? 
5 7,1% 38 54,3% 12 17,1% 0 0,0% 15 21,4% 100,0% 79 10 70 
 
Table 8-8 Effectiveness of incentives of orphan drug laws 
3. How effective are 
the individual 
provisions of orphan 
drug laws? Count 
Row Valid 
N% Count 
Row Valid 
N% Count 
Row Valid 
N% Count 
Row Valid 
N% Count 
Row 
Valid N% 
Total Row 
Valid N% Count Count 
Total 
Valid N 
 
very effective effective ineffective very ineffective no judgment  abandoned missing  
Fee reduction / Fee 
waivers 6 8,8% 28 41,2% 16 23,5% 1 1,5% 17 25,0% 100,0% 79 12 68 
Protocol assistance 9 13,2% 28 41,2% 10 14,7% 0 0,0% 21 30,9% 100,0% 79 12 68 
Tax credits 10 14,5% 33 47,8% 7 10,1% 1 1,4% 18 26,1% 100,0% 79 11 69 
Market exclusivity 15 22,1% 23 33,8% 12 17,6% 3 4,4% 15 22,1% 100,0% 79 12 68 
 
  
Table 8-9 Incentives of Orphan Drug laws-Statistics-Round I 
Orphan Drug Incentives-Statistics-Round I 
Fee reduction / 
Fee waivers 
Market 
exclusivity 
Protocol 
assistance Tax credits 
N Valid 51 53 47 51 
Missing* 108 106 112 108 
Mean 2,2 2,1 2,0 2,0 
Median 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 
Std. Deviation 0,7 0,9 0,6 0,6 
* Includes participants who abandoned the questionnaire prior to this question, who did not answer the question 
and who answered “no judgment” 
 
 
 
  
  
III. Measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases 
 
Table 8-10 Desirability of Measures-Round I 
Desirability of Measures (Round I) N= 159 
 Count Valid Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% 
Total Row 
N% Count Count 
Total 
Valid N 
 very desirable desirable undesirable very undesirable  no judgment  abandoned missing  
Public-private partnerships 61 52,6% 34 29,3% 10 8,6% 2 1,7% 9 7,8% 100,0% 34 9 116 
Obligations for national 
governments to invest into 
neglected disease R&D 
56 48,3% 45 38,8% 8 6,9% 2 1,7% 5 4,3% 100,0% 34 9 116 
Open source regulations (e.g. 
for scientific data / compound 
libraries) 
54 46,6% 49 42,2% 3 2,6% 4 3,4% 6 5,2% 100,0% 34 9 116 
Separation of innovation 
incentives from drug prices 45 38,8% 35 30,2% 5 4,3% 5 4,3% 26 22,4% 100,0% 34 9 116 
Prize funds for drug innovation  42 35,6% 52 44,1% 8 6,8% 4 3,4% 12 10,2% 100,0% 34 7 118 
Philanthropic spending  38 33,0% 56 48,7% 6 5,2% 1 0,9% 14 12,2% 100,0% 34 10 115 
Fee reduction / Fee waivers 
(e.g. for marketing approval, 
scientific advice) 
31 27,0% 62 53,9% 4 3,5% 1 0,9% 17 14,8% 100,0% 34 10 115 
Investment obligations into 
neglected diseases for drug 
producers/sellers 
30 26,1% 42 36,5% 20 17,4% 8 7,0% 15 13,0% 100,0% 34 10 115 
Protocol assistance 30 25,9% 51 44,0% 5 4,3% 0 0,0% 30 25,9% 100,0% 34 9 116 
Exemption of drugs from 
market exclusivity 26 22,8% 36 31,6% 14 12,3% 6 5,3% 32 28,1% 100,0% 34 11 114 
Advance market commitments 25 21,7% 53 46,1% 15 13,0% 4 3,5% 18 15,7% 100,0% 34 10 115 
Patent pools  24 21,1% 37 32,5% 11 9,6% 4 3,5% 38 33,3% 100,0% 34 11 114 
Tiered/differential pricing 20 17,9% 47 42,0% 9 8,0% 4 3,6% 32 28,6% 100,0% 34 13 112 
Tax credits 16 14,2% 55 48,7% 7 6,2% 2 1,8% 33 29,2% 100,0% 34 12 113 
Existing patent regulations 12 10,3% 21 18,1% 35 30,2% 21 18,1% 27 23,3% 100,0% 34 9 116 
Market exclusivity 9 7,8% 22 19,1% 30 26,1% 24 20,9% 30 26,1% 100,0% 34 10 115 
  
Table 8-11 Feasibility of Measures-Round I 
Feasibility of Measures (Round I) N= 159 
 Count Valid Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% 
Total Valid 
Row N% Count Count Total 
Valid N 
  very feasible feasible unfeasible very unfeasible no judgment  abandoned missing 
Public-private partnerships   50 46,3% 46 42,6% 4 3,7% 0 0,0% 8 7,4% 100% 37 14 108 
Philanthropic spending   48 43,6% 45 40,9% 3 2,7% 0 0,0% 14 12,7% 100% 37 12 110 
Protocol assistance  36 32,7% 49 44,5% 2 1,8% 0 0,0% 23 20,9% 100% 37 12 110 
Open source regulations (e.g. 
for scientific data / compound 
libraries) 
34 31,2% 53 48,6% 9 8,3% 3 2,8% 10 9,2% 100% 37 13 109 
Obligations for national 
governments to invest into 
neglected disease R&D  
31 28,2% 46 41,8% 22 20,0% 6 5,5% 5 4,5% 100% 37 12 110 
Fee reduction / Fee waivers 
(e.g. for marketing approval, 
scientific advice)  
29 26,6% 56 51,4% 5 4,6% 1 0,9% 18 16,5% 100% 37 13 109 
Tax credits  24 21,8% 44 40,0% 5 4,5% 3 2,7% 34 30,9% 100,0% 37 12 110 
Prize funds for drug innovation  23 20,9% 66 60,0% 5 4,5% 1 0,9% 15 13,6% 100,0% 37 12 110 
Tiered/differential pricing  18 17,0% 41 38,7% 10 9,4% 0 0,0% 37 34,9% 100,0% 37 16 106 
Investment obligations into 
neglected diseases for drug 
producers/sellers  
16 14,5% 40 36,4% 27 24,5% 12 10,9% 15 13,6% 100,0% 37 12 110 
Patent pools  15 13,6% 41 37,3% 8 7,3% 4 3,6% 42 38,2% 100,0% 37 12 110 
Advance market commitments   15 13,5% 58 52,3% 13 11,7% 1 0,9% 24 21,6% 100,0% 37 11 111 
Separation of innovation 
incentives from drug prices   14 12,6% 44 39,6% 13 11,7% 7 6,3% 33 29,7% 100,0% 37 11 111 
Existing patent regulations  11 10,2% 46 42,6% 18 16,7% 3 2,8% 30 27,8% 100,0% 37 14 108 
Market exclusivity  11 10,0% 31 28,2% 23 20,9% 3 2,7% 42 38,2% 100,0% 37 12 110 
Exemption of drugs from 
market exclusivity  9 8,2% 41 37,3% 19 17,3% 3 2,7% 38 34,5% 100,0% 37 12 110 
 
  
Table 8-12 Desirability of Measures-Round II 
Desirability of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
 Count Valid Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% 
Count Count 
Valid N 
 very desirable desirable undesirable very undesirable no judgment  Abandoned Missing 
International / 
transcontinental research 
cooperation involving 
researchers from developing 
countries 
34 60,7% 22 39,3% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 100,0% 18 3 56 
Raise awareness among 
policy makers for the impact 
of neglected diseases on 
development 
34 60,7% 18 32,1% 2 3,6% 1 1,8% 1 1,8% 100,0% 18 3 56 
Building research, technical 
and regulatory capacity in 
developing countries 
34 59,6% 22 38,6% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 1 1,8% 100,0% 18 2 57 
Neglected disease R&D as 
priority in relevant European 
Union funding programs (e.g. 
FP7)  
33 57,9% 23 40,4% 1 1,8% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 100,0% 18 2 57 
Parallel measures to improve 
access to health care and 
medicines 
33 57,9% 20 35,1% 1 1,8% 0 0,0% 3 5,3% 100,0% 18 2 57 
Establishment of an 
international health-needs 
driven R&D agenda matched 
to technological opportunities  
32 56,1% 19 33,3% 4 7,0% 0 0,0% 2 3,5% 100,0% 18 2 57 
Sharing or transfer of 
technology to developing 
countries 
30 53,6% 20 35,7% 1 1,8% 1 1,8% 4 7,1% 100,0% 18 3 56 
Contribution by foreign 
donors towards capacity 
building and strengthening 
the research infrastructure in 
developing countries 
28 50,9% 23 41,8% 2 3,6% 0 0,0% 2 3,6% 100,0% 18 4 55 
 
  
Table 8-12 continued 
Desirability of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
 Count Valid Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% 
Count Count 
Valid N 
 very desirable desirable undesirable very undesirable no judgment  Abandoned Missing 
Government support and 
funds for multilateral efforts 
(e.g. WHO-TDR) 
29 50,9% 24 42,1% 2 3,5% 0 0,0% 2 3,5% 100,0% 18 2 57 
Public-private partnerships  28 49,1% 19 33,3% 2 3,5% 4 7,0% 4 7,0% 100,0% 18 2 57 
Open source regulations (e.g. 
for scientific data or 
compound / molecule 
libraries)  
28 48,3% 20 34,5% 4 6,9% 2 3,4% 4 6,9% 100% 18 1 58 
Raising the scientific profile 
of neglected disease research 
(better career/publication 
opportunities)  
27 48,2% 24 42,9% 3 5,4% 0 0,0% 2 3,6% 100% 18 3 56 
Simplified / fast-track 
funding procedures  26 48,1% 21 38,9% 5 9,3% 0 0,0% 2 3,7% 100% 18 5 54 
Competitive grants to 
publicly fund research  25 43,9% 31 54,4% 1 1,8% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 100% 18 2 57 
Link between neglected 
disease R&D and research 
and clinical care for priority 
diseases such as HIV, TB or 
Malaria  
25 43,9% 23 40,4% 4 7,0% 0 0,0% 5 8,8% 100% 18 2 57 
Include neglected diseases in 
university curricula  25 43,1% 30 51,7% 2 3,4% 0 0,0% 1 1,7% 100% 18 1 58 
Building innovation clusters 
for low-profit oriented R&D 
in developing countries  
24 42,9% 27 48,2% 1 1,8% 0 0,0% 4 7,1% 100% 18 3 56 
Interdisciplinary research 
cooperation with e.g. 
veterinary medicine, 
traditional medicine, 
epidemiology 
24 42,1% 30 52,6% 1 1,8% 0 0,0% 2 3,5% 100% 18 2 57 
 
  
Table 8-12 continued 
Desirability of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
 Count Valid Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% 
Count Count 
Valid N 
 very desirable desirable undesirable very undesirable no judgment  Abandoned Missing 
Obligation for national 
governments to invest into 
neglected disease R&D 
23 40,4% 21 36,8% 8 14,0% 1 1,8% 4 7,0% 100% 18 2 57 
Educate / inform the public 
about the individual and 
societal burden of disease of 
neglected diseases   
22 39,3% 29 51,8% 4 7,1% 1 1,8% 0 0,0% 100% 18 3 56 
Separation of innovation 
incentives from drug prices 21 38,2% 15 27,3% 7 12,7% 3 5,5% 9 16,4% 100% 18 4 55 
Exclusive funds for R&D / 
budgetary set-asides 
exclusively for purchasing 
medicines for neglected 
diseases  
20 35,7% 21 37,5% 3 5,4% 1 1,8% 11 19,6% 100% 18 3 56 
Exemption of drugs from 
market exclusivity  20 35,1% 22 38,6% 2 3,5% 5 8,8% 8 14,0% 100% 18 2 57 
Incentives for the private 
sector (e.g. advance market 
commitments, governmental 
incentives) 
20 35,1% 26 45,6% 6 10,5% 2 3,5% 3 5,3% 100% 18 2 57 
Protocol and regulatory 
advice / assistance to 
neglected disease R&D 
projects   
19 33,9% 31 55,4% 2 3,6% 0 0,0% 4 7,1% 100% 18 3 56 
Prize funds with prizes 
awarded based on degree of 
innovation   
19 33,9% 20 35,7% 7 12,5% 2 3,6% 8 14,3% 100% 18 3 56 
Establishment of public (or 
affordable) preclinical 
research facilities  
19 33,3% 34 59,6% 2 3,5% 0 0,0% 2 3,5% 100% 18 2 57 
Patent pools / more flexible 
patent laws to improve access 
to research tools 
19 32,8% 25 43,1% 0 0,0% 3 5,2% 11 19,0% 100% 18 1 58 
  
Table 8-12 continued 
Desirability of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
 Count Valid Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% 
Count Count 
Valid N 
 very desirable desirable undesirable very undesirable no judgment  Abandoned Missing 
New alternative juridical 
instruments which allow 
governments to foster 
essential health research and 
development   
18 31,6% 21 36,8% 8 14,0% 1 1,8% 9 15,8% 100% 18 2 57 
Establishment of 
accountability systems for 
funds received   
18 31,6% 30 52,6% 1 1,8% 1 1,8% 7 12,3% 100% 18 2 57 
Interconnection between 
research projects on different 
neglected diseases   
18 31,6% 36 63,2% 2 3,5% 0 0,0% 1 1,8% 100% 18 2 57 
Lower private sector 
influence on R&D priority 
setting  
18 31,6% 18 31,6% 9 15,8% 6 10,5% 6 10,5% 100% 18 2 57 
Obligation for the private 
sector to invest x % of profit 
made from other 
drugs/treatments into 
neglected diseases  
18 31,6% 20 35,1% 7 12,3% 5 8,8% 7 12,3% 100% 18 2 57 
Development to phase III 
trials by public laboratories   17 29,8% 31 54,4% 3 5,3% 1 1,8% 5 8,8% 100% 18 2 57 
Fee reduction / Fee waivers 
(e.g. for marketing approval, 
scientific advice) 
16 28,1% 32 56,1% 4 7,0% 0 0,0% 5 8,8% 100% 18 2 57 
International regulations 
regarding the private sector  16 28,1% 27 47,4% 9 15,8% 1 1,8% 4 7,0% 100% 18 2 57 
Global funders forum to set 
priorities  14 24,6% 20 35,1% 11 19,3% 4 7,0% 8 14,0% 100% 18 2 57 
Association of biotechnology 
to health systems for better 
delivery of goods  
13 22,8% 27 47,4% 5 8,8% 1 1,8% 11 19,3% 100% 18 2 57 
Tax credits / tax incentives 11 20,4% 25 46,3% 6 11,1% 2 3,7% 10 18,5% 100% 18 5 54 
 
  
Table 8-12 continued 
Desirability of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
 Count Valid Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% 
Count Count 
Valid N 
 very desirable desirable undesirable very undesirable no judgment  Abandoned Missing 
Royalty arrangements for the 
benefit of neglected disease 
R&D if private sector 
receives exclusive license on 
government-owned invention 
for any disease 
10 18,2% 18 32,7% 8 14,5% 5 9,1% 14 25,5% 100% 18 4 55 
Selective investment (as 
incentive) in companies 
which invest in neglected 
disease R&D  
10 18,2% 23 41,8% 12 21,8% 2 3,6% 8 14,5% 100% 18 4 55 
Existing patent regulations 
(e.g. WTO-TRIPS, Doha-
Declaration)  
10 17,9% 16 28,6% 11 19,6% 6 10,7% 13 23,2% 100% 18 3 56 
Abolish patents  9 16,4% 16 29,1% 18 32,7% 6 10,9% 6 10,9% 100% 18 4 55 
Private donations to ^real^ 
pharmaceutical companies to 
develop drugs for neglected 
diseases 
9 16,1% 15 26,8% 19 33,9% 4 7,1% 9 16,1% 100% 18 3 56 
Treaty on cost-effectiveness 
of new health technologies 
linked to a competitive tender 
system   
8 14,8% 17 31,5% 7 13,0% 4 7,4% 18 33,3% 100% 18 5 54 
Voucher systems in 
developed markets (as with 
the FDA) for other products   
8 14,3% 14 25,0% 11 19,6% 4 7,1% 19 33,9% 100% 18 3 56 
Requirement for developing 
countries to include research 
with an adequate budget in 
all health programs  
7 12,5% 32 57,1% 8 14,3% 2 3,6% 7 12,5% 100% 18 3 56 
 
 
  
Table 8-12 continued 
Desirability of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
 Count Valid Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% 
Count Count 
Valid N 
 very desirable desirable undesirable very undesirable no judgment  Abandoned Missing 
Reorganize intellectual 
property rights as intellectual 
monopoly privileges  
6 10,7% 13 23,2% 8 14,3% 11 19,6% 18 32,1% 100% 18 3 56 
Market exclusivity  2 3,6% 11 20,0% 20 36,4% 12 21,8% 10 18,2% 100% 18 4 55 
Price increases (10-20%) for 
brandname drugs paid by 
public health programs to 
invest this profit in neglected 
diseases 
2 3,6% 5 9,1% 26 47,3% 11 20,0% 11 20,0% 100% 18 4 55 
 
  
  
Table 8-13 Feasibility of Measures-Round II 
Feasibility of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
  
Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row 
N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% Count Count 
Valid N   definitely feasible possibly feasible possibly unfeasible definitely unfeasible no judgment  abandoned missing 
Include neglected diseases 
in university curricula  34 65,4% 16 30,8% 1 1,9% 0 0,0% 1 1,9% 100,0% 20 5 52 
Educate / inform the public 
about the individual and 
societal burden of disease of 
neglected diseases   
33 63,5% 15 28,8% 1 1,9% 1 1,9% 2 3,8% 100,0% 20 5 52 
Raise awareness among 
policy makers for the 
impact of neglected diseases 
on development  
33 63,5% 17 32,7% 1 1,9% 0 0,0% 1 1,9% 100,0% 20 5 52 
Public-private partnerships  33 62,3% 16 30,2% 1 1,9% 1 1,9% 2 3,8% 100,0% 20 4 53 
Contribution by foreign 
donors towards capacity 
building and strengthening 
the research infrastructure 
in developing c 
29 58,0% 19 38,0% 1 2,0% 0 0,0% 1 2,0% 100,0% 20 7 50 
Competitive grants to 
publicly fund research  30 57,7% 22 42,3% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 100,0% 20 5 52 
Interconnection between 
research projects on 
different neglected diseases   
27 52,9% 21 41,2% 2 3,9% 0 0,0% 1 2,0% 100,0% 20 6 51 
Raising the scientific profile 
of neglected disease 
research (better 
career/publication 
opportunities)  
27 51,9% 22 42,3% 2 3,8% 0 0,0% 1 1,9% 100,0% 20 5 52 
Interdisciplinary research 
cooperation with e.g. 
veterinary medicine, 
traditional medicine, 
epidemiology 
26 51,0% 21 41,2% 3 5,9% 0 0,0% 1 2,0% 100,0% 20 6 51 
 
  
Table 8-13 continued 
Feasibility of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
  
Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row 
N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% Count Count 
Valid N   definitely feasible possibly feasible possibly unfeasible definitely unfeasible no judgment  abandoned missing 
International / 
transcontinental research 
cooperation involving 
researchers from developing 
countries   
26 50,0% 23 44,2% 2 3,8% 0 0,0% 1 1,9% 100,0% 20 5 52 
Neglected disease R&D as 
priority in relevant 
European Union funding 
programs (e.g. FP7) 
26 50,0% 19 36,5% 6 11,5% 0 0,0% 1 1,9% 100% 20 5 52 
Building research, technical 
and regulatory capacity in 
developing countries  
24 46,2% 25 48,1% 2 3,8% 0 0,0% 1 1,9% 100% 20 5 52 
Simplified / fast-track 
funding procedures  21 40,4% 24 46,2% 4 7,7% 0 0,0% 3 5,8% 100% 20 5 52 
Government support and 
funds for multilateral efforts 
(e.g. WHO-TDR) 
21 39,6% 29 54,7% 1 1,9% 1 1,9% 1 1,9% 100% 20 4 53 
Protocol and regulatory 
advice / assistance to 
neglected disease R&D 
projects  
18 35,3% 27 52,9% 2 3,9% 0 0,0% 4 7,8% 100% 20 6 51 
Tax credits / tax incentives) 18 35,3% 19 37,3% 3 5,9% 1 2,0% 10 19,6% 100% 20 6 51 
Establishment of 
accountability systems for 
funds received   
18 34,6% 26 50,0% 5 9,6% 0 0,0% 3 5,8% 100% 20 5 52 
Sharing or transfer of 
technology to developing 
countries   
18 34,0% 26 49,1% 5 9,4% 1 1,9% 3 5,7% 100% 20 4 53 
 
  
Table 8-13 continued 
Feasibility of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
  
Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row 
N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% Count Count 
Valid N   definitely feasible possibly feasible possibly unfeasible definitely unfeasible no judgment  abandoned missing 
Link between neglected 
disease R&D and research 
and clinical care for priority 
diseases such as HIV, TB or 
Malaria  
17 32,1% 31 58,5% 3 5,7% 1 1,9% 1 1,9% 100% 20 4 53 
Establishment of public (or 
affordable) preclinical 
research facilities  
16 31,4% 25 49,0% 5 9,8% 0 0,0% 5 9,8% 100% 20 6 51 
Private donations to ^real^ 
pharmaceutical companies 
to develop drugs for 
neglected diseases 
16 31,4% 17 33,3% 8 15,7% 2 3,9% 8 15,7% 100% 20 6 51 
Prize funds with prizes 
awarded based on degree of 
innovation  
16 30,8% 25 48,1% 6 11,5% 1 1,9% 4 7,7% 100% 20 5 52 
Establishment of an 
international health-needs 
driven R&D agenda 
matched to technological 
opportunities  
14 27,5% 27 52,9% 5 9,8% 1 2,0% 4 7,8% 100% 20 6 51 
Building innovation clusters 
for low-profit oriented R&D 
in developing countries  
14 26,9% 30 57,7% 3 5,8% 1 1,9% 4 7,7% 100% 20 5 52 
Incentives for the private 
sector (e.g. advance market 
commitments, 
governmental incentives) 
14 26,9% 30 57,7% 4 7,7% 1 1,9% 3 5,8% 100% 20 5 52 
 
 
  
Table 8-13 continued 
Feasibility of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
  
Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row 
N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% Count Count 
Valid N   definitely feasible possibly feasible possibly unfeasible definitely unfeasible no judgment  abandoned missing 
Exclusive funds for R&D / 
budgetary set-asides 
exclusively for purchasing 
medicines for neglected 
diseases  
13 25,5% 20 39,2% 12 23,5% 1 2,0% 5 9,8% 100% 20 6 51 
Global funders forum to set 
priorities  13 25,0% 26 50,0% 6 11,5% 3 5,8% 4 7,7% 100% 20 5 52 
Parallel measures to 
improve access to health 
care and medicines 
12 23,5% 30 58,8% 4 7,8% 0 0,0% 5 9,8% 100% 20 6 51 
Existing patent regulations 
(e.g. WTO-TRIPS, Doha-
Declaration)  
12 23,1% 17 32,7% 7 13,5% 0 0,0% 16 30,8% 100% 20 5 52 
Fee reduction / Fee waivers 
(e.g. for marketing 
approval, scientific advice)  
12 23,1% 26 50,0% 6 11,5% 0 0,0% 8 15,4% 100% 20 5 52 
Association of 
biotechnology to health 
systems for better delivery 
of goods  
10 19,6% 29 56,9% 4 7,8% 0 0,0% 8 15,7% 100% 20 6 51 
Open source regulations 
(e.g. for scientific data or 
compound / molecule 
libraries)  
9 17,3% 29 55,8% 10 19,2% 2 3,8% 2 3,8% 100% 20 5 52 
Development to phase III 
trials by public laboratories   8 15,4% 34 65,4% 5 9,6% 2 3,8% 3 5,8% 100% 20 5 52 
Separation of innovation 
incentives from drug prices  8 15,1% 22 41,5% 6 11,3% 5 9,4% 12 22,6% 100% 20 4 53 
Market exclusivity  7 13,7% 14 27,5% 14 27,5% 1 2,0% 15 29,4% 100% 20 6 51 
 
  
Table 8-13 continued 
Feasibility of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
  
Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row 
N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% Count Count 
Valid N   definitely feasible possibly feasible possibly unfeasible definitely unfeasible no judgment  abandoned missing 
Selective investment (as 
incentive) in companies 
which invest in neglected 
disease R&D  
7 13,5% 24 46,2% 15 28,8% 0 0,0% 6 11,5% 100% 20 5 52 
Patent pools / more flexible 
patent laws to improve 
access to research tools 
7 13,2% 20 37,7% 14 26,4% 3 5,7% 9 17,0% 100% 20 4 53 
Reorganize intellectual 
property rights as 
intellectual monopoly 
privileges  
6 11,8% 13 25,5% 17 33,3% 6 11,8% 9 17,6% 100% 20 6 51 
Royalty arrangements for 
the benefit of neglected 
disease R&D if private 
sector receives exclusive 
license on government-
owned invention for any 
disease 
6 11,8% 22 43,1% 11 21,6% 1 2,0% 11 21,6% 100% 20 6 51 
New alternative juridical 
instruments which allow 
governments to foster 
essential health research and 
development   
6 11,5% 29 55,8% 9 17,3% 1 1,9% 7 13,5% 100% 20 5 52 
Obligation for national 
governments to invest into 
neglected disease R&D  
6 11,3% 23 43,4% 19 35,8% 2 3,8% 3 5,7% 100% 20 4 53 
Exemption of drugs from 
market exclusivity  5 9,6% 18 34,6% 14 26,9% 5 9,6% 10 19,2% 100% 20 5 52 
 
 
  
Table 8-13 continued 
Feasibility of Measures (Round II) N= 77 
  
Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid Row 
N% Count 
Valid 
Row 
N% 
Total 
Valid 
Row N% Count Count 
Valid N   definitely feasible possibly feasible possibly unfeasible definitely unfeasible no judgment  abandoned missing 
Requirement for developing 
countries to include 
research with an adequate 
budget in all health 
programs  
5 9,6% 19 36,5% 20 38,5% 6 11,5% 2 3,8% 100% 20 5 52 
Obligation for the private 
sector to invest x % of 
profit made from other 
drugs/treatments into 
neglected diseases  
5 9,4% 11 20,8% 24 45,3% 9 17,0% 4 7,5% 100% 20 4 53 
Price increases (10-20%) 
for brandname drugs paid 
by public health programs 
to invest this profit in 
neglected diseases 
4 7,8% 9 17,6% 22 43,1% 10 19,6% 6 11,8% 100% 20 6 51 
International regulations 
regarding the private sector  4 7,7% 23 44,2% 16 30,8% 5 9,6% 4 7,7% 100% 20 5 52 
Voucher systems in 
developed markets (as with 
the FDA) for other products   
4 7,7% 20 38,5% 7 13,5% 1 1,9% 20 38,5% 100% 20 5 52 
Lower private sector 
influence on R&D priority 
setting  
2 3,8% 19 36,5% 18 34,6% 3 5,8% 10 19,2% 100% 20 5 52 
Treaty on cost-effectiveness 
of new health technologies 
linked to a competitive 
tender system   
2 3,8% 25 48,1% 6 11,5% 5 9,6% 14 26,9% 100% 20 5 52 
Abolish patents  1 1,9% 6 11,5% 21 40,4% 19 36,5% 5 9,6% 100% 20 5 52 
 
  
  
Table 8-14 Desirability of measures-Statistics-Round I 
Desirability of Measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases-Statistics Round I 
N 
Mean Median Std. Deviation Valid Missing* 
Advance market commitments 97 62 2,0 2,0 0,8 
Exemption of drugs from market exclusivity 82 77 2,0 2,0 0,9 
Existing patent regulations 89 70 2,7 3,0 1,0 
Fee reduction / Fee waivers (e.g. for 
marketing approval, scientific advice) 98 61 1,7 2,0 0,6 
Investment obligations into neglected 
diseases for drug producers/sellers 100 59 2,1 2,0 0,9 
Market exclusivity 85 74 2,8 3,0 1,0 
Obligations for national governments to 
invest into neglected disease R&D 111 48 1,6 1,0 0,7 
Open source regulations (e.g. for scientific 
data / compound libraries) 110 49 1,6 2,0 0,7 
Patent pools 76 83 1,9 2,0 0,8 
Philanthropic spending 101 58 1,7 2,0 0,6 
Prize funds for drug innovation 106 53 1,8 2,0 0,8 
Protocol assistance 86 73 1,7 2,0 0,6 
Public-private partnerships 107 52 1,6 1,0 0,7 
Separation of innovation incentives from 
drug prices 90 69 1,7 1,5 0,8 
Tax credits 80 79 1,9 2,0 0,6 
Tiered/differential pricing 80 79 2,0 2,0 0,8 
* Includes participants who abandoned the questionnaire prior to this question, who did not answer the question and who answered “no judgment” 
 
 
  
Table 8-15 Feasibility of measures-Statistics-Round I 
Feasibility of Measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases-Statistics-Round I 
N 
Mean Median Std. Deviation Valid Missing* 
Advance market commitments 87 72 2,0 2,0 0,6 
Exemption of drugs from market exclusivity 72 87 2,2 2,0 0,7 
Existing patent regulations 78 81 2,2 2,0 0,7 
Fee reduction / Fee waivers (e.g. for 
marketing approval, scientific advice) 91 68 1,8 2,0 0,6 
Investment obligations into neglected 
diseases for drug producers/sellers 95 64 2,4 2,0 0,9 
Market exclusivity 68 91 2,3 2,0 0,8 
Obligations for national governments to 
invest into neglected disease R&D 105 54 2,0 2,0 0,9 
Open source regulations (e.g. for scientific 
data / compound libraries) 99 60 1,8 2,0 0,7 
Patent pools 68 91 2,0 2,0 0,8 
Philanthropic spending 96 63 1,5 1,5 0,6 
Protocol assistance 87 72 1,6 2,0 0,5 
Prize funds for drug innovation 95 64 1,8 2,0 0,6 
Public-private partnerships 100 59 1,5 1,5 0,6 
Separation of innovation incentives from 
drug prices 78 81 2,2 2,0 0,8 
Tax credits 76 83 1,8 2,0 0,7 
Tiered/differential pricing 69 90 1,9 2,0 0,6 
* Includes participants who abandoned the questionnaire prior to this question, who did not answer the question and who answered “no judgment” 
 
 
  
Table 8-16 Desirability of measures-Statistics-Round II 
Desirability of measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases-Statistics-Round II 
N 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Valid Missing* 
Abolish patents 49 28 2,4 2,0 0,9 
Association of biotechnology to health systems for better delivery of goods 46 31 1,9 2,0 0,7 
Building innovation clusters for low-profit oriented R&D in developing countries 52 25 1,6 2,0 0,5 
Building research, technical and regulatory capacity in developing countries 56 21 1,4 1,0 0,5 
Competitive grants to publicly fund research 57 20 1,6 2,0 0,5 
Contribution by foreign donors towards capacity building and strengthening the research 
infrastructure in developing countries 53 24 1,5 1,0 0,6 
Development to phase III trials by public laboratories 52 25 1,8 2,0 0,6 
Educate / inform  the public about the individual and societal burden of disease of neglected 
diseases 56 21 1,7 2,0 0,7 
Establishment of accountability systems for funds received 50 27 1,7 2,0 0,6 
Establishment of an international health-needs driven R&D agenda matched to technological 
opportunities 55 22 1,5 1,0 0,6 
Establishment of public (or affordable) preclinical research facilities 55 22 1,7 2,0 0,5 
Exclusive funds for R&D / budgetary set-asides exclusively for purchasing medicines for neglected 
diseases 45 32 1,7 2,0 0,7 
Exemption of drugs from market exclusivity 49 28 1,8 2,0 0,9 
Existing patent regulations (e.g. WTO-TRIPS, Doha-Declaration) 43 34 2,3 2,0 1,0 
Fee reduction / Fee waivers (e.g. for marketing approval, scientific advice) 52 25 1,8 2,0 0,6 
Global funders forum to set priorities 49 28 2,1 2,0 0,9 
Government support and funds for multilateral efforts (e.g. WHO-TDR) 55 22 1,5 1,0 0,6 
Incentives for the private sector (e.g. advance market commitments, governmental incentives) 54 23 1,8 2,0 0,8 
Include neglected diseases in university curricula 57 20 1,6 2,0 0,6 
Interconnection between research projects on different neglected diseases 56 21 1,7 2,0 0,5 
Interdisciplinary research cooperation with e.g. veterinary medicine, traditional medicine, 
epidemiology 55 22 1,6 2,0 0,5 
  
Table 8-16 continued 
Desirability of measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases-Statistics-Round II 
N 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Valid Missing* 
International / transcontinental research cooperation involving researchers from developing 
countries 56 21 1,4 1,0 0,5 
International regulations regarding the private sector 53 24 1,9 2,0 0,7 
Link between neglected disease R&D and research and clinical care for priority diseases such as 
HIV, TB or Malaria 52 25 1,6 2,0 0,6 
Lower private sector influence on R&D priority setting 51 26 2,1 2,0 1,0 
Market exclusivity 45 32 2,9 3,0 0,8 
Neglected disease R&D as priority in relevant European Union funding programs (e.g. FP7) 57 20 1,4 1,0 0,5 
New alternative juridical instruments which allow governments to foster essential health research 
and development 48 29 1,8 2,0 0,8 
Obligation for national governments to invest into neglected disease R&D 53 24 1,8 2,0 0,8 
Obligation for the private sector to invest  x % of profit made from other drugs/treatments into 
neglected diseases 50 27 2,0 2,0 1,0 
Open source regulations (e.g. for scientific data or compound / molecule libraries) 54 23 1,6 1,0 0,8 
Parallel measures to improve access to health care and medicines 54 23 1,4 1,0 0,5 
Patent pools / more flexible patent laws to improve access to research tools 47 30 1,7 2,0 0,8 
Price increases (10-20%) for brandname drugs paid by public health programs to invest this profit 
in neglected diseases 44 33 3,0 3,0 0,7 
Private donations to ^real^ pharmaceutical companies to develop drugs for neglected diseases 47 30 2,4 2,0 0,9 
Prize funds with prizes awarded based on degree of innovation 48 29 1,8 2,0 0,8 
Protocol and regulatory advice / assistance to neglected disease R&D projects 52 25 1,7 2,0 0,6 
Public-private partnerships 53 24 1,7 1,0 0,9 
Raise awareness among policy makers for the impact of neglected diseases on development 55 22 1,5 1,0 0,7 
Raising the scientific profile of neglected disease research (better career/publication opportunities) 54 23 1,6 1,5 0,6 
Reorganize intellectual property rights as intellectual monopoly privileges 38 39 2,6 2,5 1,1 
 
  
Table 8-16 continued 
Desirability of measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases-Statistics-Round II 
N 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Valid Missing* 
Requirement for developing countries to include research with an adequate budget in all health 
programs 49 28 2,1 2,0 0,7 
Royalty arrangements for the benefit of neglected disease R&D if private sector receives exclusive 
license on government-owned invention for any disease 41 36 2,2 2,0 1,0 
Selective investment (as incentive) in companies which invest in neglected disease R&D 47 30 2,1 2,0 0,8 
Separation of innovation incentives from drug prices 46 31 1,8 2,0 0,9 
Sharing or transfer of technology to developing countries 52 25 1,5 1,0 0,6 
Simplified / fast-track funding procedures 52 25 1,6 1,5 0,7 
Tax credits / tax incentives 44 33 2,0 2,0 0,8 
Treaty on cost-effectiveness of new health technologies linked to a competitive tender system 36 41 2,2 2,0 0,9 
Voucher systems in developed markets (as with the FDA) for other products 37 40 2,3 2,0 0,9 
* Includes participants who abandoned the questionnaire prior to this question, who did not answer the question and who answered “no judgment” 
 
  
  
Table 8-17 Feasibility of measures-Statistics-Round II 
Feasibility of measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases-Statistics-Round II 
N 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Valid Missing* 
Abolish patents 52 25 8,4 8,0 0,9 
Association of biotechnology to health systems for better delivery of goods 51 26 7,4 7,0 1,3 
Building innovation clusters for low-profit oriented R&D in developing countries 52 25 7,1 7,0 1,1 
Building research, technical and regulatory capacity in developing countries 52 25 6,6 7,0 0,7 
Competitive grants to publicly fund research 52 25 6,4 6,0 0,5 
Contribution by foreign donors towards capacity building and strengthening the research 
infrastructure in developing countries 50 27 6,5 6,0 0,7 
Development to phase III trials by public laboratories 52 25 7,2 7,0 1,0 
Educate / inform  the public about the individual and societal burden of disease of neglected 
diseases 52 25 6,5 6,0 0,9 
Establishment of accountability systems for funds received 52 25 6,9 7,0 1,0 
Establishment of an international health-needs driven R&D agenda matched to technological 
opportunities 51 26 7,1 7,0 1,1 
Establishment of public (or affordable) preclinical research facilities 51 26 7,1 7,0 1,1 
Exclusive funds for R&D / budgetary set-asides exclusively for purchasing medicines for neglected 
diseases 51 26 7,3 7,0 1,2 
Exemption of drugs from market exclusivity 52 25 7,9 8,0 1,3 
Existing patent regulations (e.g. WTO-TRIPS, Doha-Declaration) 52 25 7,8 7,0 1,6 
Fee reduction / Fee waivers (e.g. for marketing approval, scientific advice) 52 25 7,3 7,0 1,3 
Global funders forum to set priorities 52 25 7,2 7,0 1,1 
Government support and funds for multilateral efforts (e.g. WHO-TDR) 53 24 6,7 7,0 0,8 
Incentives for the private sector (e.g. advance market commitments, governmental incentives) 52 25 7,0 7,0 1,0 
Include neglected diseases in university curricula 52 25 6,4 6,0 0,7 
Interconnection between research projects on different neglected diseases 51 26 6,6 6,0 0,8 
Interdisciplinary research cooperation with e.g. veterinary medicine, traditional medicine, 
epidemiology 51 26 6,6 6,0 0,8 
  
Table 8-17 continued 
Feasibility of measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases-Statistics-Round II 
N 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Valid Missing* 
International / transcontinental research cooperation involving researchers from developing 
countries 52 25 6,6 6,5 0,7 
International regulations regarding the private sector 52 25 7,7 7,0 1,0 
Link between neglected disease R&D and research and clinical care for priority diseases such as 
HIV, TB or Malaria 53 24 6,8 7,0 0,8 
Lower private sector influence on R&D priority setting 52 25 8,0 8,0 1,2 
Market exclusivity 51 26 8,1 8,0 1,4 
Neglected disease R&D as priority in relevant European Union funding programs (e.g. FP7) 52 25 6,7 6,5 0,8 
New alternative juridical instruments which allow governments to foster essential health research 
and development 52 25 7,5 7,0 1,2 
Obligation for national governments to invest into neglected disease R&D 53 24 7,5 7,0 1,0 
Obligation for the private sector to invest  x % of profit made from other drugs/treatments into 
neglected diseases 53 24 7,9 8,0 1,0 
Open source regulations (e.g. for scientific data or compound / molecule libraries) 52 25 7,2 7,0 0,9 
Parallel measures to improve access to health care and medicines 51 26 7,1 7,0 1,1 
Patent pools / more flexible patent laws to improve access to research tools 53 24 7,8 7,0 1,3 
Price increases (10-20%) for brandname drugs paid by public health programs to invest this profit 
in neglected diseases 51 26 8,1 8,0 1,1 
Private donations to ^real^ pharmaceutical companies to develop drugs for neglected diseases 51 26 7,4 7,0 1,4 
Prize funds with prizes awarded based on degree of innovation 52 25 7,1 7,0 1,1 
Protocol and regulatory advice / assistance to neglected disease R&D projects 51 26 6,9 7,0 1,1 
Public-private partnerships 53 24 6,5 6,0 0,9 
Raise awareness among policy makers for the impact of neglected diseases on development 52 25 6,4 6,0 0,7 
Raising the scientific profile of neglected disease research (better career/publication opportunities) 52 25 6,6 6,0 0,8 
Reorganize intellectual property rights as intellectual monopoly privileges 51 26 8,0 8,0 1,3 
 
  
Table 8-17 continued 
Feasibility of measures to promote R&D into neglected diseases-Statistics-Round II 
N 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Valid Missing* 
Requirement for developing countries to include research with an adequate budget in all health 
programs 52 25 7,6 8,0 1,0 
Royalty arrangements for the benefit of neglected disease R&D if private sector receives exclusive 
license on government-owned invention for any disease 51 26 7,8 7,0 1,3 
Selective investment (as incentive) in companies which invest in neglected disease R&D 52 25 7,5 7,0 1,1 
Separation of innovation incentives from drug prices 53 24 7,8 7,0 1,4 
Sharing or transfer of technology to developing countries 53 24 7,0 7,0 1,0 
Simplified / fast-track funding procedures 52 25 6,8 7,0 1,0 
Tax credits / tax incentives 51 26 7,3 7,0 1,5 
Treaty on cost-effectiveness of new health technologies linked to a competitive tender system 52 25 8,1 7,0 1,4 
Voucher systems in developed markets (as with the FDA) for other products 52 25 8,3 8,0 1,5 
* Includes participants who abandoned the questionnaire prior to this question, who did not answer the question and who answered “no judgment” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
IV. Desirability and feasibility of a regulatory instrument 
Table 8-18 Desirability of a regulatory instrument-Round I 
Desirability of a regulatory instrument-Round I 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid very desirable 50 31,4 44,2 
desirable 50 31,4 44,2 
undesirable 8 5,0 7,1 
very undesirable 2 1,3 1,8 
no judgment 3 1,9 2,7 
Total 113 71,1 100,0 
Missing abandoned 39 24,5 
 
missing 7 4,4 
 
Total 46 28,9 
 
Total 159 100,0 
 
 
Table 8-19 Feasibility of a regulatory instrument-Round I 
Feasibility of a regulatory instrument-Round I 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid 
very feasible 16 10,1 14,2 
feasible 72 45,3 63,7 
unfeasible 9 5,7 8,0 
very unfeasible 4 2,5 3,5 
no judgment 12 7,5 10,6 
Total 113 71,1 100,0 
Missing abandoned 39 24,5 
 
missing 7 4,4 
 
Total 46 28,9 
 
Total 159 100,0 
 
 
  
Table 8-20 Desirability and feasibility of a regulatory instrument-Statistics-Round I 
Desirability and feasibility of a regulatory instrument-Statistics-Round I 
N   
Mean Median Std. Deviation Valid Missing* 
Desirability of a 
regulatory 
instrument 
110 49 1,7 2,0 0,7 
Feasibility of a 
regulatory 
instrument 
101 58 2,0 2,0 0,6 
* Includes participants who abandoned the questionnaire prior to this question, who did not answer the question and who answered “no judgment” 
 
 
 
 
Table 8-21 Desirability and feasibility of a regulatory instrument-Statistics-Round II 
Desirability and feasibility of a regulatory instrument-Statistics Round II 
N 
Mean Median Std. Deviation Valid Missing* 
Desirability of a 
regulatory 
instrument 
50 27 1,6 1,0 0,8 
Feasibility of a 
regulatory 
instrument 
53 24 2,1 2,0 0,8 
* Includes participants who abandoned the questionnaire prior to this question, who did not answer the question and who answered “no judgment” 
 
 
 
  
Table 8-22 Desirability of a Regulatory Instrument * Place of Residence-Round I 
Desirability of a Regulatory Instrument * Place of Residence – Round I 
   Place of Residence Total 
   
Developed 
country 
Developing 
country 
Threshold country / 
emerging market  
Desirability of a regulatory 
instrument 
very desirable 
Count 35 11 3 49 
% within Place of Residence 42,2% 52,4% 42,9% 44,1% 
% of Total 31,5% 9,9% 2,7% 44,1% 
desirable 
Count 36 10 4 50 
% within Place of Residence 43,4% 47,6% 57,1% 45,0% 
% of Total 32,4% 9,0% 3,6% 45,0% 
undesirable 
Count 8 0 0 8 
% within Place of Residence 9,6% 0,0% 0,0% 7,2% 
% of Total 7,2% 0,0% 0,0% 7,2% 
very undesirable 
Count 2 0 0 2 
% within Place of Residence 2,4% 0,0% 0,0% 1,8% 
% of Total 1,8% 0,0% 0,0% 1,8% 
no judgment 
Count 2 0 0 2 
% within Place of Residence 2,4% 0,0% 0,0% 1,8% 
% of Total 1,8% 0,0% 0,0% 1,8% 
Total  Count 83 21 7 111 
  % within Place of Residence 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
  % of Total 74,8% 18,9% 6,3% 100,0% 
 
 
  
Table 8-23 Feasibility of a regulatory instrument * Place of Residence-Round I 
Feasibility of a Regulatory Instrument * Place of Residence - Round I 
  
Place of Residence 
Total Developed country 
Developing 
country 
Threshold country / 
emerging market 
Feasibility of a regulatory 
instrument 
very feasible 
Count 8 7 1 16 
% within Place of Residence 9,6% 33,3% 14,3% 14,4% 
% of Total 7,2% 6,3% ,9% 14,4% 
feasible 
Count 55 13 4 72 
% within Place of Residence 66,3% 61,9% 57,1% 64,9% 
% of Total 49,5% 11,7% 3,6% 64,9% 
unfeasible 
Count 8 0 1 9 
% within Place of Residence 9,6% 0,0% 14,3% 8,1% 
% of Total 7,2% 0,0% ,9% 8,1% 
very unfeasible 
Count 3 0 0 3 
% within Place of Residence 3,6% 0,0% 0,0% 2,7% 
% of Total 2,7% 0,0% 0,0% 2,7% 
no judgment 
Count 9 1 1 11 
% within Place of Residence 10,8% 4,8% 14,3% 9,9% 
% of Total 8,1% ,9% ,9% 9,9% 
Total Count 83 21 7 111 
% within Place of Residence 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
% of Total 74,8% 18,9% 6,3% 100,0% 
 
 
 
  
Table 8-24 Desirability of a Regulatory Instrument * Place of Residence-Round II 
Desirability of a Regulatory Instrument * Place of Residence – Round II 
  
Place of Residence 
Total Developed country 
Developing 
country 
Threshold 
country/emerging 
market 
Desirability of a 
regulatory instrument 
very desirable 
Count 17 6 2 25 
% within Place of Residence 43,6% 54,5% 100,0% 48,1% 
% of Total 32,7% 11,5% 3,8% 48,1% 
desirable 
Count 15 5 0 20 
% within Place of Residence 38,5% 45,5% 0,0% 38,5% 
% of Total 28,8% 9,6% 0,0% 38,5% 
undesirable 
Count 2 0 0 2 
% within Place of Residence 5,1% 0,0% 0,0% 3,8% 
% of Total 3,8% 0,0% 0,0% 3,8% 
very undesirable 
Count 2 0 0 2 
% within Place of Residence 5,1% 0,0% 0,0% 3,8% 
% of Total 3,8% 0,0% 0,0% 3,8% 
no judgment 
Count 3 0 0 3 
% within Place of Residence 7,7% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 
% of Total 5,8% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 
Total Count 39 11 2 52 
% within Place of Residence 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
% of Total 75,0% 21,2% 3,8% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8-25 Feasibility of a Regulatory Instrument * Place of Residence-Round II 
Feasibility of a Regulatory Instrument * Place of Residence – Round II 
  
Place of Residence 
Total Developed country 
Developing 
country 
Threshold country 
/ emerging market 
Feasibility of a regulatory 
instrument 
definitely feasible 
Count 5 3 1 9 
% within Place of Residence 12,8% 27,3% 50,0% 17,3% 
% of Total 9,6% 5,8% 1,9% 17,3% 
possibly feasible 
Count 25 6 1 32 
% within Place of Residence 64,1% 54,5% 50,0% 61,5% 
% of Total 48,1% 11,5% 1,9% 61,5% 
possibly unfeasible 
Count 6 2 0 8 
% within Place of Residence 15,4% 18,2% 0,0% 15,4% 
% of Total 11,5% 3,8% 0,0% 15,4% 
definitely 
unfeasible 
Count 3 0 0 3 
% within Place of Residence 7,7% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 
% of Total 5,8% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 
Total Count 39 11 2 52 
% within Place of Residence 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
% of Total 75,0% 21,2% 3,8% 100,0% 
  
  
Table 8-26 Desirability of a Regulatory Instrument*Professional Affiliation-Round I 
Desirability of a regulatory instrument * Professional affiliation - Round one, six subgroups 
  Academia National government/ parliament Industry 
International 
organization 
Non-
governmental 
organization 
Other 
very desirable 
Count 28 2 1 2 8 9 
% within 
Affiliation 46,7% 33,3% 8,3% 40,0% 50,0% 69,2% 
% of Total 25,0% 1,8% 0,9% 1,8% 7,1% 8,0% 
desirable 
Count 26 4 6 3 7 4 
% within 
Affiliation 43,3% 66,7% 50,0% 60,0% 43,8% 30,8% 
% of Total 23,2% 3,6% 5,4% 2,7% 6,3% 3,6% 
undesirable 
Count 4 0 4 0 0 0 
% within 
Affiliation 6,7% 0,0% 33,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
% of Total 3,6% 0,0% 3,6% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
very 
undesirable 
Count 0 0 1 0 1 0 
% within 
Affiliation 0,0% 0,0% 8,3% 0,0% 6,3% 0,0% 
% of Total 0,0% 0,0% 0,9% 0,0% 0,9% 0,0% 
no judgment 
Count 2 0 0 0 0 0 
% within 
Affiliation 3,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
% of Total 1,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Total Count 60 6 12 5 16 13 
 
% within 
Affiliation 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
% of Total 53,6% 5,4% 10,7% 4,5% 14,3% 11,6% 
 
  
Table 8-27 Feasibility of a Regulatory Instrument*Professional Affiliation-Round I 
Feasibility of a regulatory instrument * Professional affiliation - Round one, six subgroups 
  Academia National government / parliament Industry 
International 
organization 
Non-governmental 
organization Other 
very feasible 
Count 12 0 1 0 1 2 
% within Affiliation 20,0% 0,0% 8,3% 0,0% 6,3% 15,4% 
% of Total 10,7% 0,0% 0,9% 0,0% 0,9% 1,8% 
feasible 
Count 36 5 5 4 13 9 
% within Affiliation 60,0% 83,3% 41,7% 80,0% 81,3% 69,2% 
% of Total 32,1% 4,5% 4,5% 3,6% 11,6% 8,0% 
unfeasible 
Count 5 1 3 0 0 0 
% within Affiliation 8,3% 16,7% 25,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
% of Total 4,5% 0,9% 2,7% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
very unfeasible 
Count 1 0 2 0 1 0 
% within Affiliation 1,7% 0,0% 16,7% 0,0% 6,3% 0,0% 
% of Total 0,9% 0,0% 1,8% 0,0% 0,9% 0,0% 
no judgment 
Count 6 0 1 1 1 2 
% within Affiliation 10,0% 0,0% 8,3% 20,0% 6,3% 15,4% 
% of Total 5,4% 0,0% 0,9% 0,9% 0,9% 1,8% 
Total Count 60 6 12 5 16 13 
 % within Affiliation 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 % of Total 53,6% 5,4% 10,7% 4,5% 14,3% 11,6% 
 
 
  
Table 8-28 Desirability of a Regulatory Instrument*Professional Affiliation-Round II 
Desirability of a regulatory instrument * Professional affiliation - Round two, seven subgroups 
  Academia National government / parliament Industry 
International 
organization 
Non-governmental 
organization 
Public Private 
Partnership Other 
very desirable 
Count 16 3 1 0 5 0 1 
% within 
Affiliation 57,1% 75,0% 16,7% 0,0% 83,3% 0,0% 50,0% 
% of Total 30,8% 5,8% 1,9% 0,0% 9,6% 0,0% 1,9% 
desirable 
Count 11 1 3 1 1 1 1 
% within 
Affiliation 39,3% 25,0% 50,0% 25,0% 16,7% 50,0% 50,0% 
% of Total 21,2% 1,9% 5,8% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 
undesirable Count 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 
% within 
Affiliation 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 25,0% 0,0% 50,0% 0,0% 
 % of Total 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,9% 0,0% 1,9% 0,0% 
very 
undesirable Count 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
 
% within 
Affiliation 0,0% 0,0% 33,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
 % of Total 0,0% 0,0% 3,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
no judgment Count 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 
 
% within 
Affiliation 3,6% 0,0% 0,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
 % of Total 1,9% 0,0% 0,0% 3,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Total Count 28 4 6 4 6 2 2 
 
% within 
Affiliation 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 % of Total 53,8% 7,7% 11,5% 7,7% 11,5% 3,8% 3,8% 
 
  
Table 8-29 Feasibility of a Regulatory Instrument*Professional Affiliation -Round II 
Feasibility of a regulatory instrument * Professional affiliation - Round two, seven subgroups 
  Academia National government / parliament Industry 
International 
organization 
Non-governmental 
organization 
Public Private 
Partnership Other 
definitely feasible 
Count 7 1 0 0 2 0 0 
% within Affiliation 25,0% 25,0% 0,0% 0,0% 33,3% 0,0% 0,0% 
% of Total 13,5% 1,9% 0,0% 0,0% 3,8% 0,0% 0,0% 
possibly feasible 
Count 17 3 4 1 3 2 1 
% within Affiliation 60,7% 75,0% 66,7% 25,0% 50,0% 100,0% 50,0% 
% of Total 32,7% 5,8% 7,7% 1,9% 5,8% 3,8% 1,9% 
possibly unfeasible Count 3 0 0 3 1 0 1 
 % within Affiliation 10,7% 0,0% 0,0% 75,0% 16,7% 0,0% 50,0% 
 % of Total 5,8% 0,0% 0,0% 5,8% 1,9% 0,0% 1,9% 
definitely unfeasible Count 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 
 % within Affiliation 3,6% 0,0% 33,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
 % of Total 1,9% 0,0% 3,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Total Count 28 4 6 4 6 2 2 
 % within Affiliation 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 % of Total 53,8% 7,7% 11,5% 7,7% 11,5% 3,8% 3,8% 
 
  
  
V. Criteria for a definition of neglected diseases 
Table 8-30 Criteria for a definition of neglected diseases-Round II 
Criteria for a definition of neglected diseases 
 
Count Valid Row N%  Count 
Valid Row 
N%  Count 
Valid Row 
N%  Count 
Valid Row 
N%  Count 
Valid Row 
N%  
Total 
Valid N Missing Total 
  
most 
important  important  unimportant  
least 
important  
no 
judgment    
Disease severity: life-
threatening, serious, 
debilitating, chronic   
12 20,3% 36 61,0% 6 10,2% 3 5,1% 2 3,4% 59 18 77 
Lack of awareness / 
visibility of relevant 
diseases  
16 27,6% 28 48,3% 7 12,1% 5 8,6% 2 3,4% 58 19 77 
Economic situation of 
affected population 18 30,5% 31 52,5% 5 8,5% 3 5,1% 2 3,4% 59 18 77 
Prevalence, burden of 
disease 20 33,9% 27 45,8% 8 13,6% 2 3,4% 2 3,4% 59 18 77 
Lack of access to 
existing effective 
treatment   
21 35,0% 31 51,7% 4 6,7% 3 5,0% 1 1,7% 60 17 77 
Absence of effective 
treatment and lack of 
ongoing research  
27 45,8% 28 47,5% 2 3,4% 1 1,7% 1 1,7% 59 18 77 
 
 
  
Table 8-31 Criteria for a definition of neglected diseases-Statistics-Round II 
Criteria for a definition of neglected diseases 
N 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Valid Missing* 
Absence of effective treatment and lack of ongoing research 58 19 1,6 2,0 0,6 
Lack of awareness / visibility of relevant diseases 56 21 2,0 2,0 0,9 
Disease severity: life-threatening, serious, debilitating, chronic 57 20 2,0 2,0 0,7 
Economic situation of affected population 57 20 1,9 2,0 0,8 
Lack of access to existing effective treatment 59 18 1,8 2,0 0,8 
Prevalence, burden of disease 57 20 1,9 2,0 0,8 
* Includes participants who abandoned the questionnaire prior to this question, who did not answer the question and who answered “no judgment” 
  
  
9 Annex II – Survey Documentation 
 
Reference Manager 11.0 / Literature Search 
Search-
Strategy 
Keywords in 
document 
title or 
keyword list 
Boolean 
operator 
Keywords in 
document 
title or 
keyword list 
Boolean 
operator 
Keywords in 
document 
title or 
keyword list 
Boolean 
operator 
Keywords in 
document 
title or 
keyword list 
Boolean 
operator 
Keywords in 
document 
title or 
keyword list 
Boolean 
operator 
neglected 
disease* 
 orphan 
disease* 
OR orphan 
disease* 
OR neglected 
disease* 
AND Medical 
Research and 
Development 
Treaty 
 
treaty 
rare disease AND 
rare disease* 
neglected 
disease* 
 
* A wildcard (*) was added to retrieve the words “disease” as well as “diseases”.  
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Mailvorschau
Absender: Angela Fehr <Delphi_Survey@gmx.net>
Betreff: Research Project "Neglected and Orphan Diseases"
Mailtext:
Dear Professor #u_name#,
As part of a research project on neglected and orphan diseases, the University of Bielefeld (Germany) School of Public 
Health conducts a two-round Delphi survey to gather experts' opinions on possible solutions for the existing deficits in 
neglected disease R&D, with a special focus on mechanisms contained in orphan drug regulations and in the draft Medical 
Research and Development Treaty. With this Email, we are kindly requesting your participation in the survey.
The questionnaire for the first round of survey opens when you click on the following link: #code_complete#. The 
questionnaire will take about 10 minutes to complete. In the first round of survey, you are asked to rank items and to 
suggest additional items to the questionnaire. In the second round (which will open shortly after the closing of the first
round), you will see frequency distributions from the first round and possible new items based on the suggestions from the 
first round. All replies, comments and suggestions to the questionnaire are collected anonymously from the respondents; 
the respondents' identities will at no time be visible to other survey participants. 
Attached to this mail is a pdf-document with a short summary of the aims and methods of this survey. We are contacting 
about 400 international experts from different academic backgrounds (medicine, economics, law, political science, public 
health) and professional affiliations (academia, industry, internatinal organizations, national governments/parliaments, 
non-governmental organizations) to participate in this survey.
The assessment by experts and stakeholders of current R&D-stimulating measures and their possible suggestions for 
additional measures is of crucial importance for this research project. We would therefore be very grateful if you shared 
your opinion and participated in the survey.
Thank you very much for your time and support!
Sincerely,
Prof. Dr. Oliver Razum, MD, MSc
Prof. Dr. Petra Thürmann, MD
(Project Chairs)
Angela Fehr, M.A. (USA)
(Research Coordinator)
Anhänge: Project Summary final.pdf
Delphi Survey on Neglected and Orphan Diseases 
 
Project Summary 
 
Research questions: 1) Which incentives are effective in stimulating research 
and development on neglected and orphan diseases?  
2) Is it meaningful and/or necessary to have a regulatory 
instrument to frame the incentives for neglected diseases? 
 
Research design:  Delphi survey in two rounds 
 
Survey participants: Experts and stakeholders in the fields of neglected 
diseases and rare/orphan diseases 
 
Project location: Dept. of Epidemiology & International Health, School of 
Public Health, University of Bielefeld (Germany) 
 
Project chairs:  Professor Dr. Oliver Razum, MD, MSc 
Professor Dr. Petra Thürmann, MD 
Research coordinator: Angela Fehr, M.A. (USA) 
    University of Bielefeld (Germany) 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Project background / institutional affiliation 
This survey is part of a research project on neglected and orphan diseases, which is 
conducted at the Department of Epidemiology & International Public Health at the 
School of Public Health, University of Bielefeld, Germany. The project is supervised 
by the Department Head, Prof. Dr. Oliver Razum, MD, MSc, and by Prof. Dr. Petra 
Thürmann, MD, Chair of Clinical Pharmacology, University of Witten/Herdecke, 
Philipp Klee-Institute for Clinical Pharmacology, HELIOS Klinikum Wuppertal. 
 
Research questions 
Neglected diseases and rare, or “orphan” diseases, have in common that they offer 
little financial incentive for investing in research and drug development (R&D). 
Orphan drug regulations such as the U.S. Orphan Drug Act of 1983 or the European 
Union’s Regulation on orphan medicinal products, enforced in 2000, were developed 
to stimulate orphan drug development and to ameliorate the situation for patients with 
rare diseases. For neglected diseases, no such regulations exist yet. One option 
under discussion is to apply incentives similar to those contained in orphan drug laws 
to stimulate neglected disease R&D. A different approach was taken in 2005, when 
the draft for a Medical Research and Development Treaty (MRDT) was submitted to 
the World Health Organization (WHO), designed to “create a new global framework 
for supporting medical research and development.”  
 
With this research project, we are asking experts and stakeholders to share their 
opinion on the necessity of a regulatory instrument to stimulate neglected disease 
R&D, and on the measures such regulation would have to include. 
 
Method 
The method chosen for this research is a Delphi survey. Delphi surveys are 
anonymous surveys among a heterogeneous group of experts who represent various 
perspectives to an issue under research. Owing to rankings and priority-settings, the 
method and its outcomes are credible and operational for policy-makers. 
 
In this survey, you are asked to give priority judgment on causes for the problem of 
neglected diseases, as well as on possible solutions. The questionnaire we have 
developed covers a number of causes as well as measures included in the U.S. and 
the European regulations on orphan drugs 1. Additionally, we have listed approaches 
from the draft Medical Research and Development Treaty 2.  
 
Delphi surveys are conducted in several rounds. This survey has two rounds. In 
the first round, you are asked to rank the items given in the questionnaire, and, if you 
wish, complement them with your own suggestions. The questionnaire for the second 
round (in which only first-round participants can participate), will include these 
additions made by participants. Also in the second round questionnaire, you will see 
frequency distributions of the answers given in the first round. If you wish, you may 
change your priority judgment based on these results. 
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Final frequency distributions from the second round will be mailed to you after the 
survey has been closed and evaluated. 
 
Technical Procedure 
The Email you received contains the link to the questionnaire for the first round. 
Participants in a pre-test needed around 10 minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
The first round can be accessed for two weeks starting today.  
 
Participants 
We are contacting about 400 experts and stakeholders worldwide from the field of 
neglected and rare diseases, who took part in international conferences on the 
issues of neglected and rare diseases and/or are authors of relevant scientific 
publications on the topic. Their professional affiliations are in academia, industry, 
international organizations, national governments/parliaments or non-governmental 
organizations. 
 
The survey is anonymous. Participants’ identities will not at any time during the 
analysis and publication of data, be visible to other survey participants or correlated 
with individual survey results. 
 
Goal 
The goal of this survey is to learn which R&D-stimulating measures are given 
preference by the participating experts and stakeholders. 
 
 
 
We are very grateful for your support of this research project. Please do not 
hesitate to contact us if you have any questions about this survey. 
 
On behalf of the project team, 
Sincerely, 
Angela Fehr, Research Coordinator 
 
Email: Delphi_Survey@gmx.net 
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 Startseite  Optionen  Mailvorlagen verwalten
Mailvorlagen verwalten
	



Login:

Users Online:


	


	
Date (GMT):
24.03.2008 19:33:01
Local date (+0:00):
24.03.2008 19:33:01
 
Mailvorschau
Absender: Angela Fehr <Delphi_Survey@gmx.net>
Betreff: Research Project "Neglected and Orphan Diseases"
Mailtext:
Dear Professor / Dr. #u_name#,
Thank you very much for filling out the questionnaire for the Delphi survey on neglected 
and orphan diseases. The survey software indicates to us that your questionnaire has not 
been filled out completely. We would therefore like to ask whether you wish to complete 
the questionnaire. Your personal code to resume participation in the survey 
(#code_complete#) will be active until March 29, 2008. The answers you have given to 
date have been saved; however, you may revise them when you re-enter your 
questionnaire.
Thank you very much for your time and support!
Sincerely,
pp.
Angela Fehr
Research Coordinator
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Mailvorschau
Absender: Angela Fehr <Delphi_Survey@gmx.net>
Betreff: Research Project "Neglected and Orphan Diseases"
Mailtext:
Dear Professor#u_name#,
With this Email we would like to renew our request and kindly ask whether you would be 
willing to participate in a two-round Delphi survey on neglected and orphan diseases. The 
survey is part of a research project conducted at the University of Bielefeld (Germany) 
School of Public Health; its objective is to gather experts' opinions on possible solutions 
for the existing deficits in neglected disease R&D, with a special focus on mechanisms 
contained in orphan drug regulations and in the draft Medical Research and Development 
Treaty.
The questionnaire will take about 10 minutes to complete. The following link is your 
personal access code to the survey: 
#code_complete#. 
The link will be active until March 29, 2008, when we will close the first round, evaluate 
the results and open the second (and last) round. A request to participate in the second 
round will then be sent to all first-round participants.
We would be very grateful if you contributed your expertise to the survey!
Thank you very much for your time and support.
Sincerely,
Prof. Dr. Oliver Razum, MD, MSc
Prof. Dr. Petra Thürmann, MD
(Project Chairs)
Angela Fehr, M.A. (USA)
(Research Coordinator)
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
Users Online:


	


	
Date (GMT):
10.07.2008 19:02:45
Local date (+0:00):
10.07.2008 19:02:45
 
Mailvorschau
Absender: Angela Fehr <Delphi_Survey@gmx.net>
Betreff: Research Project "Neglected and Orphan Diseases"
Mailtext:
Dear Professor / Dr. #u_name#,
You were so kind to participate in the first round of a Delphi survey which the University of 
Bielefeld (Germany) School of Public Health conducts as part of a research project on 
neglected and orphan diseases. The aim of this project is to gather experts' opinions on 
possible solutions for the existing deficits in neglected disease R&D.
117 experts participated in the first round of survey. We have received many comments and 
suggestions, and we are very grateful that today we can present you with a much more 
differentiated list of options to rank and choose from.
The principle of a Delphi survey is to share the revised version of the questionnaire with the 
same panel of experts and ask them for their opinion again.
The questionnaire for the second round of survey opens when you click on the following link: 
#code_complete#. It contains new and modified items, frequency distributions from the first 
round as well as participants' comments on specific items and on the survey as such.
We would be very grateful if you shared your opinion and participated in the second round of 
this survey. We sincerely hope that our research project can make a contribution to the 
ongoing international debate, both in terms of its outcome and of its methodological 
approach, on the global issue of neglected diseases.
Thank you very much for your time and support!
Sincerely,
Prof. Dr. Oliver Razum, MD, MSc
Prof. Dr. Petra Thürmann, MD
(Project Chairs)
Angela Fehr, M.A. (USA)
(Research Coordinator)
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Mailvorschau
Absender: abfberlin@gmx.net
Betreff: Research Project "Neglected and Orphan Diseases" - 2nd Round of Survey
Mailtext:
Dear Professor / Dr. #u_name#,
You were so kind to participate in the first round of a Delphi survey on neglected and orphan diseases in March. This Delphi 
Survey is designed as a discussion process among experts. So, unlike an opinion survey, it is conducted in several rounds. 
We are now in the second round, and have put a new questionnaire online. It contains new items which were suggested by 
the experts in the first round. Additionally, the results of the previous round as well as comments and explanatory notes 
received by the participants of the first round are made available.
We are contacting you because according to the survey software you have not accessed the questionnaire or have not filled 
it out completely. We would like to cordially remind you of the upcoming deadline and ask you to participate in the second 
round (which will also be the last round). To complete the questionnaire, please click on the following link which is your 
personal access code: 
#code_complete#
The questionnaire can be accessed until August 6, 2008. Participants who have already completed the questionnaire 
needed about 15 minutes to fill it out. Please contact us if you have any questions regarding this survey or technical 
difficulties in accessing the questionnaire. In case you do not wish to proceed with the questionnaire we would like to 
sincerely thank you for your contribution to the first round of survey!
Thank you very much for your contribution to this research project conducted at the University of Bielefeld (Germany), 
School of Public Health!
Sincerely,
Prof. Dr. Oliver Razum, MD, MSc
Prof. Dr. Petra Thürmann, MD
(Project Chairs)
Angela Fehr, M.A. (USA)
(Research Coordinator)
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Mailvorschau
Absender: abfberlin@gmx.net
Betreff: Delphi Survey Second Round
Mailtext:
Dear Professor / Dr. #u_name#,
At the request of some participants who were unable to complete the questionnaire until August 6, we extend the time for 
the survey until Friday, August 15, 2008.
With kind regards,
Angela Fehr
Research Coordinator
Your link to the survey:
#code_complete#
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